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ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN INAZU: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly 
(Under the direction of Jeff Spinner-Halev) 
 
 
The freedom of assembly has been at the heart of some of the most important 
social movements in American history: Antebellum abolitionism, women’s suffrage in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the labor movement in the Progressive era and the 
New Deal, and the Civil Rights movement.  But in the past thirty years, assembly has 
become little more than an historical footnote in American political theory and law.  At 
least part of the reason for its loss is attributable to the judicially recognized right of 
association that emerged in the middle of the twentieth century.  After tracing the 
histories of assembly and association and the political, jurisprudential, and theoretical 
factors that shaped the modern right of association, I argue that the shift from assembly to 
association undermines the principle of group autonomy for at least three reasons: (1) 
associations acceptable to a national consensus replace dissenting assemblies; (2) the 
public assembly becomes the private and depoliticized association; and (3) the assembly 
as form of expression becomes the association as means of expression.  I offer a legal and 
theoretical roadmap for a return to assembly that can reclaim some of the autonomy for 
groups that has been sacrificed by the freedom of association.  I also suggest how some 
religious groups might discover greater theoretical and theological resources in assembly. 
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Introduction 
The freedom of assembly has been at the heart of some of the most important 
social movements in American history: Antebellum abolitionism, women’s suffrage in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the labor movement in the Progressive era and the 
New Deal, and the Civil Rights movement.  Claims of assembly stood against the 
ideological tyranny that exploded during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding 
World War I and the second Red Scare of 1950s’ McCarthyism.  Abraham Lincoln once 
called “the right of the people peaceably to assemble” part of “the Constitutional 
substitute for revolution.”1  In 1939, the popular press heralded assembly as one of the 
“four freedoms” at the core of the Bill of Rights.  Even as late as 1973, John Rawls 
characterized it as one of the “basic liberties.”2  But in the past thirty years, the freedom 
of assembly has become little more than an historical footnote in American political 
theory and law.  Why has assembly so utterly disappeared from our democratic fabric?  
One might, with good reason, contend that the right of assembly has been 
subsumed into the rights of speech and association and that these rights adequately 
protect the people gathered.  On this account, contemporary free speech doctrine guards 
the best known form of assembly—the occasional gathering of temporary duration that 
                                                 
1Abraham Lincoln, Uncollected Letters of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Gilbert A. Tracy (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), 127.    
2John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 53.  Rawls usually 
refers to association rather than assembly in his later work.  See, e.g., John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 221 n.8.  But see 
ibid., 335 (mentioning assembly).   
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often takes the form of a protest, parade, or demonstration.3  Meanwhile, the judicially 
recognized right of association shelters forms of assembly that extend across time and 
place—groups like clubs, churches, and social organizations.  
This characterization of the rights of speech and association is not implausible.  
Indeed, it appears to be the approach assumed by a number of contemporary political 
theorists.4  But I want to suggest that something is lost when assembly is construed as 
either a moment of expression (when it is viewed as speech) or an expressionless group 
(when it is viewed as association).  Many group expressions are only fully intelligible 
against the lived practices that give them meaning.  The rituals and liturgy of religious 
worship often embody deeper meaning than that which would be ascribed to them by an 
outside observer.  The political significance of a women’s pageant in the 1920s would be 
lost without an understanding of why these women gathered or what they were doing 
with the rest of their lives.  And the creeds and songs recited by members of associations 
ranging from Alcoholics Anonymous to the Boy Scouts may reflect a way of living and 
system of beliefs that cannot be captured by a text or its utterance at any one event.5   
The Supreme Court has partially recognized the connections between the meaning 
of expression and the form of life that embodies that expression in its category of 
                                                 
3Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
4See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in 
Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Amy Gutmann, ed., 
Freedom of Association, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Rawls, 
Political Liberalism.  
5The claim about intelligibility is not meant to be universal.  Some people who gather in 
single instances of fixed duration may present a relatively coherent message absent any 
shared practices or history.  A group of strangers that meets in front of a prison to protest 
an execution is one example. 
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expressive association.6  But by privileging intimate over expressive association and 
declaring the latter merely instrumentally valuable to other modes of communication, the 
Court obfuscates the critical role that a group’s practices and identity play in its 
expression. But this is to get ahead of the story.  For the Court’s distinction between 
intimate and expressive association is but itself a reconfiguration of a right of association 
that already marked a significant shift in the constitutional framework for protecting 
group autonomy.  The original framework—and, I believe, the better one—lies in the 
freedom of assembly. 
 
A.  THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 
The differences between assembly and association are more than semantic.  The 
shift in the constitutional framework brought with it three changes: (1) dissenting and 
destabilizing groups protected by the right of assembly were displaced by a right of 
association bounded by a national consensus; (2) practices that constituted public life in 
the context of the right of assembly were depoliticized and privatized by a right of 
association that developed contemporaneously with a dispersion of public power and a 
narrowing of the scope of what comprised the political; and (3) assemblies that were 
forms of expression were replaced by associations that were merely means of 
expression.7  In other words, with association came the loss of the dissenting, public, and 
expressive assembly.  
                                                 
6See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
7Cf. Ken I. Kersch, “’Guilt By Association’ and the Postwar Civil Libertarians,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 25 (2008): 55 (the right of association is “commonly considered 
as an instrument for vindicating high-status (First Amendment) rights claims, like 
freedom of religion and freedom of speech, which, as first-order rights, are defended not 
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The constitutional right of association underwrites a political theory whose 
espoused tolerance ends with groups that challenge its fundamental assumptions.  This 
weakened understanding of group autonomy opens the door for the liberal state to 
demand what Nancy Rosenblum has called a “logic of congruence” requiring “that the 
internal life and organization of associations mirror liberal democratic principles and 
practices.”8  William Galston intimates that such a result undermines liberalism itself: 
“[l]iberalism requires a robust though rebuttable presumption in favor of individuals and 
groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in 
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value.”9  
We do not live under Galston’s “rebuttable presumption.”  If we did, we might 
hear more about polygamist Mormons, communist schoolteachers, all-male Jaycees, 
peyote smoking Native Americans, and even racist homeowners.  And while today’s 
cultural and legal climate raises the most serious challenges to practices at odds with 
liberal democratic values, the eclectic collection of groups that have at one time or 
another been silenced and stilled in the absence of a meaningful right of assembly cuts 
across political and ideological boundaries.  I believe that the broad appeal of assembly to 
these groups of markedly different ideologies makes it a better “fit” than association 
                                                                                                                                                 
as instruments indispensable to the exercise of other rights but rather on their own 
substantive terms”). 
8Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 36.  
9William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for 
Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3. 
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within the context of our nation’s legal and political heritage.10  But recognizing this fit 
requires knowing the story of the right of assembly. 
Learning an unfamiliar story is never easy, least of all in constitutional law.  The 
freedom of association is now firmly entrenched in our legal and political vernacular—by 
way of example, at least twenty-five federal district and appellate court opinions have 
referred to a nonexistent “freedom of association clause” in the United States 
Constitution.  In this context, it takes effort to envision a different understanding of the 
relationship between groups and the state.  Accordingly, part of my task is to cast a vision 
that requires creative engagement with regnant legal doctrine and political theory, 
particularly that espoused by the Supreme Court and its commentators over the past half-
century.  But this is a task worth doing.  Constitutional language—and the ways in which 
we use it or ignore it—matters to the views we form about the law.  Dismissing the right 
of assembly as an archaic concept that has little relevance to contemporary discussions 
about group autonomy ignores part of our democratic fabric and forgets those who have 
insisted on the alternative kinds of political life that have existed in the shadow of the 
state.  
 
B.  THE RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE 
Although there has been some debate as to whether “the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” 
                                                 
10By “fit,” I mean to suggest the coherence to an ongoing tradition and social practice 
intimated in different ways by both Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre.  See 
Ronald M. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986). Alasdair C. 
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981). 
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recognizes a single right to assemble for the purpose of petitioning the government or 
establishes both an unencumbered right of assembly and a separate right of petition, I will 
show that the Framers of the First Amendment understood assembly to encompass more 
than petition.  The first groups to invoke the freedom of assembly also construed it 
broadly.  At the end of the eighteenth century, the Democratic-Republican Societies 
emerging out of the increasingly partisan divide between Federalists and Republicans 
“invariably claimed the right of citizens to assemble.”11  During the antebellum era, 
policymakers in southern states recognized the significance of free assembly to public 
opinion and routinely prohibited its exercise among slaves and free blacks.  Meanwhile, 
female abolitionists and suffragists in the North organized their efforts around a particular 
form of assembly, the convention.   
Although courts and commentators lost sight of this lived history (due at least in 
part to a misreading of the text of the First Amendment’s assembly clause), the people 
claiming the right to assemble insisted on a richer meaning.  During the Progressive era, 
three political movements evidenced this more robust sense of assembly: a revitalized 
women’s movement, a surge in political activity among African-Americans, and an 
increasingly agitated labor movement.  The groups underlying these movements insisted 
that their public gatherings were no less political than the institutional structures they 
criticized.  Their gatherings included parades, pageants, and demonstrations, but also a 
new form of collective action, the labor strike.  
                                                 
11Philip S. Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (A Documentary 
Sourcebook) (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), 11. 
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In 1937, the Supreme Court made assembly applicable to state action in De Jonge 
v. Oregon.12  The right of assembly gained traction in cases like Herndon v. Lowry13 and 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,14 and it became one of the core 
democratic freedoms heralded in popular discourse.  But this recognition of assembly 
proved evanescent.  The Court failed to develop a coherent doctrinal approach, and cases 
involving the rights of “speech and assembly” routinely resolved the latter within the 
framework of the former. Although principles of assembly remained important in several 
cases overturning convictions of African-Americans who participated in peaceful civil 
rights demonstrations in the 1960s, the courts resolved most cases involving group 
autonomy without considering the right of assembly.  The Court, in fact, has not 
addressed an assembly claim in the last twenty years.   
 
C.  THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ERA 
At the same time that assembly began falling out of political and legal discourse, 
the Court shifted its constitutional focus to a new concept: association.  The development 
of constitutional association—and with it, the disappearance of assembly—in many ways 
depended upon surrounding contexts.  I divide these contexts into two eras.  The first, 
which I call the national security era, began in the late 1940s and lasted until the early 
1960s.  It formed the background for the initial recognition of the right of association in 
                                                 
12De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).   
13Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937). 
14Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
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NAACP v. Alabama.15  The second, which I call the equality era, spanned from the early 
1960s to the end of the twentieth century and included an important reinterpretation of 
the right of association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.16 
The right of association first emerged in the national security era.  During this 
time, three factors influenced its shaping: (1) the conflation of rampant anti-communist 
sentiment with the rise of the civil rights movement (a political factor); (2) infighting on 
the Court over the proper way to ground the right of association in the Constitution and 
the relationship between association and assembly (a jurisprudential factor); and (3) the 
pluralist political theory of mid-twentieth century liberalism that emphasized the 
importance of consensus, balance, and stability (a theoretical factor). 
The primary political factor that influenced the right of association was the 
historical coincidence of the Second Red Scare and the Civil Rights movement.  From the 
late 1940s to the early 1960s, the government’s response to the communist threat pitted 
national security interests against group autonomy.  These tensions were mimicked 
(albeit somewhat artificially) in the South when segregationists analogized the unrest 
stirred by the NAACP to the threats posed by communist organizations; segregationists 
even charged that communist influences had infiltrated the NAACP itself.  The Supreme 
Court responded unevenly, suppressing communist organizations in the name of order 
and stability but extending broad protections to civil rights groups.  
The jurisprudential factor shaping the right of association involved disagreement 
on the Court over its constitutional source.  The issue was most evident when the Court 
                                                 
15NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).   
16Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
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applied the right of association to limit state (as opposed to federal) law.  Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan argued that association constrained state action because it, like 
other rights, could be derived from the “liberty” of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Warren insisted that 
association was located in some aspect of the First Amendment and argued that it be 
given the same “preferred position” as other First Amendment rights.  On their view, 
association applied to the states because the Fourteenth Amendment had “incorporated” 
the provisions of the First Amendment.  At times, Black and Douglas also argued that the 
right of association was part of the right of assembly.  Although this argument received 
only minimal attention from the justices, it may have offered the most sensible and least 
complicated constitutional link for the right of association.  Instead, disagreement over 
liberty and incorporation framed the legal discussion that in turn shaped the right of 
association.  
The theoretical factor influencing the shaping of association was mid-twentieth 
century liberalism.  The political and legal battles over the right of association unfolded 
within an already narrowed discourse that began with pluralist claims about the 
relationship between groups and the state.  Arthur Bentley and Harold Laski advanced 
early versions of these claims during the first half of the twentieth century.  Postwar 
pluralists like David Truman and Robert Dahl popularized them in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Two pluralist assumptions aided the embrace of the constitutional right of association: (1) 
the balance and stability between groups; and (2) the “liberal consensus” of American 
politics.  Truman and Dahl supported these premises through appeals to the two great 
theorists of association in the American context: James Madison and Alexis de 
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Tocqueville.  While Madison and Tocqueville held different views about the inherent 
characteristics of groups, both theorists implicitly recognized that the capacity for groups 
to maintain autonomous practices detached from and even antithetical to the will of the 
majority was in some ways an anti-democratic freedom.  Mid-twentieth century pluralists 
never acquiesced in this description, assuming instead that groups maintained a 
harmonious existence with each other and with the state against a background of shared 
democratic values.  Groups that diverged significantly from these values found no place 
in the pluralist order or the constitutional protections for association that emerged within 
it.  
 
D.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF ASSOCIATION IN THE EQUALITY ERA 
I have called the second constitutional epoch of the right of association the 
equality era, which spans roughly from the mid-1960s to the end of the twentieth century.  
The equality era introduced its own political, jurisprudential, and theoretical factors that 
influenced associational freedom: (1) the pursuit of civil rights policy objectives through 
antidiscrimination legislation (a political factor); (2) the emergence of a constitutional 
right to privacy and the relationship between privacy and association (a jurisprudential 
factor); and (3) the prominence of Rawlsian liberalism and the academic and popular 
debates that unfolded within its parameters (a theoretical factor).   
The primary political factor affecting the right of association in the equality era 
involved ongoing efforts to attain meaningful civil rights for African Americans.  As the 
Civil Rights movement gained acceptance as part of the democratic creed, the focus of 
activists shifted from protecting their own associational freedom (as represented in cases 
 11 
like NAACP v. Alabama) to challenging segregationists’ “right to exclude.”  Questions 
over the limits of the right to exclude became increasingly complex when civil rights 
litigation moved from public to private settings.  
The jurisprudential factor in the equality era involved the right to privacy.  
Although privacy and association had been linked in some of the Court’s earliest cases on 
the freedom of association, new connections emerged when the Court first recognized a 
constitutional right to privacy in its 1965 decision, Griswold v. Connecticut.17  Because 
privacy, like association, appeared nowhere in the text of the Constitution, the Court’s 
earlier recognition of the right of association in NAACP v. Alabama became an important 
example of the kind “penumbral” reasoning underlying Griswold.  But there was a 
definitional problem with the meaning of associational privacy.  In contrast to the view of 
privacy as the guarantor of individual autonomy that Griswold came to represent, privacy 
in the early right of association cases had more to do with protecting the boundaries of 
group autonomy.  
The theoretical factor in the equality era was the rise of Rawlsian liberalism.  
Rawlsian questions about the relationship between liberty and equality and the meaning 
of justice dominated scholarly discussions about associational freedom.  Rawlsian 
premises also permeated the work of legal scholars like Kenneth Karst and Ronald 
Dworkin.  Dworkin’s recognition of rights as “trumps” revealed that Rawlsian liberalism 
shared Madisonian and Tocquevillean concerns about majoritarianism.  But unlike 
Madison’s factions and Tocqueville’s associations, the ostensibly neutral procedural 
devices of Rawls’s public reason and Dworkin’s law as integrity didn’t merely counter 
                                                 
17Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
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majoritarian influence.  Instead, they constrained group autonomy based on the nature of 
a group’s values and epistemology.    
The influence of Rawlsian liberalism and the two lines of cases that emerged over 
the right to exclude and the right to privacy coalesced in Roberts.  Justice Brennan’s 
opinion for the Court identified two separate constitutional sources for the right of 
association in earlier cases.  One line of decisions protected “intimate association” as “a 
fundamental element of personal liberty.”  Another set of decisions guarded “expressive 
association,” which was “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those 
activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress 
of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”  Intimate and expressive association created a 
bifurcated approach to the right of association: any group that the Court classified as an 
expressive association would be relegated to a lower constitutional status.  Sixteen years 
later, the Court reaffirmed this fundamental distinction in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale.18   
 
E.  RECOVERING THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 
The disappearance of assembly from legal and political discourse is intriguing in a 
country that attaches so much importance to the Bill of Rights in general and the First 
Amendment in particular.  It may be that the principles encapsulated in the constitutional 
right of association embrace a broader kind of group autonomy than assembly.  But I 
suspect otherwise.  I have suggested that the loss of assembly weakens group autonomy 
by suppressing dissent, privatizing action, and constraining expression.  These changes 
                                                 
18Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
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are related to each other: they are all methods of control.  Collectively, they open the door 
for the state to impose meaning, purpose, and value on groups and their activities.  In 
other words, they deny that “the activity of rendering the world a meaningful place by 
generating narratives and norms requires space for groups of people gathered apart from 
the state and bound to come into conflict with it.”19 
In my view, this limiting of group autonomy is bad for liberalism in almost all 
cases even when it results from efforts to advance other liberal values like self-respect or 
equality.  This is because group autonomy stands as the fundamental liberal restraint 
against the overreaching of government into the lives and practices of its citizens.  The 
problem with privileging values other than group autonomy is related to the 
communitarian insight that liberalism is incapable of enforcing content-free values.  
When liberalism forces a group to recognize self-respect or equality among its members, 
it inescapably enforces liberal conceptions of those values.  Doing so replaces 
independent flourishing and diversity with liberalism’s own conception of the good.  
Group autonomy differs from other liberal principles because it operates simply as a 
boundary.  It creates a space for a group to manifest its own form of life without seeking 
to structure, shape, or transform that way of life.   
The right of peaceable assembly offers a constitutional framework for protecting 
this kind of group autonomy.  In my view, this framework is divisible into two stages.  
The first stage asks which groups fit within the category of peaceable assembly.  I 
propose that groups must be: (1) nongovernmental; (2) nonprofit; (3) externally 
                                                 
19Martha Minow, “Introduction,” in Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of 
Robert Cover, eds. Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992), 8 (describing the views of Robert Cover). 
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peaceable; and (4) internally peaceable.   Groups that meet these threshold characteristics 
should be given a presumption of legitimacy and their autonomy should be upheld in 
almost all cases.  There will, however, be rare occasions when countervailing concerns 
override a claim to peaceable assembly.  Those instances will require a balancing of 
interests, but this balancing will need to proceed apart from worn notions like strict 
scrutiny, which are too apt to defer to standards announced in earlier cases (like Roberts).  
A strong recognition of group autonomy through the right of peaceable assembly will 
necessarily allow some undesirable practices to flourish.  But the alternative of 
excessively suppressing group autonomy in the interests of liberal conformity risks 
endorsing the hegemonic tendencies of the state about which liberalism portends. 
 
F.  THEORIZING RELIGIOUS ASSEMBLY 
At one point in our constitutional history, religious groups received protection 
from state interference under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.  But the 
traditional view that religion occupies a special place in American political thought and 
constitutional law has come under fire in recent years.  Claims to religious freedom have 
increasingly been resolved under an attenuated free exercise framework or treated as 
analogous to speech or association claims.  I briefly explore the weaknesses of these 
approaches and contend that the First Amendment’s right of assembly offers a more 
robust protection for religious group autonomy.  My argument for assembly is in large 
part theological (and more specifically, Augustinian) and assumes that religious groups 
seek to live out of a competing political space rather than be absorbed into the unitary 
political space of the nation-state. 
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I turn to Augustinian theology because an important premise of my argument for 
the dissenting, public, and expressive assembly is that meaning, purpose, and value 
should not be imputed to a group by the state.  For this reason, an understanding of 
assembly must be justifiable not only from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism but 
also from within the particular traditions that lay claim to assembly.  The kinds of 
arguments and modes of reasoning of those traditions may differ from those advanced by 
the state and may at times even challenge the state’s fundamental claims to power and 
authority, and this kind of tradition-dependent argument finds expression in many 
religious groups. 
Consistent with the three aspects of assembly that I have highlighted, I divide my 
Augustinian narrative into the dissenting, public, and expressive aspects.  My first claim 
is that an Augustinian assembly is inherently dissenting.  This is not self-evident in 
Augustine’s writing but requires a nuanced consideration of the relationship that he posits 
between the earthly city and the heavenly city.  While these concepts do not correspond 
to “church” and “state,” they do provide insights into how the church both embodies a 
sociological form of the heavenly city and makes use of the earthly peace.  Augustine 
objects primarily to the earthly city’s orientation to earthly goods, and it is from this 
orientation that the church necessarily dissents.    
My second claim is that an Augustinian assembly is public.  Augustine’s 
distinction between the two cities means that the church, insofar as it reflects the 
heavenly city, exists as its own public and political space.  But Augustine is even more 
subversive than simply insisting on a public space for the church.  As Rowan Williams 
suggests, Augustine’s argument is “designed to show that it is life outside the Christian 
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community which fails to be truly public, authentically political.”20  For Augustine, then, 
the church as the sociological form of the heavenly city is the true public that is also 
political.  Because the church as public can never be privatized or depoliticized, it will 
always require an accounting by the government that rules the earthly city.   
My third claim is that an Augustinian assembly exists as a form of expression 
rather than a means of expression.  The starting point for this understanding is 
Augustine’s understanding of sign (signum), thing (res), and sacrament (sacramentum).  
The church does not rest on foundationalist claims but instead manifests its ethics 
through its shared practices (sacraments) that constitute a form of life pointing toward to 
the heavenly city.  This assembly is not merely an “expressive association” that facilitates 
other forms of communication; the most important aspects of its message flow out of its 
practices and cannot be reduced to mere words.  
After sketching a theological framework for the dissenting, public, and expressive 
assembly, I turn to considering some of its implications in American constitutional law.  
My argument is that Christian practices understood in the Augustinian sense that I have 
described can flourish within the constitutional framework of assembly.  An Augustinian 
conception of assembly does not provide a comprehensive solution to the problems 
plaguing the First Amendment’s religion clause jurisprudence.  Its focus on the internal 
practices of groups has little to say about concerns for a return of prayer in public 
schools, the posting of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms, the display of nativity 
scenes on public property, or the inclusion of creation science in educational curricula.  
Nor does assembly resolve claims about wholly individualistic religious belief that has 
                                                 
20Rowan Williams, “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God” Milltown 
Studies 19/20 (1987): 58. 
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nothing to do with the shared practices of a group.  Finally, although a more nuanced 
concept of assembly might provide guidance for cases involving the use or denial of 
public funds or resources, the assembly that I have sketched here does not address those 
situations.  It does not resolve questions of “equal access” to public property or funding.  
Nor does it answer questions of entitlement to unemployment benefits or tax exemptions.  
It may be that some or all of these matters can appeal to other aspects of the First 
Amendment, but they lie beyond the concern of the right of assembly.   
What assembly does offer is protection for the membership, hiring, educational, 
and worship practices of groups.  It extends beyond Augustinian Christianity to endorse 
the Court’s decisions permitting Mormons to terminate the employment of a building 
engineer not in good standing with their church21 and the Amish to disregard compulsory 
school attendance laws in the interests of protecting their children from worldly 
influences.22  Conversely, this kind of assembly challenges the Court’s curtailment of 
peaceable but unpopular activities like Mormon polygamy23 and the use of peyote in 
Native American religious ceremonies.24  My Augustinian conception of assembly is 
limited in scope and will not satisfy all religious believers.  Yet it may be the case that 
assembly offers a possibility that is neither political liberalism nor theocratic hegemony.   
 
 
                                                 
21Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).  
22Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
23Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
24Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
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G.  STARTING A CONVERSATION 
It should be apparent by now that I believe addressing questions about group 
autonomy and the differences between assembly and association requires an 
interdisciplinary approach.  The important issues surrounding the relationship of groups 
to the state cannot be addressed solely through a theoretical lens that forgets legal history 
or a doctrinal legal lens that ignores political context.  Nor can theological voices be 
ignored in questions about religious groups or ontological claims about the state.   
The greatest challenge to an interdisciplinary conversation is the same one that 
complicates understandings of group autonomy: the ease and frequency with which we 
gloss over and caricature unfamiliar ways of knowing and doing.  Part of the value of 
interdisciplinary work is the reminder that the meaning and significance of texts and 
events is not exhausted by a parochial or canonical reading from a specific discipline; so 
too, the meaning and significance of group life cannot adequately be captured by the 
uncharitable or monolithic description of a court or government official.  Rather, we must 
always keep in mind the kinds of questions that call us to the best interpretation of the 
words and practices we are trying to describe.25   Our conversation about meaning must 
be dialogical and ongoing, and it requires the ability to listen as well as the ability to 
speak. 
                                                 
25James Boyd White suggests four fundamental questions: (1) How is the world of nature 
defined and presented in the language we encounter? (2) What social universe is 
constituted in this discourse? (3) What are the central terms of meaning and value in this 
discourse, and how do they function with one another to create patterns of motive and 
significance? and (4) What forms and methods of reasoning are held out here as valid?  
James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions 
of Language, Character, and Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
10-12. 
  
I.  The Right Peaceably to Assemble 
In the pages that follow, I trace the story of the freedom of assembly.  This is the 
right of assembly “violently wrested” from slave and free African Americans in the South 
and denied to abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison in the North.  It is the freedom 
recognized in tributes to the Bill of Rights across the nation as America entered the 
Second World War—at the very time it was denied to 120,000 Japanese Americans.  It is 
the right placed at the core of democracy by eminent twentieth-century Americans as 
diverse as Dorothy Thompson, Zechariah Chafee, Louis Brandeis, Orson Welles, and 
Eleanor Roosevelt.  
I begin by examining the constitutional grounding of assembly in the Bill of 
Rights.  I then explore the use of assembly in legal and political discourse in six periods 
of American history: (1) the closing years of the eighteenth century that brought the first 
test of assembly through the Democratic-Republican societies; (2) the appeals to 
assembly in the suffragist and abolitionist movements of the antebellum era;  (3) the 
narrowing of the constitutional right of assembly by the Supreme Court following the 
Civil War; (4) the claims of assembly by suffragists, civil rights activists, and organized 
labor during the Progressive era; (5) the rhetorical high point of assembly between the 
two World Wars; and (6) the end of assembly amidst mid-twentieth century liberalism 
and the rise of the freedom of association. 
As I recount the role of assembly in the political history of the United States, I 
pay particular attention to three of its characteristics.  First, groups invoking the right of 
assembly have inherently been those that dissent from the majority and consensus 
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standards endorsed by government.  Second, claims of assembly have always been public 
claims that advocate for a visible political space distinguishable from government.  
Finally, manifestations of assembly have always themselves been forms of expression—
parades, strikes, and demonstrations, but also more creative forms of engagement like 
pageants, religious worship, and the sharing of meals.  The groups that have gathered 
throughout our nation’s history display these three themes of the dissenting, public, and 
expressive assembly.  Theirs is the story of the forgotten freedom of assembly. 
 
A.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 
I begin with the text of the First Amendment, and with a textual observation.  As 
an historical matter, we should not make too much of slight variations in wording, 
grammar, and punctuation in constitutional clauses.1  There is little indication that the 
Framers applied our level of exegetical scrutiny to the texts that they considered and 
created.  But because modern constitutional law sometimes parses wording more 
carefully, our current arguments are constrained by the precise text handed down to us.  
And so it is nevertheless a useful exercise to consider forensically the text that survived 
and the text that did not.  
 
                                                 
1Caleb Nelson cautions against placing too much reliance on punctuation in the 
Constitution because at the time of the Founding “punctuation marks [were] thought to 
lack the legal status of words.”  Caleb Nelson, "Preemption," Virginia Law Review 86 
(2000), 258.  He notes that “[t]he ratification of the Constitution by the states reflects this 
relatively casual attitude toward punctuation” because many states that incorporated a 
copy of the Constitution in the official form of ratification varied its punctuation.”  Ibid., 
259, n.102.  Nelson cites as an example the copy of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania 
form of ratification, which used “different punctuation marks than the Constitution 
engrossed at the Federal Convention” in roughly thirty-five places.  Ibid.  
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1.  The Common Good 
The most important aspect of the clause containing the constitutional right of 
assembly may be three words missing from its final formulation: the common good.  Had 
antecedent versions of the assembly clause prevailed in the debates over the Bill of 
Rights and lawful assembly been limited to purposes serving the common good, the kinds 
of dissenting and disfavored groups that have sought refuge in its protections may have 
met with far less success.  Assembly for the common good would have endorsed the 
consensus narrative advanced by mid-twentieth century pluralism: we tolerate groups 
only to the extent that they serve the national interest and thereby strengthen the stability 
and vitality of democracy.  The Framers decided otherwise.  
When the First Congress convened in 1789 to draft amendments to the 
Constitution, it took under consideration proposals submitted by the various states.  
Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical amendments covering the rights of 
assembly and petition: 
That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for 
the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every 
freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for redress of 
grievances.2 
 
New York and Rhode Island offered slightly different wording, emphasizing that the 
people assembled for “their” common good rather than “the” common good: 
That the People have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for 
their common good, or to instruct their Representatives; and that every 
                                                 
2Neil H. Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 140.  This language is substantially similar 
to declarations in North Carolina and Pennsylvania in 1776 that “the people have a right 
to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, 
and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.” 
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person has a right to Petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of 
Grievances.3  
 
On June 8, 1789, Madison’s proposal to the House favored the possessive pronoun over 
than the definite article: 
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and 
consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by 
petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.4  
 
Whether intentional or not, the recognition of the common good of the people who 
assemble rather than the common good of the state signaled that the interests of the 
people assembled need not align with the interests of the ruling order.  
The point was not lost during the House debates.  When Thomas Hartley of 
Pennsylvania contended that, with respect to assembly, “every thing that was not 
incompatible with the general good ought to be granted,”5 Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts replied that if Hartley “supposed that the people had a right to consult for 
the common good” but “could not consult unless they met for that purpose,” he was in 
fact “contend[ing] for nothing.”6  In other words, if the right of assembly encompassed 
only the common good as understood by the state, then its use as a means of protest or 
dissent would be eviscerated.7   
                                                 
3Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights, 129. 
4Ibid.  
5Congressional Register, August 15, 1789, vol. 2, quoted in Cogan, The Complete Bill of 
Rights, 145. 
6Ibid. 
7Cf. Melvin Rishe, "Freedom of Assembly," DePaul Law Review 15 (1965): 337 (“Were 
the courts truly bound to delve into whether or not an assembly served the common good, 
it is likely that many assemblies that have been held to be protected by the constitution 
would lose this protection.”). 
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On August 24, 1789, the House approved a version of the amendment that 
retained the reference to “their common good” and also incorporated the rights of speech 
and press:  
The freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to 
the government for redress of grievances shall not be infringed.8   
 
Eleven days later, the Senate defeated a motion to strike the reference to the common 
good.9  But the following week, the text inexplicably dropped out when the Senate 
merged language pertaining to religion into the draft amendment.10   
 
 
  2. Assembly and Petition 
The striking of the reference to the common good may have been intended to 
broaden the scope of the assembly clause, but it also introduced a textual ambiguity.  
Without the prepositional “for their common good” following the reference to assembly, 
the text now described “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”  This left ambiguous whether the amendment 
                                                 
8Ibid., 143.  This version also changed the semi-colon after “common good” to a comma. 
9Senate Journal (1st Congress) (September 3, 1789): 70. The following day the Senate 
adopted similar language: “That Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press, or the [r]ight of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for 
their common good, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  Ibid., 
September 4, 1789, 71. 
10“Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition to the government for the 
redress of grievances.”  Ibid., September 9, 1789, 77.  The amendment took its final form 
on September 24, 1789: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.”  Cogan, Complete Bill of Rights, 136. 
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recognized a single right to assemble for the purpose of petitioning the government or 
whether it established both an unencumbered right of assembly and a separate right of 
petition.   
In one of the only recent considerations of assembly in the First Amendment, 
Jason Mazzone argues in favor of the former.11  Mazzone suggests that: 
There are two clues that we should understand assembly and petition to 
belong together.  The first clue is the use of “and to petition,” which 
contrasts with the use of “or” in the remainder of the First Amendment’s 
language.  The second clue is the use of “right,” in the singular (as in “the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition”), rather than the 
plural “rights” (as in “the rights of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition”).  The prohibitions on Congress’ power can therefore be 
understood as prohibitions with respect to speech, press, and assembly in 
order to petition the government.12     
 
Mazzone’s interpretation is problematic because the comma preceding the phrase “and to 
petition” appears to be residual from the earlier text that had described the “right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”13  Whether left in deliberately or inadvertently, 
                                                 
11Jason Mazzone, "Freedom's Associations," Washington Law Review 77 (2002).  But see 
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998): 26 (referring to assembly and petition as separate clauses); 
William W. Van Alystyne, First Amendment: Cases and Materials (Westbury: 
Foundation Press, 1995): 32 (referring to a distinct “‘peaceably to assemble’ clause”);  
James E. Leahy, The First Amendment: 1791-1991: Two Hundred Years of Freedom 
(Jefferson: McFarland and Co., 1991): 202 (“The final wording of the First Amendment 
indicates that the first Congress intended to protect the right of the people to assemble for 
whatever purposes and at the same time to be assured of a separate right to petition the 
government if they chose to do so.”). 
12Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 712-13.  
13Cogan, Complete Bill of Rights, 143.  The earlier version derived in turn from 
Madison’s draft.  Ibid., 129.  Mazzone recognizes that “in Madison’s draft, assembly is 
separated from petitioning by a semi-colon, perhaps indicating that while the right of 
assembly is related to the right of petition, assembly is not necessarily limited to 
formulating petitions.”  Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 715 n.409. 
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the comma relates back to a distinction between a right to peaceable assembly and a right 
to petition.14  Moreover, at least some members of the First Congress appeared to have 
conceived of a broader notion of assembly, as evidenced by an exchange between 
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts and John Page of Virginia during the House 
debates over the language of the Bill of Rights.  Sedgwick criticized the proposed right of 
assembly as redundant in light of the freedom of speech: 
If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it 
is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly 
a thing that never would be called in question; it is derogatory to the 
dignity of the House to descend to such minutiae.15  
 
Page responded that Sedgwick: 
. . . supposes [the right of assembly] no more essential than whether a man 
has a right to wear his hat or not, but let me observe to him that such rights 
have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to pull of his hat when he 
appeared before the face of authority; people have also been prevented 
from assembling together on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to 
guard against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the 
declaration of rights; if the people could be deprived of the power of 
assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every 
other privilege contained in the clause.16  
 
                                                 
14Mazzone addresses the comma in a footnote and argues that because it “mirrors the 
comma” preceding the words “or prohibit the free exercise thereof” in the first half of the 
First Amendment, “[i]t does not therefore signal a right of petition separate from the right 
of assembly.”  Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 713 n.392.  The argument for textual 
parallelism doesn’t hold because the free exercise clause explicitly refers back to 
“religion” (before the comma) with the word “thereof.”  A closer parallel—which 
illustrates the problem with Mazzone’s interpretation—is the suggestion that the comma 
separating speech and press connotes that they embody only a singular freedom. 
15Cogan, Complete Bill of Rights, 144.  
16Ibid. (quoting Congressional Register, August 15, 1789, vol. 2).  
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Irving Brant notes that while Page’s allusion to a man without a hat is lost on a 
contemporary audience, “[t]he mere reference to it was equivalent to half an hour of 
oratory” before the First Congress.17  Page was referring to the trial of William Penn.18   
On August 14, 1670, Penn and other Quakers had attempted to gather for worship 
at their meeting-house on Gracechurch Street, London, in violation of the 1664 
Conventicle Act that forbade “any Nonconformists attending a religious meeting, or 
assembling themselves together to the number of more than five persons in addition to 
members of the family, for any religious purpose not according to the rules of the Church 
of England.”19  Prevented from entering by a company of soldiers, Penn began delivering 
a sermon to the Quakers assembled in the street.  Penn and a fellow Quaker, William 
Mead, were arrested and brought to trial in a dramatic sequence of events that included a 
contempt of court charge stemming from their wearing of hats in the courtroom.20  A jury 
acquitted the two men on the charge that their public worship constituted an unlawful 
                                                 
17Irving Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1965). 
18Ibid., 61. 
1916 Charles II c. 4 (1664).  The act was renewed in 1667 and again in 1670.  William 
Dixon, William Penn: An Historical Biography (Philadelphia: Blanchard and Lea, 1851), 
75, 76.  In 1715, an “Act for preventing Tumults and riotous Assemblies” made it a 
felony if twelve or more people unlawfully assembled failed to disperse within an hour 
after authorities read a proclamation.  George P. Smith, "The Development of the Right 
of Assembly: A Current Socio-Legal Investigation," William and Mary Law Review 9 
(1967): 359, 363 n.22.  This is the origin of the phrase “reading the Riot Act.”  Ibid. 
20Brant, Bill of Rights 57 (quoting Penn’s journal).  Penn and Mead were fined for 
contempt of court for wearing their hats after being ordered by an officer of the court to 
put them on.  Ibid.  
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assembly.  The case gained renown throughout England and the American colonies.21  
Brant reports that “[e]very Quaker in America knew of the ordeal suffered by the founder 
of Pennsylvania and its bearing on freedom of religion, of speech, and the right of 
assembly” and “[e]very American lawyer with a practice in the appellate courts was 
familiar with it, either directly or through its connection with its still more famous 
aftermath.”22  According to Brant: 
William Penn loomed large in American history, but even if he had never 
crossed the Atlantic, bringing the Quaker religion with him, Americans 
would have known about his ‘tumultuous assembly’ and his hat.  Few 
pamphlets of the seventeenth century had more avid readers than the one 
entitled ‘The People’s Ancient and Just Liberties, asserted, in the Trial of 
William Penn and William Mead at the Old Bailey, 22 Charles II 1670, 
written by themselves.’  Congressman Page had known the story from 
boyhood, reproduced in Emlyn’s State Trials to which his father 
subscribed in 1730. It was available, both in the State Trials and as a 
pamphlet, to the numerous congressmen who had used the facilities of the 
City Library of Philadelphia. Madison had an account of it written by Sir 
John Hawles, a libertarian lawyer who became Solicitor General after the 
overthrow of the Stuarts in 1688.23   
 
Congressman Page’s allusion to Penn made clear that the right of assembly under 
discussion in the House encompassed more than meeting to petition for redress of 
grievances: Penn’s ordeal had nothing to do with petition; it was an act of religious 
worship.  After Page spoke, the House defeated Sedgwick’s motion to strike assembly 
                                                 
21In addition to its pronouncement on the right of assembly, the case became an important 
precedent for the independence of juries.  Following their verdict of acquittal, the trial 
judge had imprisoned the jurors.  They were later vindicated in habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
22Ibid., 61. 
23Ibid., 56. 
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from the draft amendment by a “considerable majority.”24  On September 24, 1789, the 
Senate approved the amendment in its final form, and the subsequent ratification of the 
Bill of Rights in 1791 enacted “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”25    
The text handed down to us thus conveys a broad notion of assembly in two ways.  
First, it does not limit the purposes of assembly to the common good, implicitly allowing 
assembly for purposes that might be antithetical to the good (although constraining 
assembly to peaceable means).  Second, it does not limit assembly to the purposes of 
petitioning the government.  As we will see in this and later chapters, neither of these 
broad interpretations has been readily acknowledged in legal and political discourse.  But 
the larger vision of assembly can be found in the practices of people who have gathered 
throughout American history.  It is to these practices that I now turn. 
 
B.  THE FIRST TEST OF ASSEMBLY: THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES 
The nascent freedom of assembly faced an early challenge when the first 
sustained political dissent in the new republic emerged out of the increasingly partisan 
divide between Federalists and Republicans.  By the summer of 1792, Republican 
concern over the Federalist administration and its perceived support of the British in their 
conflict with the French had reached new levels of agitation.  The Republican-leaning 
                                                 
24Cogan, Complete Bill of Rights, 145 (quoting Congressional Register, August 15, 1789, 
vol. 2).    
25“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”  Ibid., 136. 
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National Gazette began calling for the creation of voluntary “constitutional” and 
“political” societies to critique the Washington Administration.26   
The first society organized in Philadelphia in March of 1793.27  Over the next 
three years, dozens more emerged throughout most of the major cities in the United 
States.28  These “Democratic-Republican” societies consisted largely of farmers and 
laborers wary of the aristocratic leanings of Hamilton and other Federalists, but they also 
included lawyers, doctors, publishers, and government employees.29  The largest 
society—the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania—boasted over 300 members.30 
The societies “invariably claimed the right of citizens to assemble.”31  A 1794 
resolution from a society in Washington, North Carolina, asserted that: “It is the 
unalienable right of a free and independent people to assemble together in a peaceable 
                                                 
26Robert M. Chesney, "Democratic-Republican Socieites, Subversion, and the Limits of 
Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic," University of North Carolina Law 
Review, 82 (2004): 1525, 1536 n.46. 
27Philip S. Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (A Documentary 
Sourcebook) (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976): 6. 
28Although the exact number is disputed, there were probably around forty societies.  
Chesney, “Democratic-Republican Societies,” 1537 n.52.   
29Foner, Democratic-Republican Societies, 7; Chesney, “Democratic-Republican 
Societies,” 1538 n.54; Eugene Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 
(Mornignside Heights, NY: Columbia University Press, 1942): 71-74.  The term 
“Democratic-Republican Societies” comes from historians.  Chesney, “Democratic-
Republican Societies,” 1527 n.5.   
30Foner, Democratic-Republican Societies, 7. 
31Ibid., 11. 
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manner to discuss with firmness and freedom all subjects of public concern.”32  That 
same year, the Boston Independent Chronicle declared that: 
Under a Constitution which expressly provides ‘That the people have a 
right in an orderly and peaceable manner to assemble and consult upon 
the common good,’ there can be no necessity for an apology to the public 
for an Association of a number of citizens to promote and cherish the 
social virtues, the love of their country, and a respect for its Laws and 
Constitutions.33 
 
The societies usually met monthly, although more frequently during elections or times of 
political crisis.34  Philip Foner reports that a large part of their activities consisted of 
“creating public discussions; composing, adopting, and issuing circulars, memorials, 
resolutions, and addresses to the people; and remonstrances to the President and the 
Congress—all expressing the feelings of the assembled groups on current political 
issues.”35 In Robert Chesney’s characterization, the societies “embodied an 
understanding of popular sovereignty and representation in which the role of the citizen 
was not limited to periodic voting, but instead entailed active and constant engagement in 
political life.”36  But in addition to meeting to discuss political issues, the societies also 
joined in the “extraordinarily diverse array of . . . feasts, festivals, and parades” that 
unfolded in the streets and public places of American cities.37  These gatherings were 
                                                 
32Ibid. (quoting North-Carolina Gazette (New Bern), April 19, 1974). 
33Ibid., 25 (quoting Independent Chronicle (Boston), January 16, 1794) (original 
emphasis).  It is unclear what authority the paper is quoting—the italicized text is not 
from the Constitution.   
34Ibid., 10. 
35Ibid.  
36Chesney, “Democratic-Republican Societies,” 1539. 
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self-consciously public expressions.  Simon Newman’s study of popular celebrations of 
this era reminds us that: 
Festive culture required both participants and an audience, and by printing 
and reprinting accounts of July Fourth celebrations and the like 
newspapers contributed to a greatly enlarged sense of audience: by the end 
of the 1790s those who participated in these events knew that their actions 
were quite likely going to be read about and interpreted by citizens far 
beyond the confines of their own community.38 
 
Celebrations of the French Revolution took on an especially partisan character 
when members and supporters of the Federalist party refused to participate in them.39  
Without the endorsement of the Federalist government, Republicans “were forced to 
foster alternative ways of validating celebrations that were often explicitly oppositional.” 
40  In doing so, they characterized their tributes as representing the unified views of the 
entire community rather than just political elites.  Newman writes that: 
The result of the Democratic Republican stratagem was that members of 
subordinate groups—including women, the poor, and black Americans, all 
of who were excluded from or had strictly circumscribed roles in the white 
male contests over July Fourth and Washington’s birthday celebrations—
found a larger role for themselves in French Revolutionary celebrations 
than in any of the other rites and festivals of the early American republic.41   
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The relatively egalitarian gestures of these celebrations were not well received by   
Federalists, who berated the women who participated in them with sarcasm and derision 
and raised fears about black participation in public events.42  
 Federalists became increasingly agitated with the growing popular appeal of the 
societies.  The pages of the pro-Federalist Gazette of the United States repeatedly warned 
that the societies were fostering disruptive tendencies and instigating rebellion.43  And 
while there was little basis in fact to suggest that the societies were behind the Whiskey 
Rebellion, the Federalist press quickly highlighted that several members of societies in 
western Pennsylvania had been actively involved in the insurrection.44   
Washington had been incensed by organized opposition to the whiskey tax, 
writing in a personal letter that while “no one denies the right of the people to meet 
occasionally, to petition for, or to remonstrate against, any Act of the Legislature,” 
nothing could be “more absurd, more arrogant, or more pernicious to the peace of 
Society, than for . . . a self created permanent body” that would pass judgment on such 
acts.45  He came to believe that the widespread public condemnation of the Whiskey 
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Rebellion had created a political opportunity for the “annihilation” of the societies.46   
Washington took clear aim at the societies in his annual address to Congress on 
November 19, 1794, asserting that “associations of men” and “certain self-created 
societies” had fostered the violent rebellion.47  Chesney suggests that “[t]he speech was 
widely understood at the time not as ordinary political criticism, but instead as a denial of 
the legality of organized and sustained political dissent.”48  And Irving Brant observes 
that “[t]he damning epithet ‘self-created’ indorsed the current notion that ordinary people 
had no right to come together for political purposes.”49  
The Federalist-controlled Senate issued a quick censure of the societies following 
Washington’s address.  The House, in contrast, entered an extended debate about the 
wording of its response, and assigned James Madison, Theodore Sedgwick, and Thomas 
Scott to draft a reply.  The Federalist Sedgwick, who years earlier had suggested that the 
freedom of assembly was so “self-evident” and “unalienable” that its inclusion in the 
Constitutional amendments was unnecessary, now argued in spite of the First 
Amendment that the societies’ efforts to organize were effectively illegal.50  But after 
four days of debate, Madison contended that a House censure would be a “severe 
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punishment” and would have dire consequences for the future of free expression.51  The 
final language in the House response was substantially more muted than that issued by 
the Senate.  
Following Washington’s address and the Congressional responses, “[s]pirited 
debates concerning the legitimacy of the societies were conducted in every community 
where a society existed.”52  Due in part to Washington’s wide popularity, public opinion 
turned the corner against the societies.  Many of them folded within a year of the 
President’s speech, and by the end of the decade, all had been driven out of existence.53  
Yet despite their relatively short duration, the societies’ influence was not 
inconsequential.  According to Foner, “[a]s a center of Republican agitation and 
propaganda . . . the societies did much to forge the sword that defeated Federalism and 
put Jefferson in the presidency.”54  And as significant as these first assemblies were the 
heavy-handed political attacks against them.  The vigorous resistance to the claims of the 
people assembled by those who held political power demonstrated the precarious nature 
of dissenting groups in the new republic.  
 
C.  ASSEMBLY IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA 
In spite of the fate of the Democratic-Republican societies, the idea that the 
people could assemble apart from the state continued to take hold in early American 
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political life.  Writing in 1838, the state theorist Francis Lieber described “those many 
extra-constitutional, not unconstitutional, meetings, in which the citizens either unite their 
scattered means for the obtaining of some common end, social in general, or political in 
particular; or express their opinion in definite resolutions upon some important point 
before the people.”55  These “public meetings” were undertaken for a variety of purposes:  
[T]hey are of great importance in order to direct public attention to 
subjects of magnitude, to test the opinion of the community, to inform 
persons at a distance, for instance, representatives, or the administration, 
of the state of public opinion respecting certain measures, whether yet 
depending or adopted; to resolve upon and adopt petitions, to encourage 
individuals or bodies of men in arduous undertakings, requiring the moral 
support of well-expressed public approbation; to effect a contract and 
connexion with others, striving for the same ends; to disseminate 
knowledge by way of reports of committees; to form societies for 
charitable purposes or the melioration of laws or institutions; to sanction 
by the spontaneous expression of the opinion of the community measures 
not strictly agreeing with the letter of the law, but enforced by necessity; 
to call upon the services of individuals who otherwise would not feel 
warranted to appear before the public and invite its attention, or feel 
authorized to interfere with a subject not strictly lying within their proper 
sphere of action; to concert upon more or less extensive measures of 
public utility, and whatever else their object may be.56  
 
A generation later, John Alexander Jameson referred to “wholly unofficial” gatherings 
and “spontaneous assemblies” that were protected by the right of peaceable assembly, a 
“common and most invaluable provision of our constitutions, State and Federal.”57  These 
assemblies were “at once the effects and the causes of social life and activity, doing for 
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the state what the waves do for the sea: they prevent stagnation, the precursor of decay 
and death.”58  They were “public opinion in the making,—public opinion fit to be the 
basis of political action, because sound and wise, and not a mere echo of party cries and 
platforms.”59   
Policymakers in southern states recognized the significance of free assembly to 
public opinion and routinely prohibited its exercise among slaves and free blacks.  A 
1792 Georgia law restricted slaves from assembling “on pretense of feasting.”60  In South 
Carolina, an 1800 law forbade “slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes” from 
assembling for “mental instruction or religious worship.”61  An 1804 Virginia statute 
made any meeting of slaves at night an unlawful assembly.62  In 1831, the Virginia 
legislature declared “[a]ll meetings of free Negroes or mulattoes at any school house, 
church, meeting house or other place for teaching them reading or writing, either in the 
day or the night” to be an unlawful assembly.63 
The restrictions on assembly intensified following Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion in 
Southampton County, Virginia.  Turner’s insurrection sent Virginia and other southern 
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states into a panic.64  Virginia Governor John Floyd made the rebellion the central theme 
of his December 5, 1831, address to the legislature.65  Floyd believed that black preachers 
were behind a broader conspiracy for insurrection and had acquired “great ascendancy 
over the minds of their fellows.”66  He argued that these preachers had to be silenced 
“because, full of ignorance, they were incapable of inculcating anything but notions of 
the wildest superstition, thus preparing fit instruments in the hands of crafty agitators, to 
destroy the public tranquility.”67 In response, the legislature strengthened Virginia’s black 
code by imposing additional restrictions on assembly for religious worship.68  
Concern over Turner’s rebellion also spawned additional restrictions on the 
assembly of slaves and free blacks in Maryland, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Alabama.69  By 1835, “most southern states had outlawed the right of assembly and 
organization by free blacks, prohibited them from holding church services without a 
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white clergyman present, required their adherence to slave curfews, and minimized their 
contact with slaves.”70  In 1836, Theodore Dwight Weld aptly referred to the oppressive 
restrictions on blacks as “‘the right of peaceably assembling’ violently wrested.”71 
The importance of assembly to religious worship and the felt impact of its loss is 
captured in the words of James Smith, the Methodist minister whose 1881 narrative 
detailed his experiences as a slave in Virginia: 
The way in which we worshiped is almost indescribable.  The singing was 
accompanied by a certain ecstasy of motion, clapping of hands, tossing of 
heads, which would continue without cessation about half an hour; one 
would lead off in a kind of recitative style, others joining in the chorus.  
The old house partook of the ecstasy; it rang with their jubilant shouts, and 
shook in all its joints. . . . When Nat Turner’s insurrection broke out, the 
colored people were forbidden to hold meetings among themselves.72   
 
The collective restrictions on assembly did not simply silence political dissent in a 
narrow sense; they were rather an assault on an entire way of life, suppressing worship, 
education, and community among slave and free African-Americans.73 
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At the same time that southern states increased their efforts to suppress the 
freedom of assembly for African-Americans, abolitionists in the North expanded their 
reliance on the constitutional right.  And because many abolitionists were women, 
freedom of assembly was “indelibly linked with the woman’s rights movement from its 
genesis in the abolition movement.”74  Female abolitionists and suffragists organized 
their efforts around a particular form of assembly: the convention.  The turn to the 
convention was not accidental.  Between 1830 and 1860, official conventions 
accompanied revisions to constitutions in almost every state.75  The focus of these official 
conventions on rights and freedoms provided a natural springboard for “spontaneous 
conventions” to criticize the blatant racial and gender inequalities perpetuated by the state 
constitutions.76   
Women held anti-slavery conventions in New York in 1837 and in Philadelphia in 
1838 and 1839.77  Two years after the 1848 Woman’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, 
New York, and less than a month before the official convention to revise the Ohio 
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constitution, a group of women assembled in Salem, Ohio, to call for equal rights for all 
people “without distinction of sex or color.”78  As Nancy Isenberg describes: 
[T]he Salem forum stood apart from the American political tradition.  
Activists used the meeting to critique politics as usual.  Women occupied 
the floor and debated resolutions and gave speeches, while the men sat 
quietly in the gallery.  Through a poignant reversal of gender roles, the 
women engaged in constitutional deliberation, and the men were relegated 
to the sidelines of political action.79 
 
In other words, the conventions conveyed the suffragist message of equality and signaled 
a disruption of the existing order not only in their words but in their very form of 
gathering.  
Women’s conventions often met with harsh resistance.  When Angelina and Sarah 
Grimké toured New England on a campaign for the American Anti Slavery Society in 
1837, they were rebuked for lecturing before “promiscuous audiences.”80  The following 
year, Philadelphia newspapers helped inspire a riotous disruption of the Convention of 
American Women Against Slavery that ended in the burning of Pennsylvania Hall.81  The 
participants of the 1850 Salem convention were denied the use of the local school and 
church.82  An 1853 women’s rights convention at the Broadway Tabernacle in New York 
degenerated into a shouting match when hecklers interrupted the speakers.  Rather than 
criticize the disruptive crowd, the New York Herald sardonically characterized the 
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gathering as the “Women’s Wrong Convention” and quipped that “[t]he assemblage of 
rampant women which convened at the Tabernacle yesterday was an interesting phase in 
the comic history of the nineteenth century.”83  The following year, the Sunday Times 
published an editorial using racial and sexual slurs to describe the national women’s 
rights convention in Philadelphia.84  Isenberg intimates that proponents of these attacks 
believed that “women’s unchecked freedom of assembly mocked all the restraints of 
civilized society.”85 
A striking example of the importance of free assembly to politically unpopular 
causes in the antebellum era occurred in 1835, when the Boston Female Anti-Slavery 
Society invited William Lloyd Garrison and the British abolitionist George Thompson to 
speak at its annual meeting.86  After the Society announced that the meeting would take 
place at the offices of Garrison’s Liberator, anti-abolitionists circulated a handbill, duly 
printed in the Boston Commercial Gazette: 
That infamous foreign scoundrel THOMPSON, will hold forth this 
afternoon, at the Liberator Office, No. 46 Washington street.  The present 
is a fair opportunity for the friends of the Union to snake Thompson out!  
It will be a contest between the abolitionists and the friends of the Union.  
A purse of $100 has been raised by a number of patriotic citizens to 
reward the individual who shall first lay violent hands on Thompson, so 
that he may be brought to the tar kettle before dark.  Friends of the Union, 
be vigilant!87   
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Despite the threat, the Society went forward with its meeting.  A large crowd gathered 
and soon turned riotous.  Unable to find Thompson, some of them called for Garrison’s 
lynching.  Garrison fled through a back entrance and barely escaped with his life.88   
Reflecting on the harrowing experience in the November 7, 1835 edition of The 
Liberator, Garrison lambasted the instigators of the riot in an editorial entitled “Triumph 
of Mobocracy in Boston”: 
Yes, to accommodate their selfishness, they declared that the liberty of 
speech, and the right to assemble in an associated capacity peaceably 
together, should be unlawfully and forcibly taken away from an estimable 
portion of the community, by the officers of our city—the humble servants 
of the people!  Benedict Arnold’s treachery to the cause of liberty and his 
bleeding country was no worse than this.89 
 
The Boston violence “became a cause célèbre among abolitionists who defended 
their right to free speech and assembly.”90  But fifteen years later, when Thompson 
returned to Boston to address the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society in Faneuil Hall, he 
was again driven away by a mob.91  Frederick Douglass referred to the latter incident as 
the “mobocratic violence” that had “disgraced the city of Boston.”92  In an 1850 address 
delivered in Rochester, New York, Douglass decried “[t]hese violent demonstrations, 
these outrageous invasions of human rights” and argued that “[i]t is a significant fact, that 
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while meetings for almost any purpose under heaven may be held unmolested in the city 
of Boston, that in the same city, a meeting cannot be peaceably held for the purpose of 
preaching the doctrine of the American Declaration of Independence, ‘that all men are 
created equal.’”93    
Slaves, suffragists, and abolitionists met with slanderous media coverage, blatant 
racial and sexual slurs, and even outright violence.  Yet they persisted as dissenting, 
public, and expressive assemblies.  These groups were political movements, to be sure, 
but they embodied and symbolized even larger societal and cultural challenges.  As Akhil 
Amar has argued, the movements of the disenfranchised brought “a different lived 
experience” to the words of the First Amendment’s assembly clause.94   
 
D.  ASSEMBLY IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH 
The decade following the Civil War saw a proliferation of large-scale voluntary 
associations.  Men who had met during the war formed groups like the Knights of Pythias 
in 1864 and the Patrons of Husbandry in 1867.95  Women launched the Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union in 1874.  But in the Reconstruction South, the most 
significant gatherings were by secret and violent societies of white supremacists. 
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1.  Assembly Perverted: White Supremacy and Violence 
The Ku Klux Klan formed in late 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee, and within five 
years “most white men in [the southeastern United States] either belonged to the 
organization or sympathized with it.”96  Charles Lane has chronicled the violence that 
immediately characterized Klan activities: 
In 1868, the Klan assassinated a Negro Republican congressman in 
Arkansas and three black Republican members of the South Carolina 
legislature—and in Camilla, Georgia, four hundred Klansmen, led by the 
sheriff, fired on a black election parade and hunted the countryside for 
those who fled, eventually killing or wounding more than twenty people.  
A Klan-led “nigger chase” in Laurens County, South Carolina, claimed 
thirteen lives in the fall of 1870.  Thanks in part to Klan intimidation of 
Republican voters—white and black—Democrats had returned to power in 
Alabama, Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia in the 1870 
elections.  This only seemed to encourage more Klan terror elsewhere.  In 
January 1871, five hundred masked men attacked the Union County jail in 
South Carolina and lynched eight black prisoners.  In March 1871, the 
Klan killed thirty Negroes in Meridian, Mississippi.97 
 
These criminal acts fell outside of the exercise of peaceable assembly, but they 
encountered little resistance in southern states where the rule of law itself was in 
question. 
 Responding in part to the Klan offensives, Congress passed the Enforcement Act 
of 1870 to federalize crimes that were going unpunished in southern jurisdictions.98  The 
Act relied on the powers granted Congress under the recently enacted Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.  Among other things, it prohibited conspiracy “to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and 
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enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws 
of the United States.”99  In October of 1870, the United States Attorney in Alabama 
indicted a number of Klansmen who had killed four and wounded fifty-four in an assault 
on a Republican campaign meeting in Eutaw, Alabama.100  The indictment charged that 
the Klansmen had conspired to violate the Republicans’ First Amendment rights of 
speech and assembly.101  Defense attorneys argued that the Bill of Rights applied to the 
federal government, not the states, and that the Fourteenth Amendment had not altered its 
scope.  In any case, they pointed out, the violence had been carried out by private 
individuals, not state officials.   
In United States v. Hall, Fifth Circuit Judge William Woods rejected both 
arguments.102  He concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment had made the rights of 
speech and assembly applicable to the states and had authorized Congress to enforce 
those rights against the states.  Moreover, the state need not have itself endorsed or 
carried out the violence because “denying the equal protection of the laws includes the 
omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection.”103  As Lane 
suggests, this meant that the federal government “had the power to protect freedmen not 
only from discriminatory state legislation but also from ‘state inaction, or 
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incompetency.’”104  Such a broad understanding of the right of assembly might have 
become one of the primary weapons to combat the Klan and other violent organizations 
set on suppressing the freedoms of black southerners.  
 
2.  Assembly Constrained: United States v. Cruikshank 
Woods’s interpretation would not last.  Its unraveling began in Grant Parish, 
Louisiana, one of the crucibles of white supremacist violence.  By the fall of 1871, whites 
in the area had formed a secret society “whose purpose was to kill or expel leading 
Republicans and prevent blacks from voting.”105  One report indicated the group had 360 
members, more than half of the adult white males in the parish.106  The unrest proved so 
unsettling that local Republican officials repeatedly requested the assistance of federal 
troops stationed in New Orleans.107  Tensions escalated even further after Republicans 
challenged the results of the 1872 elections around the state.  
The contested elections led to a particularly volatile situation in Grant Parish, 
where racist candidates claimed landslide victories despite the fact that registered black 
voters outnumbered whites and Republicans had won handily just two years before.108  In 
March of 1873, Republicans snuck into the parish courthouse in Colfax and swore in 
their candidates to the elected positions.  White supremacists from Grant and nearby 
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parishes converged on the courthouse, and black citizens moved in to defend it.  On April 
13th, Easter Sunday, the whites attacked the courthouse.  After a brief skirmish, the black 
citizens surrendered.  The white attackers then massacred dozens of their prisoners, 
including a number who were shot execution-style after being marched into the woods.109   
The federal government tried nearly one hundred white perpetrators of the Colfax 
Massacre for violations of the Enforcement Act.  Two counts of the indictments alleged 
that the defendants had prevented black citizens from enjoying their “lawful right and 
privilege to peaceably assemble together with each other and with other citizens of the 
United States for a peaceful and lawful purpose.”110  Only three defendants, William 
Cruikshank and two others, were convicted.  On appeal, Cruikshank and his co-
defendants contended that the First Amendment did not guarantee the right of assembly 
against infringement by private citizens.  The Supreme Court agreed, concluding in 
United States v. Cruikshank that the First Amendment: 
. . . assumes the existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful 
purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress. The right was 
not created by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, 
except as against congressional interference. For their protection in its 
enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States. The power for 
that purpose was originally placed there, and it has never been surrendered 
to the United States.111   
 
The Court stopped short of declaring the Enforcement Act unconstitutional, but the effect 
of the ruling made further prosecutions practically impossible.112   
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Cruikshank’s primary legal conclusion was that private citizens could not be 
prosecuted for denying the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly to other citizens.113  
But the Court’s dictum proved more significant than its holding.  Reiterating that the First 
Amendment established a narrow right enforceable only against the federal government, 
Chief Justice Waite wrote that:  
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of 
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else 
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an 
attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and 
guaranteed by, the United States.114   
 
In context, it is evident that Waite only listed petition as an example of the kind of 
assembly that the First Amendment protected against infringement by the federal 
government; the Constitution also guaranteed assembly “for any thing else connected 
with the powers of the duties of the national government,” which was as broadly as the 
right of assembly could be applied prior to its incorporation through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.115  But Waite’s reference to “[t]he right of the people peaceably to assemble 
for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances” came close to the text 
of the First Amendment.  Read in isolation from the qualifying language in the rest of 
                                                 
113This is a relatively uncontroversial proposition today, but it had severe implications for 
the protection of African-Americans in southern jurisdictions where the rule of law was 
in peril. 
114Ibid. 
115For most of our nation’s history, the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been 
considered enforceable only against the federal government, not against state and local 
government.  As Cruikshank demonstrates, the Court construed quite literally the First 
Amendment’s prohibition that “Congress shall make no law . . .”  The Court began to 
apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states following the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and recognized the applicability of assembly to the states in 
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).  See Chapter 2 for more discussion about the 
applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states. 
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Waite’s paragraph, the dictum could erroneously be construed as limiting assembly to the 
purpose of petition.116  
 
3.  Assembly Misconstrued: Presser v. Illinois 
Ten years after Cruikshank, William Woods made precisely this interpretive 
mistake in Presser v. Illinois.117  Woods, the same judge who prior to his elevation to the 
Supreme Court had held the right of assembly applicable to states and private actors in 
Hall, now reversed course and concluded that Cruikshank had announced that the First 
Amendment protected the right to assemble only if “the purpose of the assembly was to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”118  This misreading of Cruikshank is 
the only time that the Supreme Court has expressly limited the right of assembly to the 
                                                 
116It is likely that Waite was not engaging in a careful exegesis of the assembly clause: a 
few paragraphs earlier, he misquoted the constitutional text by omitting the word 
“peaceably” and the residual comma between the phrases “to assemble” and “and to 
petition.”   
117Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).   
118Ibid., 267. 
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purpose of petition.119  But Woods’s erroneous interpretation has been followed in 
decades of scholarship.120 
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Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
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concluded that “the right to assemble except for the purpose of petitioning the 
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Right or Judicial Technique," Virginia Law Review 46 (1960): 730, 736 (“The first case 
to construe this provision of the first amendment construed freedom of assembly to mean 
the right to assemble in order to petition the government.”); Charles E. Rice, Freedom of 
Association (New York: New York University Press, 1962): 109 (citing Cruikshank for 
the view that the language in the First Amendment “constituted the right of petition as the 
primary right, and the right of assembly as the ancillary right, thereby guaranteeing a 
right to assemble in order to petition”); Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and 
Association (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1961): 152 (“It is important 
to note that the Cruikshank dictum narrowed the federal right from that of ‘the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble and petition for a redress of grievances’ to ‘the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of 
grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National 
Government.”) (emphasis added);  Edward S. Corwin, Harold W. Chase and Craig R. 
Ducat, Edwin S. Corwin's The Constitution and What it Means Today, 14th Edition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978): 332 (citing Cruikshank for the view 
that historically “the right of petition is the primary right, the right peaceably to assemble 
a subordinate and instrumental right, as if Amendment I read: ‘the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble’ in order to ‘petition the government’”).  Presser has also been 
cited for the view that the freedom of assembly is limited to the purpose of petition. See 
Frank Easterbrook, "Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association," Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 10 (1987): 91 (citing Presser for the view that the freedom of 
assembly is “the exercise by groups of the right to petition for redress of grievances”). 
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E.  ASSEMBLY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
In spite of the Court’s construal of assembly in Cruikshank and Presser, the 
people claiming the right to assemble insisted on a far broader purpose and meaning.  
This more robust sense of the dissenting, public, and expressive assembly is most evident 
in three political movements of the Progressive era: a revitalized women’s movement, a 
surge in political activity among African-Americans, and an increasingly agitated labor 
movement.  Here are snapshots of each. 
 
  1.  Suffragists 
The new women’s movement began at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
“[h]undreds of thousands of women joined the thousands of clubs united under the 
auspices of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs and the National Association of 
Colored Women.”121  According to Linda Lumsden, these clubs “served as training 
grounds for the activist, articulate reformers who steered the suffrage movement in the 
1910s.”122  In 1908, various women’s clubs began holding “open-air” campaigns to draw 
attention to their interests:  
The success of the open-air campaigns helped prompt the organization of 
the first American suffrage parades, a more visible and assertive form of 
assembly.  The spectacle of women marching shoulder to shoulder 
achieved many ends.  One was that because of the press coverage parades 
attracted, suffrage became a nationwide issue.  Women also acquired 
organizational and executive skills in the course of orchestrating 
extravaganzas featuring tens of thousands of marchers, floats, and bands.  
Better yet, parades showcased women’s skills in these areas and 
emphasized their numbers and determination.  Finally, and most crucially, 
                                                 
121Lumsden, Rampant Women, 3. 
122Ibid., 3, 186 n.8. 
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marching together imbued women with a sense of solidarity that lifted the 
movement to the status of a crusade for many participants.123   
  
 As is often the case, the growth of local assemblies corresponded with the growth 
of the larger institutional structures that operated on a national level.124  The National 
American Woman Suffrage Association grew from 45,000 in 1907, to 100,000 in 1915, 
to almost two million in 1917.125  But the core of assembly in the women’s movement 
came through local networking and personal connections.  Women’s assemblies were not 
confined to traditional deliberative meetings but included banner meetings, balls, 
swimming races, potato sack races, baby shows, meals, pageants, and teatimes.126  Just as 
the Democratic-Republican Societies had earlier refused to limit their gatherings to 
formal meetings, the women’s movement capitalized on an expanded conception of 
public political life.  These gatherings appealed not only to reason but also to the 
emotions of those before whom they assembled.  As Harriot Stanton Blatch affirmed in 
1912, men and women “are moved by seeing marching groups of people and by hearing 
music far more than by listening to the most careful argument.”127 
 
                                                 
123Ibid., 146. 
124See generally, Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to 
Managemetn in American Civic Life (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003) 
(discussing the relationship between grassroots movements and larger institutional 
structures). 
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 B.  Civil Rights Activism 
 A second example of the right of assembly during the Progressive era involved 
political organizing among African Americans.  Assertion of and resistance to this 
increased political mobilization led to repeated instances of mob violence, much of it 
carried out by white citizens unrestrained by state and federal authorities.  The first 
decade of the twentieth century saw “savage race riots” around the country, including 
significant violence in Atlanta in 1906 and Springfield, Illinois in 1908.128  Stirred by 
observing firsthand the carnage resulting from these riots, Mary White Ovington and 
others called for a conference to discuss “present evils, the voicing of protests, and the 
renewal of the struggle for civil and political liberty.”129  Sixty prominent Americans, 
including Jane Addams, William Lloyd Garrison, John Dewey and W.E.B. Du Bois, 
signed a document known as The Call.130  The first National Negro Conference that 
resulted from The Call soon led to the formation of the NAACP, and a decade later, the 
organization had over 350 branches and 100,000 members.131  But despite the increased 
organizing among African Americans, racial violence grew worse.  In the summer of 
1917, “furious rioting” broke out in East St. Louis, leaving nine whites and forty blacks 
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dead, “many of them victims of unspeakable horror.” 132  Two years later, hundreds died 
in race riots in dozens of cities, including Washington, Chicago, and Elaine, Arkansas.133       
Based partly on the proximity of labor unrest to racial violence, government 
officials linked the increasing political activity among African-Americans to the 
influence of communism.  Theodore Kornweibel reports that J. Edgar Hoover “fixated on 
the belief that racial militants were seeking to break down social barriers separating 
blacks from whites, and that they were inspired by communists or were the pawns of 
communists.”134  In a report to Congress, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer described 
“a well-concentrated movement among a certain class of Negro leaders of thought and 
action to constitute themselves a determined and persistent source of radical opposition to 
the Government” who proclaimed “an outspoken advocacy of the Bolsheviki or Soviet 
doctrines.”135   
Armed with these suspicions of communist influences, agents from the Bureau of 
Investigation carefully monitored and constrained efforts by African Americans to 
organize.  When A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, the editors of the black 
publication The Messenger, arrived to address a large crowd in Cleveland on August 4, 
1918, two Bureau agents confiscated their publications and took them into custody for 
interrogation.136  Undercover informants and the first black agents of the Bureau also 
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infiltrated local gatherings of the NAACP and other African-American organizations.137  
An agent attending a lecture by Du Bois in Toledo reported that the audience consisted of 
“mostly radicals.”138  In Boston, an agent reported that Du Bois’s editorials were urging 
that supporters “incite riots and cause bloodshed.”139  The Bureau also kept tabs on 
whites associated with the NAACP, including Jane Addams and Anita Whitney.140  
 
 C.  Organized Labor 
 The most frequent articulations of the right of assembly during the Progressive era 
came from an increasingly vocal labor movement.  Widespread labor unrest had emerged 
with the increase in industrialization and immigration at the end of the nineteenth 
century.141  The “Great Strike” of 1877 had involved over 100,000 workers throughout 
the country and brought to a halt most of the nation’s transportation system.142  By the 
early 1880s, the Knights of Labor had organized hundreds of thousands of workers.143  
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The Haymarket Riot of 1886 and the Pullman Strike of 1894 sandwiched “almost a 
decade of labor unrest punctuated by episodes of spectacular violence” which included 
“the strike of the Homestead Steel workers against the Carnegie Corporation, the miners’ 
strikes in the coal mining regions of the East and hardrock states in the West, a 
longshoremen’s strike in New Orleans that united black and white workers, and 
numerous railroad strikes.”144  But these labor efforts remained largely unorganized, and 
direct appeals to the freedom of assembly did not begin in earnest until the formation of 
the Industrial Workers of the World in 1905.  
 The IWW (nicknamed the “Wobblies”) formed out of a conglomeration of labor 
interests dissatisfied with the reform efforts of the American Federation of Labor.  Led by 
William Haywood, Daniel De Leon, and Eugene Debs, the Wobblies were deliberately 
provocative in their words and actions.  The Preamble to their Constitution declared that 
“the working class and the employing class have nothing in common,”145 and the IWW 
advocated this message in gatherings and demonstrations throughout the country.  The 
freedom of assembly figured prominently in their appeals to constitutional protections.  
From 1909 to 1913, the IWW organized strikes in major industries including 
steel, textiles, rubber, and automobiles.  In 1910, Wobblies highlighted the denial of the 
right to assemble at a demonstration in Spokane.146  When members of the IWW invoked 
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the rights of speech and assembly during the Paterson Silk Strike of 1913, Paterson 
Mayor H.G. McBride responded that these rights extended to the striking silk workers but 
not to the Wobblies: 
I cannot stand for seeing Paterson flooded with persons who have no 
interest in Paterson, who can only give us a bad name, who can despoil in 
a few hours a good name we have been years in building up, and I propose 
to continue my policy of locking these outside agitators up on sight.147   
 
True to his word, McBride arrested a number of IWW leaders, including Elizabeth 
Gurley Flynn.148  Later that year, the IWW publication Solidarity protested that “America 
today has abandoned her heroic traditions of the Revolution and the War of 1812 and has 
turned to hoodlumism and a denial of free speech and assembly to a large and growing 
body of citizens.”149 
 
F.  THE INTER-WAR YEARS AND THE RISE OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 
The growing fear of communism facilitated gross incursions on the freedom of 
assembly across progressive movements.  As Irwin Marcus has observed: “Unrest 
associated with the assertiveness of women, African Americans, and immigrant workers 
could be ascribed to the influence of the Communists and inoculating Americans with a 
vaccine of 100 percent Americanism was offered as a cure for national problems.”150  
The rising Americanism verged on claiming the freedom of assembly as one of its 
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casualties.  On the eve of America’s entry into the First World War, President Wilson 
predicted to New York World editor Frank Cobb that “the Constitution would not 
survive” the war and “free speech and the right of assembly would go.”151  Seven months 
later, Wilson’s words seemed ominously prescient when the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia triggered the First Red Scare.  Over the next few years, the federal government 
constrained the freedom of assembly through shortsighted legislation like the Espionage 
Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice 
Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920, which “effectively torpedoed most notions 
of freedom of expression and freedom of association that survived the war fought to 
make the world safe for democracy.”152 
 
1.  Holmes, Brandeis, and a New Conception of the First Amendment 
Despite the Red Scare, and probably because of some of the flagrant abuses of 
civil liberties that occurred during it, libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment 
that had surfaced prior to World War I began to take shape soon into the interwar period.  
Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee led the doctrinal charge with his 1919 article 
“Freedom of Speech in War Time” 153 and his book Freedom of Speech the following 
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year.154  Although Chafee’s scholarship was shaky, it “provided intellectual cover for 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis when they began to dissent in First Amendment cases in 
the fall of 1919.”155   
References to free speech and assembly also increased in political rhetoric.  In 
1920, Senator Warren Harding’s acceptance speech as the Republican presidential 
nominee warned that “[w]e must not abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of press, 
or the freedom of assembly.”156  In 1921, the Intercollegiate Liberal League organized at 
Harvard and asserted that it would “espouse no creed or principle other than the complete 
freedom of assembly and discussion in the college.”157  Meanwhile, Samuel Gompers 
repeatedly invoked the freedoms of speech and assembly in his battle against labor 
injunctions.158 
                                                 
154Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 
1920).   
155Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 7.  For the importance of Chaffee’s work 
to Holmes and Brandeis, see Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 5.  See also 
John Wertheimer, "Freedom of Speech: Zechariah Chafee and Free-Speech History," 
Reviews in American History 22 (1994): 367, 374.  On the problems with Chafee’s 
scholarship, see Wertheimer, “Freedom of Speech,” 374-75 (Chafee’s “record as a 
scholar rightly gives us pause.”).  Wertheimer also notes that Chafee’s advocacy was not 
without personal risk: “A group of conservative Harvard Law School alumni, with 
behind-the-scenes help from J. Edgar Hoover and the Justice Department, launched a 
campaign to have Chafee fired from Harvard on the grounds that his free-speech writings 
rendered him unfit to continue teaching there.”  Ibid., 368. 
156Washington Post, "Pertinent Points in Republican Acceptance Speech," July 23, 1920: 
4. 
157New York Times, "College Liberals Organize League," April 4, 1921. 
158New York Times, "Gompers Fights Sedition Bill," January 19, 1920: 15 (Sterling-
Graham sedition bill “can be used to kill free speech and free assembly”); ibid., "Labor 
Will Fight for Every Right, Gompers Asserts," June 13, 1922: 1 (arguing against the 
denial of “freedom of expression, freedom of press, and the freedom of assemly”); ibid., 
"Gompers Assails Harding on Unions," July 1, 1923: 3 (Daugherty injunction “sought to 
 60 
The growing recognition of the connection between speech, assembly, and 
democracy is strikingly evident in Brandeis’s famous opinion in Whitney v. California.159  
Anita Whitney’s appeal stemmed from her conviction under California’s Criminal 
Syndicalism Act for having served as a delegate to the 1919 organizing convention of the 
Communist Labor Party of California.160  Whitney was far from a marginalized 
subversive: her pedigree included an 1889 degree from Wellesley, a father who was a 
California state senator, and an uncle who was a Supreme Court justice.  But the Court 
nevertheless rejected her argument that the California law violated her rights under the 
First Amendment, expressing particular concern that her actions had been undertaken in 
concert with others, which “involve[d] even greater threat to the public peace and 
security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals.”161 
Rejecting this rationale, Brandeis penned some of the most well-known words in 
American jurisprudence.  Brandeis wrote:  
                                                                                                                                                 
deny the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of 
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Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.162 
 
The freedoms of “speech and assembly” lie at the heart of Brandeis’s argument—the 
phrase appears eleven times in his brief concurrence.  The Court had linked these two 
freedoms only once before; after Whitney, the nexus occurs in over one hundred of its 
opinions.163  The connection recognizes the importance of assembly to speech and 
expression—the people gathered convey not only spoken words but also the expression 
of the gathering itself. 
There was, however, one group that even Brandeis considered beyond the 
constitutional protections of free assembly: the Ku Klux Klan.  The year after Whitney, 
Brandeis joined an 8-1 majority in Bryant v. Zimmerman that rejected the Klan’s 
challenge to a New York law mandating that associations requiring an oath for 
membership and having twenty or more members file documents including a membership 
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roster and a list of officers.164  Under the law, members of an association with knowledge 
that the association had failed to register were guilty of a misdemeanor.165   The Court 
dismissed a number of constitutional challenges from a Klansman who had been 
imprisoned after the Klan failed to register, including his argument that the New York 
statute deprived him of “liberty” and prevented him “from exercising his right of 
membership in the organization,” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.166  The Court concluded that in this case, liberty “must yield to 
the rightful exertion of the police power” and there “can be no doubt that under that 
power the State may prescribe and apply to associations having an oath-bound 
membership any reasonable regulation calculated to confine their purposes and activities 
within limits which are consistent with the rights of others and the public welfare.”167   
 
  2. New Challenges to Labor 
In the early 1920s, the conservative wing of the Supreme Court issued a series of 
anti-labor decisions aimed at stopping picketing and union organizing.168  But by 1933, 
workers had sought legislative relief, and the National Industrial Recovery Act provided 
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the first guarantee to workers of the right to organize in associations.  Two years later, the 
Wagner Act sought to strengthen the associational rights of workers even further.  
 On April 10, 1936, Congress initiated hearings on legislation to authorize the 
Committee on Education and Labor to investigate “violations of the rights of free speech 
and assembly and undue interference with the right of labor to organize and bargain 
collectively.”169  National Labor Relations Board chairman J. Warren Madden testified 
that “[t]he right of workmen to organize themselves into unions has become an important 
civil liberty” and that workers could not organize without exercising the rights of free 
speech and assembly.170  Following the hearings and subsequent approval of the Senate 
measure, Committee Chair Hugo Black named Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., of 
Wisconsin to chair a subcommittee to investigate these concerns.  The La Follette 
Committee embarked with “the zeal of missionaries” in an exhaustive investigation that 
spanned five years.171  When it concluded, La Follette reported to Congress that “[t]he 
most spectacular violations of civil liberty . . . [have] their roots in economic conflicts of 
interest” and emphasized that “[a]ssociation and self-organization are simply the result of 
the exercise of the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly.”172  
Rhetoric across the political spectrum echoed the increased appeals to assembly in 
the labor context.  In a 1935 speech on Constitution Day, former President Hebert Hoover 
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listed assembly among the core freedoms that guarded liberty.173  That same year, 
Roosevelt’s Interior Secretary Harold Ickes referred to the freedoms of speech, press, and 
assembly as “the three musketeers of our constitutional forces” at an address before an 
annual luncheon of the Associated Press.174  Ickes asserted that “We might give up all the 
rest of our Constitution, if occasion required it, and yet have sure anchorage for the 
mooring of our good ship America, if these rights remained to us unimpaired.”175  
 
3.  Assembly Made Applicable to the States 
In 1937, the Supreme Court made the freedom of assembly applicable to state 
action in De Jonge v. Oregon.176  Dirk De Jonge had spoken before a group of 150 people 
at a Portland meeting that occurred under the auspices of the Communist Party.177  
During his speech, De Jonge protested against conditions at the county jail and the 
actions of the police in response to an ongoing maritime strike.178  He had been convicted 
under Oregon’s criminal syndicalism statute and sentenced to seven years’ 
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imprisonment.179  A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the conviction.  Chief Justice 
Hughes reasoned that: 
The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees 
that right [of assembly] against abridgment by Congress.  But explicit 
mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere.  For the right is one 
that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political 
institutions,—principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in 
the general terms of its due process clause.180   
 
Hughes underscored the significance of applying the right of assembly to state action by 
observing that “[t]he right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free 
speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”181  In words strikingly similar to 
Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence, he emphasized the need:  
. . . to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press 
and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political 
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the 
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.  
Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of 
constitutional government.182 
 
De Jonge laid the doctrinal framework to buttress assembly in response to the 
growing sensitivities to labor and political dissent that had emerged after the first Red 
Scare.  Months later, the Court underscored in Herndon v. Lowry that “[t]he power of a 
state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather than the 
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rule.”183  The case involved the appeal of Angelo Herndon, a young black man affiliated 
with the Communist Party in Georgia.  In 1933, Herndon had been convicted of 
insurrection under a Reconstruction-era law and sentenced to 18-20 years’ imprisonment.  
The Communist Party’s International Labor Defense pursued his appeals, and within two 
years, “white liberals, labor leaders, and other citizens joined blacks and radicals in 
viewing the conviction as a serious threat to basic civil liberties, especially the rights of 
free speech and free assembly.”184  After Herndon spent years languishing in a Georgia 
prison while his appeals went up and down the courts, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the statute under which he had been convicted was “merely a dragnet which may enmesh 
anyone who agitates for a change of government.”185 
 
4. Hague v. C.I.O. 
At the end of 1938, the American Bar Association’s Committee on the Bill of 
Rights filed an amicus brief on the importance of the freedom of assembly in Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization.186  The appeal before the Third Circuit involved 
Mayor Frank Hague’s repeated denials of a permit to the Committee for Industrial 
Organization to hold a public meeting in Jersey City.  The ABA’s lengthy brief 
emphasized the public and expressive nature of assembly, contending that “the integrity 
of the right ‘peaceably to assemble’ is an essential element of the American democratic 
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system” involving “the citizen’s right to meet face to face with others for the discussion 
of their ideas and problems—religious, political, economic or social,” that “assemblies 
face to face perform a function of vital significance in the American system,” and that 
public officials had the “duty to make the right of free assembly prevail over the forces of 
disorder if by any reasonable effort or means they can possibly do so.”187  
The Committee’s filing garnered an unusual amount of attention for an amicus 
brief.  The American Bar Association wrote that: 
The filing of the brief was widely hailed as a great step in the defense of 
liberty and the American traditions of free speech and free assembly as 
basic institutions of democratic government.  The clear and earnest 
argument of the brief was attested as an admirable exposition of the 
fundamental American faith.  Hardly any action in the name of the 
American Bar Association in many years, if ever, has attracted as wide 
and immediate attention and as general acclaim, as the preparation and 
filing of this brief.188  
 
The New York Times reviewed the brief with similarly effusive language: 
This brief ought to stand as a landmark in American legal history.  It ought 
to be multiplied and spread about in all communities in which private 
citizens, private organizations or public officials dare threaten or suppress 
the basic guarantees of American liberty.  It ought to be on file in every 
police station.  It ought to be in every public library, in every school 
library, and certainly in the home of every voter in Jersey City.189  
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The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the C.I.O., but Hague appealed to the Supreme Court, 
setting the stage for an even broader judicial endorsement of the freedom of assembly.190  
 
5. The Four Freedoms 
In 1939, assembly joined religion, speech, and press as one of the “Four 
Freedoms” celebrated in the New York World’s Fair.  Fair organizers commissioned Leo 
Friedlander to design of group of statues commemorating each of the four freedoms.191  
Grover Whalen, the president of the fair corporation, credited New York Times president 
and publisher Arthur Sulzberger with the idea: 
Mr. Sulzberger pointed out that if we portrayed four of the constitutional 
guarantees of liberty in the “freedom group” we could teach the millions 
of visitors to the fair a lesson in history with a moral.  The lesson is that 
freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of speech, firmly fixed in the cornerstone of our government since the 
days of Washington, have enabled us to build the most successful 
democracy in the world.  And the moral is that as long as these freedoms 
remain a part of our constitutional set-up we can face the problems of 
tomorrow, a nation of people calm, united and unafraid.192   
 
The buildup to the opening of the Fair began with New Year’s Day speeches 
celebrating each of the four freedoms that were broadcast internationally from Radio City 
Music Hall.  Dorothy Thompson, the “First Lady of American Journalism,” delivered the 
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speech on the freedom of assembly.193  Calling assembly “the most essential right of the 
four,” Thompson elaborated that: 
The right to meet together for one purpose or another is actually the 
guaranty of the three other rights.  Because what good is free speech if it 
impossible to assemble people to listen to it?  How are you going to have 
discussion at all unless you can hire a hall?  How are you going to practice 
your religion, unless you can meet with a community of people who feel 
the same way?  How can you even get out a newspaper, or any 
publication, without assembling some people to do it? 194 
 
Three months later, Columbia University president Nicholas Butler penned a New York 
Times editorial on “The Four Freedoms.”195  With the European conflict in mind, Butler 
warned of the “millions upon millions of human beings living under governments which 
not only do not accept the Four Freedoms, but frankly and openly deny them all.”196  The 
following month, the Times ran an editorial by Henry Steele Commager, who decried the 
assaults on the “four fundamental freedoms” and concluded his essay by asserting that:    
The careful safeguards which our forefathers set up around freedom of 
religion, speech, press and assembly prove that these freedoms were 
thought to be basic to the effective functioning of democratic and 
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republican government.  The truth of that conviction was never more 
apparent than it is now.197   
 
On April 30, 1939, the opening day of the World’s Fair, New York Mayor 
Fiorello La Guardia called the site of Friedlander’s four statues the “heart of the fair.”198  
Before an audience of 15,000 to 20,000, La Guardia proclaimed that the right of 
assembly “must be given to any group who desire to meet and there discuss any problem 
that they desire.”199    
 Barely a month after the opening of the World’s Fair, the Supreme Court issued 
its decision in Hague.200  Justice Roberts relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
to hold the freedom of assembly applicable to Mayor Hague’s actions.201  The New York 
Times’s coverage of the decision pronounced that “with the right of assembly reasserted, 
all ‘four freedoms’ of [the] Constitution are well established.”202  
 Hague’s words on the heels of the tribute to the four freedoms at the World’s Fair 
appeared to anchor assembly in political discourse.  Indeed, a poll by Elmo Roper’s 
organization at the end of 1940 reported that 89.9% of respondents thought their personal 
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liberties would be decreased by restrictions on freedom of assembly (compared to 81.5% 
who expressed concern over restrictions on “freedom of speech by press and radio”).203  
Americans appeared resolute in their belief of the indispensability of free assembly to 
democracy. 
Politics and history decided otherwise.  On January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt 
proclaimed “four essential human freedoms” in his State of the Union Address.  Rather 
than refer to the freedoms of speech, religion, assembly and press that had formed the 
centerpiece of the World’s Fair, Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Speech” called upon 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom 
from fear.  The new formulation—absent assembly—quickly overtook the old.  Seven 
months later, Roosevelt and Churchill incorporated the new four freedoms into the 
Atlantic Charter.  In 1943, Norman Rockwell created four paintings inspired by 
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.  The paintings were published in successive editions of The 
Saturday Evening Post, accompanied by matching essays expounding upon each of the 
freedoms.  And like the earlier four freedoms, the new ones were also set to stone.  
Roosevelt commissioned Walter Russell to create the Four Freedoms Monument, which 
was dedicated at Madison Square Garden.  Today, the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt 
Institute honors well-known individuals with the “Four Freedoms Award.”  
 
G.  THE RHETORIC OF ASSEMBLY 
Although Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms neglected assembly, the right did not 
disappear from political and legal discourse overnight.  In 1941, a group called “The Free 
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Company” penned a series of radio dramas about the First Amendment.  Attorney 
General Robert Jackson and Solicitor General Francis Biddle helped shape the group, 
which included Robert Sherwood (then Roosevelt’s speechwriter), William Saroyan, 
Maxwell Anderson, Ernest Hemmingway, and James Boyd.204  The illustrious group 
operated under what was “virtually a Government charter” to spread a message of 
democracy.205   
Orson Welles wrote The Free Company’s play on the freedom of assembly, “His 
Honor, the Mayor.”  Welles’s play portrayed the dilemma of Bill Knaggs, a fictional 
mayor confronted with an impending rally of a group called the “White Crusaders.”  
After deciding to allow the rally, the mayor addressed the crowd that had gathered to 
protest the meeting: 
[D]on’t start forbiddin’ anybody the right to assemble.  Democracy’s a 
rare and precious thing and once you start that—you’ve finished 
democracy!  Democracy guarantees freedom of assembly unconditionally 
to the worst lice that want it. . . . All of you’ve read the history books.  
You know what the right to assemble and worship God meant to most of 
those folks that first came here, the ones that couldn’t pray the way they 
wanted to in the old country?206 
 
The play concluded with music followed by the voice of the narrator: 
Like his honor, the Mayor, then, let us stand fast by the right of lawful 
assembly.  Let us say with that great fighter for freedom, Voltaire, “I 
disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say 
it.”  Thus one of our ancient, hard-won liberties will be made secure and 
we, differing though we may at times among ourselves, will stand together 
on a principle to make sure that government of the people, by the people, 
for the people shall not perish from the earth.207 
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Not everyone shared these sentiments.  Following the broadcast of “His Honor, The 
Mayor,” the Hearst newspaper chain and the American Legion attacked it as “un-
American and tending to encourage communism and other subversive groups” and 
“cleverly designed to poison the minds of young Americans.”208  The next week, J. Edgar 
Hoover drafted a Justice Department memorandum “concerning the alleged Communist 
activities and connections of Orson Welles.”209   
Later in 1941, festivities around the country marked the sesquicentennial 
anniversary of the Bill of Rights.  In Washington D.C.’s Post Square, celebration 
organizers displayed an enormous copy of the Bill of Rights next to the four phrases: 
“Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of the 
Press.”210  President Roosevelt served as the honorary chairman of the Sesquicentennial 
Committee, which issued a proclamation describing the original four freedoms as “the 
pillars which sustain the temple of liberty under law.”211  Days before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Roosevelt declared that December 15, 1941, would be “Bill of Rights Day.”  
Roosevelt heralded the “immeasurable privileges” of the First Amendment and signed the 
proclamation against the backdrop of a mural listing the original four freedoms.212  The 
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photo op was not without irony; less than three months later, he signed Executive Order 
9066 authorizing the internment of Japanese Americans. 
Although the Supreme Court endorsed the President’s restrictions on the civil 
liberties of Japanese Americans in Hirabayashi v. United States213 and Korematsu v. 
United States,214 it elsewhere affirmed a core commitment to the Bill of Rights generally 
and the freedom of assembly in particular.  In 1943, Justice Jackson wrote in West 
Virginia v. Barnette215 that:  
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from 
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections.216 
 
Two years later, the Court emphasized in Thomas v. Collins that restrictions of assembly 
could only be justified under the “clear and present danger” standard that the Court had 
adopted in its free speech cases.  By a 5-4 majority, the Court overturned the contempt 
conviction of a labor spokesman who had given a speech in Houston despite a restraining 
order prohibiting him from doing so.  Because of the “preferred place given in our 
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment,” the Court concluded that only “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount 
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interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”217  Justice Rutledge’s opinion noted 
that the right of assembly guarded “not solely religious or political” causes but also 
“secular causes,” great and small.218  And Rutledge recognized the expressive nature of 
assembly by noting that the rights of the speaker and the audience were “necessarily 
correlative.”219 As Aviam Soifer has suggested, Rutledge’s “dynamic, relational 
language” emphasized that the right of assembly was “broad enough to include private as 
well as public gatherings, economic as well as political subjects, and passionate opinions 
as well as factual statements.”220 
A further endorsement of assembly came by way of the executive branch in the 
1947 Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.221  The Report indicated that 
the “great freedoms” of religion, speech, press, and assembly were “relatively secure” 
and that citizens were “normally free . . . to assemble for unlimited public discussions.”222  
Noting growing concerns about “Communists and Fascists,” the Committee asserted that 
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it “unqualifiedly opposes any attempt to impose special limitations on the rights of these 
people to speak and assemble.”223   
  
H.  THE END OF ASSEMBLY 
Despite the rhetorical tributes to assembly in Supreme Court opinions and popular 
discourse, assembly as a constitutional right lacked a coherent doctrinal framework.  
Frequent invocations of Brandeis’s phrase “speech and assembly” usually meant that the 
Court resolved challenges to the latter within the growing doctrinal framework of the 
former.224  By the mid-1960s, the only cases addressing the freedom of assembly (as 
opposed to the freedom of association) were those overturning convictions of African-
Americans who had participated in peaceful civil rights demonstrations.225  Martin Luther 
King, Jr. also appealed to assembly in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail and in his 
speech, I’ve Been to the Mountaintop, delivered just prior to his assassination.226  But by 
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the end of the 1960s, the right of assembly applied only to public gatherings like protests 
and demonstrations.  Any earlier intimations of a broadly construed right beyond these 
narrow circumstances were largely forgotten.  
In 1983, the Court swept the remnants of assembly within the ambit of free 
speech jurisprudence in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association.227  Justice White reasoned that: 
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted 
to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity 
are sharply circumscribed.  At one end of the spectrum are streets and 
parks which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.  In these quintessential public forums, the government may not 
prohibit all communicative activity.  For the State to enforce a content-
based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  
The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of 
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels 
of communication.228  
 
The doctrinal language came straight out of the Court’s free speech cases and made no 
mention of the right of assembly.229  With Perry, even cases involving protests or 
demonstrations could now be resolved without reference to assembly.  The Court’s 1988 
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opinion in Boos v. Barry exemplifies this change.230  Boos involved a challenge to a 
District of Columbia law that prohibited, among other things, congregating “within 500 
feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any 
foreign government or its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation, 
consulate, or for other official purposes.”231  On its face, the challenge to the regulation 
appeared to rest on the right of assembly.  The petitioner challenged the “deprivation of 
First Amendment speech and assembly rights” and argued that “[t]he right to congregate 
is a component part of the ‘right of the people peaceably to assemble’ guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.”232  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court cited Perry three times 
and resolved the case under a free speech analysis without reference to the freedom of 
assembly.  The Court, in fact, has not addressed a freedom of assembly claim in the last 
twenty years.233   
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II.  The Emergence of Association in the National Security Era 
In the preceding chapter, I recounted the forgotten story of the freedom of 
assembly in American political and legal discourse.  At least part of the reason for the 
loss of assembly has been the emergence and entrenchment of the judicially recognized 
right of association.  I turn my attention to the development of that right in this chapter 
and the one that follows.  The rise of constitutional association in many ways depended 
upon surrounding political and cultural contexts.  I have divided these contexts into two 
eras.  The first, which I call the national security era, began in the late 1940s and lasted 
until the early 1960s.  It formed the background for the initial recognition of the right of 
association in NAACP v. Alabama.1  This is the subject of the present chapter.  The 
second, which I call the equality era, spanned from the early 1960s to the end of the 
twentieth century and included an important reinterpretation of the right of association in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.2  I address the equality era in the next chapter.   
In the national security era, three factors influenced the shaping of association: (1) 
the conflation of rampant anti-communist sentiment with the rise of the civil rights 
movement (a political factor); (2) infighting on the Court over the proper way to ground 
the right of association in the Constitution and the relationship between association and 
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assembly (a jurisprudential factor); and (3) the pluralist political theory of mid-twentieth 
century liberalism that emphasized the importance of consensus, balance, and stability (a 
theoretical factor).   
The primary political factor that influenced the right of association emerged from 
the historical coincidence of the Second Red Scare and the Civil Rights movement.  From 
the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the government’s response to the communist threat 
pitted national security interests against individual and group autonomy.  These tensions 
were mimicked (albeit somewhat artificially) in the South when segregationists 
analogized the unrest stirred by the NAACP to the threats posed by communist 
organizations; segregationists even charged that the NAACP itself was infiltrated by 
communist influences.  The Supreme Court responded unevenly, suppressing communist 
organizations in the name of order and stability but protecting the NAACP.   
The jurisprudential factor shaping the right of association involved disagreement 
on the Court over the constitutional source of association.  The issue was most evident 
when the Court applied the right of association to limit state (as opposed to federal) law.  
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan argued that association constrained state action because 
it, like other rights, could be derived from the “liberty” of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  I refer to this as the liberty argument.  Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, and Warren insisted that association could be located in some aspect of the First 
Amendment and argued that it be given the same “preferred position” as other First 
Amendment rights.  On their view, the right of association applied to the states because 
the Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated the provisions of the First Amendment.  I 
call this the incorporation argument.  At times, Black and Douglas also argued that the 
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right of association was part of the right of assembly.  I call this the assembly argument.  
Although it received only minimal attention from the justices, the assembly argument 
may have offered the most sensible and least complicated constitutional link for the right 
of association.  Instead, disagreement between the justices over the liberty argument and 
the incorporation argument framed the legal discussion that in turn shaped the right of 
association.  As I will show, this disagreement is evident in the Court’s 1957 decision in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.3  Harlan’s opinion in NAACP v. Alabama can be read in part 
as an attempt to accommodate the tensions raised in Sweezy.  But his ambiguous wording 
left the doctrinal framing of association open to interpretation.  
The theoretical factor influencing the shaping of association was mid-twentieth 
century liberalism.  Constitutional association developed within an already narrowed 
discourse that began with pluralist claims about the relationship between groups and the 
state.  Arthur Bentley and Harold Laski advanced early versions of these claims during 
the first half of the twentieth century.  Postwar pluralists like David Truman and Robert 
Dahl popularized them in the 1950s and 1960s.  Two pluralist assumptions aided the 
embrace of the constitutional right of association: the balance and stability between 
groups, and the “liberal consensus” of American politics.  Truman and Dahl supported 
these premises through appeals to the two great theorists of association in the American 
context: James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville.  The pluralist claims and their 
attendant interpretations of Madison and Tocqueville helped establish a theoretical 
background that qualified group autonomy by the interests of the democratic state.  
                                                 
3Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
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It is my contention that the above three factors contributed to three changes 
detrimental to group autonomy that can be linked to the shift from assembly to 
association: (1) dissenting and destabilizing groups protected by the right of assembly 
were rejected by a right of association predicated upon a bounded consensus; (2) 
practices that constituted public and political life in the context of the right of assembly 
were depoliticized and privatized by a right of association that developed among a 
dispersion of public power and a narrowing of the scope of what comprised the political; 
and (3) assemblies that were forms of expression were replaced by associations that were 
merely means of expression.  My objective in this chapter and the one that follows is 
simply to illustrate the plausibility of these changes and their connection to the shift from 
assembly to association.  In Chapter 4, I will explore the implications of these changes 
when I compare the right of assembly to the right of association using the contours of 
contemporary political theory. 
 
A.  THE POSTWAR POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE COMMUNIST THREAT 
The political context that shaped the constitutional right of association included a 
growing paranoia over the threat of domestic communism in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.  The ubiquity of these concerns across the branches of state and federal 
government in many ways upset the checks and balances that guarded against incursions 
into civil liberties.  It was not the first time that the American experiment faltered under 
such pressures, and as recent reactions to the threat of domestic terrorism attest, it would 
not be the last.4  But peculiar to the emergence of the right of association in the context of 
                                                 
4A concise account of some of the more egregious episodes in our nation’s history is 
provided in Rasul v. Bush, 524 U.S. 466 (2004), Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu 
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what became the Second Red Scare—perhaps in a way paralleled only by the right of 
assembly asserted by the Democratic-Republican Societies in the 1790s—was the claim 
to an untested constitutional right of group autonomy raised by those outside of the 
political mainstream during a politically tumultuous time. 
 
1.  Executive and Legislative Measures 
The federal government had actively pursued the threat of domestic communism 
since the formation of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in 
1938.5  Concern over “subversive” government employees had prompted the Hatch Act 
in 1939, the Civil Service Commission’s War Service Regulations in 1942, and the 
formation of the Attorney General’s Interdepartmental Committee on Investigations in 
1942.6  In 1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights reported that while “the 
government has the obligation to have in its employ only citizens of unquestioned 
loyalty,” our “whole civil liberties history provides us with a clear warning against the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Support of Petitioners.  Korematsu was the petitioner in Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944).  Concerns over domestic terrorism prompted then Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General John Yoo to advise the White House and Department of Defense that 
“First Amendment speech and press rights may also be subordinated to the overriding 
need to wage war successfully.”  See John Yoo, “Authority for Use of Military Force to 
Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States,” October 23, 2001, p. 24. 
5Formed at the urging of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, the investigative body was 
popularly known as the “Dies Committee” from 1938-1945.  From 1945 to 1957, the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) conducted over 230 public 
hearings and examined over 3,000 witnesses, 135 of whom were cited for contempt. Carl 
Beck, Contempt of Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions Initiated by the Committee on 
Un-American Activities, 1945-1957 (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1959), 181. 
6See generally Thomas Emerson and David Helfeld, "Loyalty Among Government 
Employees," Yale Law Journal 58 (1948): 8-19 (discussing the development of federal 
government’s loyalty program). 
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possible misuse of loyalty checks to inhibit freedom of opinion and expression.”7  The 
Committee specifically cautioned of the dangers posed by “any standard which permits 
condemnation of persons or groups because of ‘association.’”8   
That same year, President Truman established the Federal Employee Loyalty 
Program, which empowered the federal government to deny employment to “disloyal” 
individuals.9   The government’s loyalty determination could consider “activities and 
associations” that included “[m]embership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association 
with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination 
of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or 
subversive.”10  Attorney General Tom Clark quickly generated a list of 123 “subversive” 
organizations.11  Within a year, the FBI had examined over two million federal 
employees and conducted over 6,300 full investigations.12    
Constitutional scholar Thomas Emerson attacked the loyalty program in a 1947 
article in the Yale Law Journal, contending that the investigations encompassed “not only 
membership and activity in organizations, including labor unions, but private beliefs, 
                                                 
7To Secure These Rights, The Report of the Presidents Committee on Civil Rights (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1947): 50. 
8Ibid. 
9Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 176 (quoting Executive Order 9835, March 22, 1947). 
10Executive Order 9835, March 22, 1947. 
11Emerson and Helfeld, "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 32.  Emerson co-
founded the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee in 1951. 
12Ibid.  By 1951, the FBI had initiated 14,000 full-scale investigations of federal 
employees, which had led to over 2,000 resignations.  Melvin Urofsky, Felix 
Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties (Boston: Twayne, 1991), 107. 
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reading habits, receipts of mail, associations, and personal affairs.”13  Emerson charged 
that the program relied upon “the legal premise that Federal employees are entitled to no 
constitutional protection” and ignored “the right to freedom of political expression 
embodied in the First Amendment.”14  To Emerson, this “concept of the right to freedom 
of political expression” emerged from “the specific guarantees of freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, the right of assembly and the right to petition the government.”15  
This right of political expression was “basic, in the deepest sense, for it underlies the 
whole theory of democracy.”16   
Emerson didn’t explicitly reference a “freedom of association,” but he cited a 
speech delivered earlier in the year to the State Bar of California by the powerful federal 
judge, Charles Wyzanski, Jr.17  In that speech, Wyzanski had offered “an inquiry into 
freedom of association,” suggesting that despite the “verbal kinship of the phrases 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association . . . the triad 
represented an ascending order of complexity.”18  The term “association” implied “a 
                                                 
13Emerson and Helfeld, "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 70. 
14Ibid., 79, 81. 
15Ibid., 83. 
16Ibid.  Emerson’s article drew a fiery response from J. Edgar Hoover, whose comments 
were printed in the next issue of the Yale Law Journal 58 (1948): 401.   
17Charles Wyzanski Jr., "The Open Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry into 
Freedom of Association," California Law Review 35 (1947): 336-51.  Roosevelt 
appointed Wyzanski to the federal bench in 1941.  He served in that capacity for 45 
years, presided over the Harvard University Board of Overseers, and served as a trustee 
of the Ford Foundation.  Eric Pace, “Charles E. Wyzanski, 80, is Dead,” New York Times, 
September 5, 1986, p. A20.  Frankfurter had mentored Wyzanski at Harvard and called 
him “one of the most brilliant students I ever had.”  Ibid. 
18Wyzanski, "The Open Window and the Open Door,” 336-37. 
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body of persons who have assembled not on an ad hoc, but on a more or less permanent, 
basis and who are likely to seek to advance their common purposes not merely by debate 
but often in the long run by overt action.”19  The “peculiarly complicated” freedom of 
association “cuts underneath the visible law to the core of our political science and our 
philosophy.”20  Wyzanski contended that by the time of Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 book, An 
American Dilemma, “freedom of association was considered a deeply rooted 
characteristic of American society.”21 
But the “deeply rooted characteristic” wasn’t evident in 1947.  As the executive 
branch embarked on its loyalty investigations of government employees, the HUAC 
subpoenaed movie producers, screenwriters and directors to examine alleged communist 
affiliations.  Hollywood personalities including Humphrey Bogart, Lauren Bacall, 
Groucho Mark, and Frank Sinatra formed the Committee for the First Amendment and 
flew to Washington to support those called to testify.22  In October of 1947, ten 
Hollywood witnesses refused on First Amendment grounds to answer questions from the 
HUAC.  But the “Hollywood Ten” were largely abandoned after Congress cited them for 
contempt.  Within a month, top Hollywood executives agreed to blacklist them, and the 
Committee for the First Amendment “folded almost as fast as it had formed.”23  
                                                 
19Ibid., 337. 
20Ibid., 337, 338. 
21Ibid., 346 (citing Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944). 
22Victor Navasky, Naming Names (New York: Viking Press, 1980), 80. 
23Ibid., 83. Hollywood executives issued the “Waldorf-Astoria Policy Statement” which 
announced that producers would “not knowingly employ a Communist.”  Harold 
Horowitz, "Loyalty Tests for Employment in the Motion Picture Industry," Stanford Law 
 87 
One of the earliest attempts to challenge the HUAC inquiries based upon a “right 
of association” came after the committee cited Dr. Edward Barsky for contempt 
following his refusal to answer a records request.  Barsky, a surgeon and national 
chairman of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, appealed his conviction to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  The ACLU filed a brief on his behalf, 
arguing that the First Amendment prohibited “general inquiry into matters relating to 
opinion or affecting freedom of association.”24  But Barsky lost at the Court of Appeals, 
and the Supreme Court declined to hear his case.25   
In their investigative hearings, the HUAC and the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee (SISS) routinely asked witnesses whether they were presently or had ever 
been a member of the Communist Party.26  The question posed a Catch-22.  On the one 
hand, witnesses who denied any affiliation could be charged with perjury based on 
circumstantial evidence that suggested otherwise.  On the other hand, those who admitted 
                                                                                                                                                 
Review 6 (1954): 443.  The New York Times called the statement “an action 
unprecedented in American industrial fields.”  Ibid. 
24Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 181. 
25Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.D.C. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).  
Barsky returned to the Supreme Court six years later to challenge New York’s suspension 
of his medical license following his six-month prison sentence for contempt.  This time, 
the Court took the case, but the result was no better for Barsky: the Court concluded that 
New York’s suspension did not violate Barsky’s due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Barsky vs. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).  Douglas, Black, and 
Frankfurter dissented.  Douglas expressed incredulity over the purported connection 
Barsky’s refusal to comply with the HUAC and his ability to practice medicine.  Ibid., 
472 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Black argued that the action violated Barsky’s First 
Amendment rights.  Ibid., 455 (Black, J., dissenting).  Frankfurter alleged that the 
suspension violated due process by unreasonably depriving Barsky of his right to earn a 
living.  Ibid., 467 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  See also Lucas Powe Jr., The Warren 
Court and American Politics (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 80-81. 
26Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 77. 
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a communist affiliation usually suffered adverse economic and social consequences.  As 
a result, a growing number of witnesses refused on constitutional grounds to answer 
questions.  Initially, most of these witnesses invoked the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.  But observers increasingly saw this as an admission of guilt by those 
they labeled “Fifth Amendment Communists.”27  Accordingly, witnesses began turning to 
the First Amendment.  As with the Hollywood Ten, reliance on the First Amendment 
usually resulted in contempt of Congress citations.  
 
 2.  The Perceived Threat Grows 
The executive and legislative actions to curtail communist activity took on added 
urgency in light of global events including the Berlin blockade, the first Soviet test of an 
atomic bomb, and Mao Tse-tung’s overthrow of Chiang Kai-Shek’s government in 
China.28 Alger Hiss’s 1950 perjury conviction and the espionage convictions of Julius 
and Ethel Rosenberg the following year reinforced fears of an ongoing domestic 
communist threat.  As Lucas Powe has written: “Americans, very much including 
Supreme Court justices, viewed these trials against the backdrop of communist expansion 
in Europe and Asia, and an aggressive anticommunism became a staple of American 
                                                 
27Ibid., 77-78. 
28In 1950, with these events in mind, Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security 
Act, authorizing concentration camps for subversives and requiring communists to 
register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.  50 U.S.C. § 781, et seq. (1950).  
The Act was also known as the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.  Registered 
individuals were denied employment in government, defense and labor unions. Powe, 
The Warren Court and American Politics, 77; Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 
198. 
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politics and society.”29   In light of the unsettling domestic and global developments, 
citizens across the political spectrum welcomed the Smith Act prosecutions as a 
necessary defense against the spread of communism.   
Sidney Hook captured the heightened fears and the growing tensions within 
liberalism in a popular 1950 article published in the New York Times Magazine titled 
“Heresy, Yes—But Conspiracy, No.”30  Hook warned that while “[t]he liberal stands 
ready to defend the honest heretic no matter what his views against any attempt to curb 
him,” the “failure to recognize the distinction between heresy and conspiracy is fatal to a 
liberal civilization.”31  Hook drew a sharp distinction between “Communist ideas” and 
the “Communist movement.”  The former were merely heresies, “and liberals have no 
fear of them where they are freely and openly expressed.”32  But the Communist 
movement was “something much more than a heresy.”33  It included “native elements 
who by secrecy and stratagem serve the interests of a foreign power.”34  Hook saw the 
communist plot particularly at work in labor organizations and schools.  In language that 
foreshadowed some of the Supreme Court’s rhetoric, he maintained that: “It is not his 
                                                 
29Ibid., 15. 
30Sidney Hook, “Heresy, Yes—But Conspiracy, No,” New York Times, July 9, 1950, p. 
SM7. Hook’s similarly titled book published three years later became “one of the most 
prominent mid-century works reflecting seriously on questions relating to the freedom of 
association.” Kersch, “’Guilt By Association’” and the Postwar Civil Libertarians,” 65.  
Hook’s book is Sidney Hook, Heresy Yes; Conspiracy, No (New York: John Day & Co., 
1953). 
31Hook, “Heresy, Yes—But Conspiracy, No.” 
32Ibid.  
33Ibid.  
34Ibid.  
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beliefs, right or wrong; it is not his heresies, which disqualify the Communist party 
teacher but his declaration of intention, as evidenced by official statements of his party, to 
practice educational fraud.”35  Policing the schools against communists was “a matter of 
ethical hygiene, not of politics or of persecution.”36  
 
3.  The Supreme Court Speaks 
The first indication of the Supreme Court’s complicity in the communist scare 
came in its 1950 decision, American Communications Association v. Douds.37  Douds 
involved a challenge to the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), which required that union officers submit affidavits disavowing membership in 
or support of the Communist Party before a union could receive the NLRA’s 
protections.38  The Court upheld the affidavit requirement.  Chief Justice Vinson reasoned 
that the Act protected the country from “the so-called ‘political strike.’”39  He referred to 
“substantial amounts of evidence” presented to Congress “that Communist leaders of 
labor unions had in the past and would continue in the future to subordinate legitimate 
trade union objectives to obstructive strikes when dictated by Party leaders, often in 
                                                 
35Ibid.  
36Ibid. Christopher Phelps suggests that Hook’s writing “became perhaps the most 
influential justification for firing Communists and suspected Communists from 
universities and schools in the early 1950s.”  Christopher Phelps, Young Sidney Hook: 
Marxist and Pragmatist (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 119.  
37American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
3861 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 141, § 159 (h), amending National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 
39 Ibid., 388. 
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support of the policies of a foreign government.”40  Although recognizing “[t]he high 
place in which the right to speak, think, and assemble as you will was held by the 
Framers of the Bill of Rights and is held today by those who value liberty both as a 
means and an end,” Vinson concluded that the Act reflected “legitimate attempts to 
protect the public, not from the remote possible effects of noxious ideologies, but from 
present excesses of direct, active conduct.”41  Just five years earlier, the Court had noted 
the “preferred place” of the freedom of assembly in Thomas v. Collins.42  In that case, 
Justice Rutledge had concluded that “the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms 
secured by the First Amendment” meant that only “the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”43 Douds made no mention 
of Thomas’s preferred place doctrine but instead invoked “the deference due to the 
legislative determination of the need for restriction upon particular forms of conduct.”44  
The weakening of associational protections continued in Dennis v. United 
States,45 which ACLU national chairman Roger Baldwin later called “the worst single 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41Ibid., 399. 
42Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1945).  Cf. United States v. Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (legislative 
judgment “does not bear the same weight and is not entitled to the same presumption of 
validity, when the legislation on its face or in specific application restricts the rights of 
conscience, expression and assembly protected by the Amendment.”). 
43Thomas v. Collins, 530-31.  Rutledge’s opinion also noted that the right of assembly 
guarded “not solely religious or political” causes but also “secular causes,” great and 
small.  Ibid. 
44Douds, 401. 
45Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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blow to civil liberties in all our history.”46  Dennis came to the Court after FBI director J. 
Edgar Hoover initiated Smith Act prosecutions of twelve senior leaders of the 
Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA).47  The government charged 
the defendants with violating the Act’s membership clause, which made it unlawful “to 
organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage 
the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence, 
or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of 
persons, knowing the purposes thereof.”48  The government construed the Act so broadly 
that it “made no effort to prove that this attempted overthrow was in any sense imminent, 
or even in the concrete planning stages.”49  Following a nine-month trial, the jury 
convicted all twelve defendants after less than a day of deliberation.50   
Vinson’s plurality opinion in Dennis recounted the speech-protective views of 
Holmes and Brandeis and conceded that “there is little doubt that subsequent opinions 
have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale.”51  But Vinson refashioned 
Holmes’s clear and present danger standard, concluding that with respect to the CPUSA, 
                                                 
46Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 187.  Cf. Martin H. Redish, The Logic of 
Persecution: Free Expression and the McCarthy Era (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), 81 (describing Dennis as “one of the most troubling free speech decisions 
ever handed down by the United States Supreme Court”). 
47Redish, The Logic of Persecution, 81-82. 
4818 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948). 
49Redish, The Logic of Persecution, 83. 
50Ibid., 82, 87. 
51Dennis, 507. 
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“it is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger.”52  Justice Black’s dissent 
lamented that: 
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of 
these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times, 
when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later 
Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred 
place where they belong in a free society.53  
 
As Black anticipated, Dennis generated little public outcry, and even liberals like Norman 
Thomas and Arthur Schlesinger supported the decision.54  One of the lone openly critical 
voices was Eleanor Roosevelt, who wrote the day after the decision: “I am not sure our 
forefathers—so careful to guard our rights of freedom of speech, freedom of thought and 
freedom of assembly—would not feel that the Supreme Court had perhaps a higher 
obligation . . .”55  Roosevelt spent the following two summers touring criticizing Dennis 
in public forums with Justice Douglas, an endeavor that at times met with hostility.56      
 
4.  The Second Red Scare 
Dennis opened the floodgates for additional FBI investigations and prosecutions.  
The Justice Department began pursuing “second-string” CPUSA leadership and over the 
                                                 
52Ibid., 511. Milton Konvitz quipped that Vinson’s interpretation of Holmes and Brandeis 
was “doctrine reduced to a phrase.”  Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free 
People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957): 307. 
53Dennis, 581 (Black, J., dissenting). 
54Allida M. Black, Casting Her Own Shadow: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Shaping of 
Postwar Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 155. 
55Ibid., 154. 
56Ibid., 155.  Black reports that “the furor [Roosevelt’s] stance generated cut into her 
lecture tour and deprived her of income she needed.”  Ibid. 
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next few years charged 126 communists with conspiracy under the Smith Act.57  Paul 
Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Lewis Mumford, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Henry Steele 
Commager launched sporadic efforts to halt the prosecutions or obtain amnesty for 
defendants.58  But widespread public concern for the accused never materialized, and the 
government routinely won even its weakest cases.59    
The anti-communist concerns also pervaded state legislation.  In 1953, the Court 
reviewed a speech and assembly challenge to a New York law that denied employment in 
its public schools to any person who advocated the violent overthrow of the government 
or who joined a society or group of persons knowing that it advanced such advocacy.60  
The law took aim at “members of subversive groups, particularly of the Communist Party 
and its affiliated organizations” who had been “infiltrating into public employment in the 
public schools of the State.”61  In passing the restrictive statute, the New York legislature 
had found that “the members of such groups use their positions to advocate and teach 
their doctrines . . . without regard to truth or free inquiry” in ways “sufficiently subtle to 
escape detection in the classroom.”62  In Adler v. Board of Education, a 6-3 majority 
                                                 
57Michael R. Belknap, Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, 
and American Civil Liberties (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977), 156. 
58Ibid., 157. 
59Ibid., 157-58. 
60Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
61Ibid., 489. 
62Ibid., 489-90. 
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concluded that New York had acted “in the exercise of its police power to protect the 
schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.”63   
Nine months after Adler, the Court finally set limits on anti-communist 
legislation.  Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Wieman v. Updegraff struck down an 
Oklahoma statute that required state employees to affirm, among other things, that they 
had not within the last five years “been a member of . . . any agency, party, organization, 
association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States 
Attorney General or other authorized public agency of the United States to be a 
communist front or subversive organization.”64  Clark distinguished Adler by 
emphasizing that the New York law had required a person to have known the purposes of 
the society or group that he or she had joined.  In contrast, Oklahoma’s law mandated that 
“the fact of association alone determines disloyalty and disqualification; it matters not 
whether association existed innocently or knowingly.”65   
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Wieman referred to “a right of association peculiarly 
characteristic of our people.”66  That same year, Thomas Emerson and David Haber’s 
                                                 
63Ibid., 493.  The Court’s rhetoric is astounding.  Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter filed 
separate dissents.  Black protested the Court’s endorsement of a law “which effectively 
penalizes school teachers for their thoughts and their associates.”  Ibid., 497 (Black, J., 
dissenting).  Douglas refused to accept “the recent doctrine that a citizen who enters the 
public service can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights.”  Ibid., 508 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). Frankfurter’s lengthy dissent rested largely on procedural grounds.  Ibid., 497 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
64Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 186 (1952). 
65Ibid., 191. 
66Ibid., 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  The Court had briefly 
referred to a “freedom of association” in Douds. 409 (“the effect of [a] statute in 
proscribing beliefs—like its effect in restraining speech or freedom of association—must 
be carefully weighed by the courts in determining whether the balance struck by 
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treatise, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, contended that the “right of 
association is basic to a democratic society.”67  Emerson and Haber asserted that 
association “embraces not only the right to form political associations but also the right to 
organize business, labor, agricultural, cultural, recreational and numerous other groups 
that represent the manifold activities and interests of a democratic people.”68   
 
5.  Harlan and Brennan Join the Court 
In the midst of the Second Red Scare and initial glimpses of a right of association, 
two men who would deeply influence the development of that right joined the Supreme 
Court: John Harlan and William Brennan.  Brennan, who succeeded Sherman Minton in 
1956, became the chief intellectual architect of the Warren Court’s civil liberties activism 
and arguably “the most important jurist of the second half of the century.”69  His tenure 
on the Court included the first official recognition of the right of association in NAACP v. 
Alabama and its transformation in the opinion he wrote twenty-six years later in Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees.  Harlan, who replaced Robert Jackson in 1955, authored the 
Court’s opinion in NAACP v. Alabama.  His role on the Court is often cast as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Congress comports with the dictates of the Constitution”).  The Court’s only mention of a 
right of association prior to Douds had been a passing reference to “the rights of free 
speech, assembly, and association” in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). 
67Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 
(Buffalo: Dennis, 1952), 248. 
68Ibid.  Emerson and Haber wrote that “it is generally accepted that the rights in the First 
Amendment to freedom of speech, press and assembly, and to petition the government 
for redress of grievances, taken in combination, establish a broader guarantee to the right 
of political association.”  Ibid. 
69Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 90. 
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“conservative” based on his close relationship with Felix Frankfurter, his predilection for 
judicial restraint and deference to national security decisions by government officials, and 
his constant sparring with the Warren Court liberals.  But this label obscures the 
complexity of his thought.70  Even in his first few months on the Court, Harlan expressed 
discomfort over Smith Act prosecutions and associational restrictions on communists and 
let slip that he had little patience for “McCarthyite garbage.”71   
Harlan’s constitutional hermeneutic proved even more important in shaping the 
right of association than his concerns about the communist prosecutions.  He believed 
that the “full scope” of the liberty of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not be “found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.”72  For Harlan, the meaning of 
constitutional law was “one not of words, but of history and purposes.”73  This required 
an appropriate balancing of past tradition and present reform:      
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having 
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed 
as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living 
thing.  A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not 
                                                 
70At a 1972 memorial service for Harlan, Justice Stewart quipped: “I can assure you that 
a very interesting law review article could someday be written on ‘The Liberal Opinions 
of Mr. Justice Harlan.’” Norman Dorsen, "John Marshall Harlan," in The Warren Court: 
A Retrospective, ed. Bernard Schwartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 241. 
71Tinsley E. Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan: Great Dissenter of the Warren Court 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 338 (quoting Charles Fried).  Frankfurter, 
too, “privately deplored the excesses of McCarthyism and the witch-hunts conducted in 
the name of national security,” and “risked personal opprobrium in his defense of some 
of the accused.”  Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter, 105. 
72Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
73Ibid., 542-43. 
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long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely 
to be sound.74 
 
These views about liberty and tradition gave Harlan an openness to the kind of arguments 
that would later be advanced to secure the right of association.   
 
6.  Red Monday 
On Monday, June 17, 1957, with Brennan and Harlan now in place, the Court 
released a quartet of decisions curtailing the government’s anti-communist efforts in what 
became known as “Red Monday.”75  Three of the decisions checked actions by the 
federal government.  Service v. Dulles ordered the reinstatement of a federal government 
employee who had been dismissed based on loyalty concerns.76  Watkins v. United States 
reversed John Watkins’s contempt conviction following his refusal on First Amendment 
grounds to respond to questions from the HUAC about his alleged communist 
affiliations.77  Yates v. United States, the most important of the three decisions against the 
federal government, involved the appeal of fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in 
California convicted under the Smith Act.78  Harlan’s majority opinion distinguished 
                                                 
74Ibid., 542. 
75Following the decisions, outraged conservatives in the Senate led by William Jenner of 
Indiana introduced a “court-stripping” bill to deprive the Court of certain subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
76Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). 
77Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).  The Court noted that the First 
Amendment could be invoked against investigating committees but resolved the case as a 
violation of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.  Ibid., 215. Watkins 
“amounted to little more than the imposition of a rather minimal constitutional restraint.” 
Redish, The Logic of Persecution, 41. 
78Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
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between advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an “abstract principle” on 
the one hand and “advocacy or teaching of action” on the other.79  Based on this standard, 
the Court directed that five of the convictions be overturned outright and the other nine 
remanded for retrial.  More importantly, Harlan’s statutory interpretation effectively 
limited future Smith Act prosecutions.80      
The fourth Red Monday decision, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, involved state rather 
than federal action.81  Paul Sweezy, a well-known Marxist economist and founder of the 
Monthly Review, had been subpoenaed by the New Hampshire attorney general to testify 
about alleged communist affiliations.82  Like Watkins, Sweezy refused to answer certain 
questions on First Amendment grounds.  The Superior Court of Merrimack County, New 
Hampshire, found him in contempt and ordered his imprisonment.  The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court upheld his conviction despite its assertion that “the right to associate with 
others for a common purpose, be it political or otherwise,” was one of the “individual 
liberties guaranteed to every citizen by the State and Federal Constitutions.”83  Chief 
Justice Warren’s plurality opinion reversed the conviction, concluding that New 
                                                 
79Ibid., 318-320.  See Yarborough, John Marshall Harlan, 191; Walker, In Defense of 
American Liberties, 243; Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 94-95. 
80See Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 243 (Yates “halted further Smith Act 
prosecutions”); Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 191 (“Following [Yates], Smith Act 
prosecutions were drastically curtailed, then abandoned entirely.”). 
81Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
82N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.1955, c. 588, §§ 1-16 (New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act 
of 1951). 
83Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N. H. 103, 113 (N.H. 1956). 
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Hampshire’s statute impermissibly extended to “conduct which is only remotely related 
to actual subversion.”84  
 
7.  Sweezy, Liberty, and Penumbras 
Sweezy also brought to the foreground an important legal question about the right 
of association: its constitutional source.  Thomas Emerson, who represented Sweezy 
before the Court, noted that the New Hampshire Supreme Court had referred to “speech 
and association” rights in its review of Sweezy’s conviction.  But Emerson also 
recognized that the New Hampshire court had cited only “the Federal Constitution” as its 
basis for these rights.85  Emerson offered two more specific possibilities.  First, he argued 
that New Hampshire’s law deprived Sweezy “of liberty and property without due process 
of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”86  
Second, he wrote that “it can hardly be doubted that the requirements of the First 
Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, impose 
comparable or identical limits on state power.”87  The differences between these 
arguments may seem like hairsplitting to non-lawyers, but they reflect an important 
                                                 
84Sweezy, 247. Warren paid particular attention to Sweezy’s role as a university 
professor, noting that “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust” and “[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate 
and die.”  Ibid., 250. 
85Sweezy v. New Hampshire, Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, filed June 19, 1956 
(“Jurisdictional Statement”), 27. 
86Ibid., 4. 
87Ibid., 19. 
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doctrinal divide that complicated the Court’s efforts to settle on a jurisprudential 
framework for the right of association.88   
The disagreement centered on how rights located in the federal Constitution could 
limit state action.  The Supreme Court had initially concluded that the substantive 
provisions of the Bill of Rights limited only the federal government and did not apply to 
the states.89  But after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
had established—in language similar to the Fifth Amendment—that states could not 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”90   
Whether the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed specific 
provisions in the Bill of Rights remained unclear at the time of Sweezy.  In 1922, Justice 
Pitney had written for a majority of the Court that “[n]either the Fourteenth Amendment 
nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States 
any restriction about the freedom of speech.”91  But three years later, Justice Sanford 
concluded in Gitlow v. New York that “we may and do assume that freedom of speech 
                                                 
88These arguments weren’t at issue in Scales, Watkins, and Dulles, all of which involved 
federal rather than state action. 
89See Barron v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
90U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV.  This clause restricted state action that deprived 
“liberty” without due process, but it remained to be seen what exactly that encompassed.  
Soon after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court focused on a different 
provision of the Bill of Rights, the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  In the Slaughter-
House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873), the Court intimated that the Bill of Rights 
might be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment as “privileges and 
immunities” of citizenship.  This is the theory that Justice Roberts relied upon to hold the 
freedom of assembly applicable to Mayor Hague’s actions in Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).  But outside of Hague, the Court has 
usually cited the Due Process Clause rather than the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 
applying the rights of the First Amendment to state action. 
91Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922). 
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and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”92   
Gitlow made clear that states, like the federal government, could not “impair” the 
freedoms of speech and press, but the decision left open to interpretation the source of 
those restrictions.  Twelve years later, Justice Cardozo suggested two possibilities in 
Palko v. Connecticut: (1) that certain provisions from the Bill of Rights had been 
“brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption;”93 and (2) that 
restrictions against the federal government from “the specific pledges of particular 
amendments” were “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and thereby valid against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.94  Restating Cardozo’s alternatives 
suggests the following two possibilities: 
(1) The incorporation argument, which holds that the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the specific rights enumerated 
in the First Amendment, thereby making those rights applicable to the 
states; and  
 
                                                 
92Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
93Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). Cardozo continued that: “These, in 
their origin, were effective against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth 
Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its source in the belief 
that neither liberty nor Justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  Ibid. 
94Ibid., 324-25 (citations omitted).  Later that year, Chief Justice Hughes reached a 
similar conclusion about the right of assembly in De Jonge v. Oregon: “The First 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees [the right of assembly] 
against abridgment by Congress.  But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion 
elsewhere.  For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions-
principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due 
process clause.” De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
 103 
(2) The liberty argument, which holds that rights similar to those in the 
First Amendment were implicit in the liberty protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and could thus be derived 
independently of the First Amendment. 
 
Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter had sparred over the differences between the 
incorporation argument and the liberty argument well before Sweezy.  In 1943, Douglas’s 
majority opinion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania referred without elaboration to “[t]he First 
Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states.”95  Four years later, 
Black’s majority opinion in Everson v. Board of Education echoed the same language.96  
Frankfurter dissented in both cases.  He didn’t see anything in the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that applied the Bill of Rights to the states. Two years later, he rebuffed 
Douglas and Black in his majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado: “[t]he notion that the 
‘due process of law’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first 
eight amendments of the Constitution, and thereby incorporates them, has been rejected 
by this Court again and again, after impressive consideration. . . . The issue is closed.”97  
Black and Douglas disagreed with Frankfurter not only about the source of the 
constitutional limits on state action but also about the extent of those limits.  Black saw 
the rights in the First Amendment as “absolute” and impervious to restriction by state 
action.  Douglas did not always go that far, but he argued in Murdock that the freedoms 
of the First Amendment held a “preferred position.”98  Frankfurter considered the 
                                                 
95Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943). 
96Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1,8 (1947).   
97Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949). Black concurred and Douglas dissented, 
arguing that entirety of Fourth Amendment applied to the states.  
98Murdock, 108.  Rutledge had used the same language with respect to the freedom of 
assembly in Thomas v. Collins, 530-31.  Black and Douglas didn’t share the exact same 
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preferred position language a “mischievous phrase” that expressed “a complicated 
process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula” and implied “that any law 
touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity.”99  He argued instead 
for a “balancing” that weighed the interests of the government against the liberty of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  On this view, Frankfurter would defer to a legislative judgment 
if a restriction of speech or assembly had a “rational basis.”  Justice Jackson described the 
tension between the two positions in his 1943 opinion in West Virginia v. Barnette: 
In weighing arguments of the parties, it is important to distinguish 
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an 
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and 
those cases in which it is applied for its own sake.  The test of legislation 
which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides 
with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when 
only the Fourteenth is involved.  Much of the vagueness of the due process 
clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its 
standard.  The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may 
well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose 
all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a “rational basis” for 
adopting.  But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of 
worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.  They are 
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to 
interests which the State may lawfully protect.100   
                                                                                                                                                 
views about incorporation.  Douglas joined Black’s dissent in Adamson v. California, 
which argued that the Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated all of the civil liberties 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 71-72 (1947) 
(Black J., dissenting).  But elsewhere Douglas backed away from Black’s “total 
incorporation” theory. 
99Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90, 95-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
100West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
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The upshot of these two perspectives was that the Court would be more likely to uphold a 
state law restricting speech or assembly if it followed the liberty argument and more 
likely to strike down the law if it followed the incorporation argument.101 
Sweezy added a new wrinkle: unlike the rights of speech, press, and assembly at 
issue in earlier cases, the right of association appeared nowhere in the Constitution.  
Under the liberty argument, association (like any other right enforced against the states) 
was implicit in the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The incorporation argument 
faced a greater hurdle because it claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment relied upon 
provisions found in the First Amendment.  The only possible explanation to support the 
incorporation argument was that a right implicit in the First Amendment implicitly 
applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  That was one more degree of 
inference than the liberty argument.  Penumbras formed by emanations, as Douglas 
would later characterize it.102   
Emerson was well aware of the doctrinal divide that Sweezy presented, and he 
straddled the line by making both the liberty argument and the incorporation argument.  
Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion (joined by Douglas, Black, and Brennan) relied 
on the incorporation argument: “the right to engage in political expression and 
association . . . was enshrined in the First Amendment.”103  Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, 
concurred only in the result.  In Frankfurter’s view, the justices were confined to “the 
                                                 
101There were, of course, phrasings ambiguous enough to be consistent with both 
alternatives.  See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325 (1958) (the 
“fundamental right [of speech] is made free from congressional abridgment by the First 
Amendment and is protected by the Fourteenth from invasion by state action”). 
102See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
103Sweezy, 250. 
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limited power to review the action of the States conferred upon the Court by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”104  The Court’s role was “the narrowly circumscribed but 
exceedingly difficult task of making the final judicial accommodation between the 
competing weighty claims that underlie all such questions of due process.”105  Frankfurter 
made no reference to the First Amendment but relied instead upon “‘the concept of 
ordered liberty’ implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”106  
His concurrence rested upon “a judicial judgment in balancing two contending 
principles—the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection.”107   
 
B.  NAACP V. ALABAMA 
The divide between the liberty argument and the incorporation argument persisted 
when the Court squarely addressed the constitutional right of association the following 
year in NAACP v. Alabama, a case that shifted the Court’s focus on group autonomy 
from the government’s anti-communist efforts to the civil rights movement in the South.   
 
 
 
                                                 
104Ibid., 255-56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
105Ibid., 256. 
106Ibid., 266 (quoting Palko, 325). 
107Ibid., 266-267.  Justice Clark’s dissent erroneously concluded that Frankfurter 
concurred “on the ground that Sweezy’s rights under the First Amendment had been 
violated.”  Ibid., 268 (Clark, J., dissenting).    
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1.  The Growing Civil Rights Movement 
The proximity between a waning but still active concern over domestic 
communism and the expanding civil rights movement led to widely divergent claims 
about the relationship between the two.  On the one hand, the federal government 
increasingly viewed segregation as undercutting its stance against communist ideology.  
Its amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education108 argued that “[t]he United States is 
trying to prove to the people of the world, of every nationality, race, and color, that a free 
democracy is the most civilized and most secure form of government yet devised by 
man,” and segregation jeopardized “the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of 
the free and democratic nations of the world.”109  This view prevailed in the northern 
media as well.  The New York Times described Brown as a “blow to communism.”110  
The Washington Post added that with Brown, “America is rid of an incubus which 
impeded and embarrassed it in all of its relations with the world.”111   
In contrast to these attempts to link integration with democracy, southern 
conservatives argued that integration advocates were controlled by communist forces.  
The charges were not entirely surprising: segregationists had associated communism and 
black activism since the turn of the century and the early days of the NAACP.112  In the 
                                                 
108Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
109Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 35 (quoting Brown v. Board of 
Education, Amicus Brief of the United States of America). 
110Ibid. (quoting New York Times, May 18, 1954, at 19). 
111“Equal Education for All,” Washington Post, May 19, 1954, p. 19. 
112Jeff Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the 
South, 1948-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 49 (citing  
Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 
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1930s, this link between “red” and “black” had solidified in the minds of many 
southerners when the Communist Party’s legal arm, the International Labor Defense, 
undertook the celebrated defenses of Angelo Herndon and the “Scottsboro Boys.”113  But 
the “southern red scare” of the 1950s pressed the connections between these two 
“radical” movements beyond the realm of plausibility.114  And while segregationists 
“never found any good evidence that Communists had a perceptible influence in the 
NAACP,” they nevertheless perpetuated a link “to discredit the civil rights movement by 
associating it with the nation’s greatest enemy.”115 
Warren’s Brown opinion sparked further efforts to steer anti-communist sentiment 
toward civil rights activists.  His famous footnote eleven cited four non-legal sources—
including Myrdal and two other authors who had “what passed for communist leanings 
                                                                                                                                                 
Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984), 26-33).  See also the discussion of 
this era in Chapter 1. 
113See Charles H. Martin, The Angelo Herndon Case and Southern Justice (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1976), xii. 
114Neil McMillen asserts that “the region had virtually no Communists.”  Neil R. 
McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 
1954-64 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 193.  But see Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 580 (1963) (Harlan J. dissenting) (“it 
is not amiss to recall that government evidence in Smith Act prosecutions has shown that 
the sensitive area of race relations has long been a prime target of Communist efforts at 
infiltration”).  In 1950, the NAACP adopted an “anti-communism” resolution that 
acknowledged that “certain branches of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People are being rocked by internal conflicts between groups who follow the 
Communist line and those who do not, which threaten to destroy the confidence of the 
public in the Association and which will inevitably result in its eventual disruption” and 
“there is a well organized, nationwide conspiracy by Communists either to capture or 
split and wreck the NAACP.”  Ibid., 580, 581 (quoting Statement from Forty-First 
Convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). 
115Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare, 5, 53. 
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during that era.”116  Collectively, the footnote citations “reduced both the legal and moral 
force” of the opinion and gave segregationists additional fodder for their arguments.117  In 
response to the decision, Georgia’s lieutenant governor denounced the “meddlers, 
demagogues, race baiters, and communists who are determined to destroy every vestige 
of State’s Rights.”118  Mississippi Senator James Eastland, who at the time chaired both 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and the SISS, argued that the Court in Brown had 
“responded to a radical, pro-Communist political movement in this country.”119  Eastland, 
Arkansas senator John McClellan, and Louisiana representative Edwin Willis used their 
positions on the SISS, HUAC, and other investigative subcommittees to hold public 
hearings on “Communist influence in civil rights protests.”120  
One of the most forceful advocates of the link between communism and civil 
rights in the South was Mississippi Circuit Court Judge Tom P. Brady.  Lucas Powe 
writes that “Brady saw Brown as a virtual communist plot to mandate the amalgamation 
of the races.”121  The summer after the Court’s decision, Brady spearheaded the creation 
                                                 
116Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 42. 
117Ibid., 44. 
118Ibid., 39. 
119McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 195.  Eastland followed this with a frontal assault in 
a publication called “Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?”  Ibid., 195-96.  Another 
segregationist, Medford Evans, wrote that “[f]orced integration is communism in action.” 
Ibid., 197. 
120Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare, 5.  Eastland was “one of the era’s leading racists” 
and dubbed by Time magazine as “the nation’s most dangerous demagogue.” Robert 
Sherrill, First Amendment Felon: The Story of Frank Wilkinson, his 132,000-page FBI 
File and his Epic Fight for Civil Rights and Liberties (New York: Nation, 2005), 157. 
121Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 68. 
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of the Citizens Councils, which purported to be a “nonviolent alternative to the Ku Klux 
Klan” that would ensure economic ruin to anyone supporting integration.122  According 
to Neil McMillen, “the nexus between the NAACP and the international Communist 
apparatus was the central motif of literally hundreds of Council speeches and 
publications.”123 
In late 1954 and early 1955, Citizens Councils sprang up across Alabama.  From 
October to December 1955 alone, membership in the Alabama Councils grew from “a 
few hundred to twenty thousand.”124  The Councils made clear their intentions to bury 
civil rights advocates in Alabama with economic and social pressures: 
The white population in this country controls the money, and this is an 
advantage that the council will use in a fight to legally maintain complete 
segregation of the races.   We intend to make it difficult, if not impossible, 
for any Negro who advocates desegregation to find and hold a job, get 
credit or renew a mortgage.125  
 
This background is critical to understanding the importance of the membership lists at 
issue in NAACP v. Alabama: once the names of NAACP members became public, the 
Citizens Councils would ensure swift and dire consequences.126  
 
                                                 
122Ibid.  Brady was careful to make a clear distinction between the councils and the 
“nefarious Ku Klux Klans.” McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 18. 
123McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 198. Brady told one Council gathering that the 
NAACP “was a willing and ready tool in the hands of Communist front organizations.”  
NAACP v. Alabama, Brief Supporting Petition for Certiorari (“NAACP Cert Brief”), 21 
n.20 (citing Brady comments made on June 22, 1955.) 
124Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 68. 
125NAACP Cert Brief at 20 (quoting Southern School News, Vol I., No. 5, p. 2). 
126See Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 68, 165.   
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  2.  Membership Lists and the Right of Association  
The background to NAACP v. Alabama began in June of 1956, when Alabama 
Attorney General John Patterson initiated an action to enjoin the NAACP from operating 
within the state.127  The state court trial judge issued the injunction ex parte, explaining 
that he intended “to deal the NAACP a mortal blow from which they shall never 
recover.”128  The judge also ordered the NAACP to produce its membership list, which 
Patterson had requested as part of a records review.  Knowing what this disclosure would 
mean given the activity of the Citizens Councils, the NAACP refused.  The judge 
responded with a $10,000 contempt fine, which he increased to $100,000 five days later.  
After the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the NAACP’s appeal of the judge’s order 
through a series of disingenuous procedural rulings, the NAACP appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
In its petition for certiorari, the NAACP contended that the actions of Patterson 
and the Alabama courts amounted to “a serious interference with essential freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and the right to petition” and “an 
unlawful restraint by the State of Alabama of First Amendment rights.”129  The inclusion 
of “association” among the First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, and petition 
seemed almost haphazard.  The NAACP’s substantive legal arguments relied on the 
                                                 
127Patterson argued that the NAACP was a “business” that had failed to register under 
applicable state law. 
128Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 165 (quoting Mark Tushnet, Making 
Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 283). 
129NAACP v. Alabama, Petition for Certiorari, 17, 18. 
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rights of speech and assembly, and the only other reference to a freedom of association in 
the petition made no effort to suggest its constitutional basis.  
In contrast to its cert petition, which implicitly made the incorporation argument, 
the NAACP’s merits brief endorsed the liberty argument: the organization and its 
members were “merely invoking their constitutionally protected rights of free speech and 
free association guaranteed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”130  The brief elaborated that “[t]he unimpaired maintenance of freedom of 
association and free speech is considered essential to our political integrity” and quoted 
from Frankfurter’s in Wieman concurrence that the right of association was “peculiarly 
characteristic of our people.”131  
In its reply brief, the State of Alabama conceded the existence of a right of 
association.  Using “association” and “assembly” interchangeably, the State contended 
that “[l]ike the other basic First Amendment freedoms, freedom of assembly is protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment against unreasonable impairment by the states.”132  The 
Court, according to the State, had “recently reaffirmed” the “constitutional status of 
association” in Sweezy.133  
                                                 
130NAACP Cert Brief at 21. 
131NAACP v. Alabama, Petitioner’s Brief, 22, 24 (quoting Wieman, 195 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)). Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, and Arthur Shores signed the brief 
for the NAACP.  Walker reports that lawyers from the ACLU and American Jewish 
Congress wrote “major sections” of the brief.  Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 
239. 
132NAACP v. Alabama, Respondent’s Brief at 2.  
133Ibid., 2 (quoting Sweezy, 250).  Alabama insisted that the only harm articulated by the 
NAACP and its members was “the mere speculation of injury by private persons to its 
members.” Respondent’s Brief, 12.  Citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
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First Amendment scholar Leo Pfeffer submitted an amicus brief on behalf of a 
number of organizations, including the American Jewish Congress, the American Baptist 
Convention, the Commission on Christian Social Progress, the ACLU, and the American 
Veterans Committee.134  The Court refused to consider the brief,135 but Pfeffer’s 
arguments are preserved in the record and illuminate the conflation of the constitutional 
and doctrinal concepts in the case.   
Pfeffer was best known for his work on the First Amendment’s religion clauses, 
but his 1956 book, The Liberties of an American, had included a section on assembly and 
association in which he had asserted that despite the absence of any mention of 
association in the Bill of Rights, “there can be little doubt that [the founding fathers] 
recognized the right to associate as a liberty of Americans.”136  He elaborated by drawing 
a distinction between association and assembly that cast assembly in a remarkably narrow 
role: 
When men band together for a single public demonstration of feeling or 
expression of a grievance they exercise their right of assembly; when they 
continue banding and acting together until the grievance is redressed they 
exercise their right of association.  Freedom of indefinite or permanent 
association is as fundamental to democracy and as much a liberty of 
Americans as freedom of temporary assembly, and no less entitled to 
constitutional protection. 137  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1875), the State contended that “[p]rivate action is not state action” and did not 
constitute a violation of constitutional rights.  Ibid. 
134NAACP v. Alabama, Amicus Brief of American Jewish Congress, et al. (“Pfeffer 
Amicus Brief”), October 3, 1957. 
135NAACP v. Alabama, 355 U.S. 860 (1957) (denying motion for leave to file amicus 
brief). 
136Leo Pfeffer, The Liberties of an American: The Supreme Court Speaks (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1956), 111. 
137Ibid. 
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But a few sentences later, Pfeffer collapsed the distinction, referring to “the right of 
assembly (i.e., association).”138    
In his amicus brief, Pfeffer opened by appealing both to the liberty argument and 
the incorporation argument:   
Freedom of association is a liberty guaranteed against Federal 
infringement by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and against state infringement by the Fourteenth.  In addition it is one of 
the co-equal guarantees of the First Amendment applied to the states by 
the Fourteenth.139 
 
In support of the liberty argument, Pfeffer contended that “[a] constitutional provision 
protecting liberty against arbitrary governmental deprivation would have little meaning if 
it did not encompass the freedom of men to associate with each other.”140  When he 
explained the incorporation argument, Pfeffer exhibited the same confusion between 
association and assembly that he had displayed in The Liberties of an American.  He 
argued on the one hand that “‘freedom of association’ may be viewed as a right to 
conduct indefinitely continuing assemblies.”141  But he also asserted that “freedom of 
assembly is not limited to occasional meetings but includes the organization of 
associations on a permanent basis.”142  This latter argument represented a third way to 
ground association in the Constitution:  
                                                 
138Ibid. 
139Pffefer Amicus Brief, at 8. 
140Ibid., 10-11. 
141Ibid., 15. 
142Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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The assembly argument, which holds that the right of association is part of 
the right of assembly and is therefore accorded the same deference and 
applicable to the states to the same extent as the right of assembly. 
 
The assembly argument garnered little attention from the justices (other than Black and 
Douglas, who raised it infrequently in later cases).  But it could have linked the right of 
association to the doctrinal and constitutional history of the right of assembly.  This is not 
to suggest that the right of assembly was immune to political pressure—as previously 
noted, the preferred position of assembly had already been attenuated by some of the 
early communist cases of the 1950s.  But at the very least, connecting a new right of 
association to the existing right of assembly would have provided a more direct link to 
the text of the Constitution than either the incorporation argument or the liberty 
argument.  
Oral argument in NAACP v. Alabama focused almost entirely on procedural and 
jurisdictional questions related to Alabama state law.  The justices showed little interest 
in the freedom of association and asked no questions about its constitutional basis.  
NAACP attorney Robert L. Carter, who had advanced the incorporation argument in his 
cert petition and the liberty argument in his brief, now reverted back to the incorporation 
argument: the denial of “free speech and freedom of association” infringed upon a right 
“protected by the First Amendment.”143  Alabama Assistant Attorney General Edmon 
Rinehart made no argument regarding the constitutional basis of association but conceded 
its status as an individual right.144   
                                                 
143NAACP v. Alabama, January 15, 1958 Oral Argument Tr. at 32:15. 
144NAACP v. Alabama, January 16, 1958 Oral Argument Tr. at 51:30 – 1:01:20.  Rinehart 
instead challenged the NAACP’s attempt to assert the right as a corporation or on behalf 
of its members.  He argued that Watkins and Sweezy had addressed assertions of 
individual rights, not the rights of a group.  He intimated only once that the state could 
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The justices agreed that Alabama had infringed upon the associational rights of 
the members of the NAACP.  After they met in conference, Warren assigned the opinion 
to Harlan with the understanding that it would be unsigned or per curiam, in keeping with 
the Court’s practice in post-Brown race cases.145  But Harlan soon realized that “it would 
reflect adversely on the Court were we to dispose of the case without a fully reasoned 
opinion,” and his colleagues agreed to his request to write a full opinion.146    
Harlan’s opinion for a unanimous Court framed the constitutional question in 
terms of the “fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”147  He began his constitutional analysis by citing De Jonge v. 
Oregon148 and Thomas v. Collins149 for the principle that: “Effective advocacy of both 
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced 
by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the 
                                                                                                                                                 
constrain an individual right of association, arguing unconvincingly that a member of the 
NAACP asked during a hearing to confirm his membership would be required to make 
such a disclosure.  Ibid., 1:00:20 – 1:01:13.  Rinehart also argued vehemently that the 
right of association wasn’t implicated because the case involved no state action: any 
adverse treatment following disclosure of membership in the NAACP would come from 
private persons or businesses, not the state.  Ibid.  For good measure, Rinehart 
implausibly contended that the possibility of these private actions was “pure speculation.”   
Ibid., 55:00. 
145Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 161.  Yarbrough explains that these opinions 
“contained little explication of their rationale for a particular ruling and thus permitted 
various facets of the segregation issue to jell in the lower courts with limited Supreme 
Court intervention.”  Ibid. 
146Ibid. (quoting John M. Harlan, Memorandum for the Conference, April 22, 1958, 
Harlan Papers, Box 495). 
147NAACP v. Alabama, 461. 
148De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
149Thomas v. Collins, 516. 
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close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”150  De Jonge and Thomas 
had established that the freedom of assembly applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that it covered political, economic, religious, and secular matters, and that it 
could only be restricted “to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the 
State may lawfully protect.”151  Based on these precedents, Harlan could have grounded 
his decision in the freedom of assembly.  But he instead shifted away from assembly, 
writing in the next sentence that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
embraces freedom of speech.”152  The Alabama courts had constrained the “right to 
freedom of association” of members of the NAACP.153  These members had a 
“constitutionally protected right of association” that meant they could “pursue their 
lawful private interests privately” and “associate freely with others in doing so.”154  
Writing a few years after NAACP v. Alabama, Thomas Emerson suggested that Harlan 
“initially treated freedom of association as derivative from the first amendment rights to 
freedom of speech and assembly, and as ancillary to them” and then “elevated freedom of 
association to an independent right, possessing an equal status with the other rights 
                                                 
150NAACP v. Alabama, 460. 
151De Jonge, 364; Thomas, 528 n.12. 
152NAACP v. Alabama, 460 (emphasis added). He then proceeded to discuss the 
“protected liberties” of speech and press that were “assured under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Ibid., 461. 
153Ibid., 462. 
154Ibid., 463, 466. 
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specifically enumerated in the first amendment.”155  But Harlan’s opinion is more 
ambiguous than Emerson suggests: it is not clear that he relied at all on the First 
Amendment to ground association—the opinion, in fact, never mentions the First 
Amendment.   
 
3.  Unanimity Masking Division? 
Harlan’s vagueness about the source of the right of association may explain how 
he marshaled a unanimous opinion.156  In an earlier draft that he circulated to his 
colleagues, Harlan had written: “[i]t is of course firmly established that the protection 
given by the First Amendment against federal invasion of such rights is afforded by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state action.”157  Douglas and 
Frankfurter were both troubled by the draft language, but for opposite reasons.  
Frankfurter pushed Harlan to rely expressly on the liberty argument and avoid any 
mention of the First Amendment:   
Why in heaven’s name must we, whenever some discussion under the Due 
Process Clause is involved, get off speeches about the First Amendment?  
Why can’t you . . . state in two or three sentences that to ask disclosure of 
membership  . . . is, in the light of prior decisions, merely citing them, an 
invasion of the free area of activity under the Fourteenth Amendment not 
                                                 
155Thomas I. Emerson, "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression," Yale Law 
Journal 74 (1964): 2. 
156The justices realized that “unanimity was considered crucial in racial cases.” 
Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 162. Yarbrough cites letters from Erwin Griswold and 
Edward Corwin congratulating Harlan on the opinion.  Ibid., 165 n.35 (citing Erwin 
Griswold to John M. Harlan, July 8, 1958, Harlan Papers, Box 538; Edward S. Corwin to 
John M. Harlan, July 7, 1958, Harlan Papers Box 511).   
157Ibid., 125 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, Harlan opinion draft, Harlan Papers, Box 
533). 
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overcome by any solid, as against a very tenuous, interest of the state in 
prying into such freedom of action by individuals . . .158   
 
Douglas, on the other hand, feared that Harlan’s due process analysis diluted the First 
Amendment as it applied to the states: 
[I]f the right of free speech is watered down by the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and made subject to state regulation, then the 
police power of the state has a pretty broad area for application.  If we are 
dealing here with something that can be regulated then I think we are in 
very deep water in this case, as for the life of me I do not see why a state 
could not have a rational judgment for believing that an organization like 
the NAACP was a source of a lot of trouble, friction, and unrest . . . 159    
 
Douglas expressed particular concern over Frankfurter’s proposed balancing approach 
(which Harlan had endorsed in earlier opinions): “I thought that when we dealt with these 
racial problems and with free speech and free assembly and religious problems we were 
dealing with something that is right close to the absolute.”160   
Harlan had no affinity for Douglas’s argument, but he also expressed “the most 
serious misgivings” about Frankfurter’s advice.161  Nonetheless, his revised draft 
eliminated any reference to the First Amendment.  This concerned Black, who thought 
                                                 
158Ibid. (quoting Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan, April 23, 1958, Harlan Papers, Box 
46). 
159Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., The Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private Papers of 
Justice William O. Douglas, ed. Melvin I. Urofsky (Bethesda: Adler & Adler, 1987), 198 
(quoting William O. Douglas to John Marshall Harlan, Apri1, 22, 1958.   
160Urofsky, The Douglas Letters, 198.  Dissenting from an opinion handed down the 
same day as NAACP v. Alabama, Douglas wrote that the liberties contained in the First 
Amendment include “the right to believe what one chooses, the right to differ from his 
neighbor, the right to pick and choose the political philosophy that he likes best, the right 
to associate with whomever he chooses, the right to join the groups he prefers, the 
privilege of selecting his own path to salvation.” Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 
357 U.S. 399, 412-13 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
161Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 126-27. 
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that the opinion now read “as though the First Amendment did not exist.”162  Black 
notified Harlan that he planned on submitting a brief concurrence to specify “that the 
state has here violated the basic freedoms of press, speech and assembly, immunized 
from federal abridgement by the First Amendment, and made applica[ble] as a 
prohibition against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”163  But six days later, he 
relented, writing to Harlan that while he “would prefer our holding be supported by 
different reasoning,” he realized that doing so would prevent the unanimous decision so 
important to the Court in cases involving questions of race.164   
 In the midst of satisfying Frankfurter, Douglas, and Black, Harlan had one other 
hurdle to clear in his opinion.  The State of Alabama had argued that the Court was bound 
by Bryant v. Zimmerman, the 1928 case in which an 8-1 majority had upheld a New York 
registration and membership disclosure law against a challenge from a member of the Ku 
Klux Klan.165  Bryant had given short shrift to the assertion of a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process liberty right “of membership in the association,” concluding that this right 
“must yield to the rightful exertion of the police power.”166  The Court had noted that: 
There can be no doubt that under that power the State may prescribe and 
apply to associations having an oath-bound membership any reasonable 
regulation calculated to confine their purposes and activities within limits 
                                                 
162Ibid., 126 (quoting Hugo L. Black to John M. Harlan, May 2, 1958, Harlan Papers, 
Box 46). 
163Ibid. 
164Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 162.  Clark threatened to dissent on procedural 
grounds, but Frankfurter persuaded him to join the majority on the merits.  Ibid., 162, 
163.  
165Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).  See the discussion of Bryant in Chapter 1. 
166Ibid., 72. 
 121 
which are consistent with the rights of others and the public welfare. . . . 
[R]equiring [membership lists] to be supplied for the public files will 
operate as an effective or substantial deterrent from the violations of 
public and private right to which the association might be tempted if such 
a disclosure were not required.167  
  
This broad deference to police power, with explicit approval of the public disclosure of 
the Klan’s membership list, may have prompted Douglas’s concern that it would be 
difficult to distinguish Bryant if Harlan resolved NAACP v. Alabama under the liberty 
argument.  Harlan concluded that Bryant “was based on the particular character of the 
Klan’s activities, involving acts of unlawful intimidation and violence.”168  Relying on 
the “markedly different considerations in terms of the interest of the State in obtaining 
disclosure” Harlan distinguished Bryant without overruling it.169  That distinction—based 
on the nature of the group rather than the nature of the restriction—combined with 
Harlan’s nebulous final wording towing an ambiguous middle line to appease the 
concerns raised by Frankfurter, Douglas and Black, left uncertain the precise 
constitutional basis for association and its applicability in other contexts. 
 
C.  ASSOCIATION AFTER NAACP V. ALABAMA 
 It was clear that NAACP v. Alabama had broken new constitutional ground, but 
specifying exactly what had taken place proved elusive.  The Washington Post 
                                                 
167Ibid. 
168NAACP v. Alabama, 466.  Harlan also attempted a less plausible distinction, noting 
that “the situation before us is significantly different from that in Bryant, because the 
organization there had made no effort to comply with any of the requirements of New 
York’s statute but rather had refused to furnish the State with any information as to its 
local activities.” Ibid., 465-66. 
169Ibid., 465. 
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editorialized that the Court had “cut through the flummery of Alabama’s treatment of the 
NAACP and dealt with it as an outright violation of the freedom of assembly.”170  The 
New York Times suggested that the Court had relied on the liberty argument, writing that 
the decision rested upon “one of the ‘fundamental freedoms’ guaranteed by the due 
process clauses [sic] of the Fourteenth Amendment.”171  Meanwhile, the first round of 
commentary in the law reviews endorsed the incorporation argument, contending that 
Harlan’s opinion had located the freedom of association in the First Amendment.  The 
Ohio State Law Journal tied the new freedom of association to the freedom of assembly 
and suggested that the decision reinforced that “First amendment rights occupy a high 
position in the hierarchy of constitutional freedoms and may be limited only when the 
state has a compelling interest.”172  The Brooklyn Law Review concluded that the freedom 
of association, although not mentioned in the First Amendment, was “included 
therein.”173  And the George Washington Law Review suggested that “the new freedom of 
association is a cognate of  . . . first amendment freedoms and enjoys coordinately their 
preferred status.”174   The only thing clear from these initial reactions was that nobody 
                                                 
170“Freedom of Association,” Washington Post, July 3, 1958, p. A12 (emphasis added). 
171“Freedom to Associate,” New York Times, July 2, 1958, p. 28. 
172Frank M. Hays, “State May Not Compel Association to Disclose Names of Members,” 
Ohio State Law Journal 20 (1959): 123, 124-25, 124 n.8.  Cf. ibid., 126 (the Court 
followed “quite closely its previous holdings in the area of free speech and assembly”). 
173“Freedom of Association—Right to Privacy,” Brooklyn Law Review 25 (1985): 123. 
174Myron Solter, “Freedom of Association—A New and Fundamental Civil Right,” 
George Washington Law Review 27 (1959): 653, 672.  The Harvard Law Review’s 
summary of Alabama noted that the holding rested on “freedom of association” but did 
not elaborate on the nature or source of that freedom.  “Disclosure of Membership Lists,” 
Harvard Law Review 72 (1958): 193, 194. 
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was clear about the source or scope of the new right of association.  The Court would 
defer to later cases to resolve those questions. 
 
1.  Uphaus and Barenblatt: Ducking the Hard Question 
The Court’s first opportunities to apply NAACP v. Alabama came the following 
term in Uphaus v. Wyman175 and Barenblatt v. United States,176 two cases involving 
inquiries into alleged communist affiliations.  The new freedom of association could have 
provided increased protection against the overzealous investigations of the McCarthy era.  
But while Anthony Lewis had characterized NAACP v. Alabama as “an illustration of the 
[C]ourt’s concern for the Constitutional right to express beliefs and ideas, however 
unpopular, through effective means,” when the Court turned from the NAACP to the 
Communist Party, it became clear that not all associations were created equal.177    
Uphaus involved another inquiry by New Hampshire’s Attorney General, Louis 
Wyman, who had been on the losing end of the Court’s Sweezy decision two years 
earlier.  Without mentioning the freedom of association, Justice Clark suggested that the 
case turned on “the single question of whether New Hampshire, under the facts here, is 
precluded from compelling the production of the documents by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”178  Clark concluded that the “governmental interest in 
self-preservation is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in associational 
                                                 
175Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
176Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
177Anthony Lewis, “High Court Term a Significant One,” New York Times, July 6, 1958, 
p. 29. 
178Uphaus, 77. 
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privacy.”179  Brennan filed a lengthy dissent premised on “the constitutionally protected 
rights of speech and assembly.”180  Because he saw “no valid legislative interest” behind 
Wyman’s inquiry, Brennan didn’t see the need for any balancing of interests.181  He 
thought that the “Court’s approach to a very similar problem in NAACP v. Alabama 
should furnish a guide to the proper course of decision here.”182   
Barenblatt, which unlike NAACP v. Alabama and Uphaus involved a 
congressional action, gave the Court its first opportunity to explain how the new right of 
association applied to the federal government.  There were two possibilities.  If 
association were a First Amendment right, then it would apply directly to actions of 
Congress.183  If, on the other hand, association were rooted in liberty, it presumably 
would apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.184  Harlan’s opinion for the Court unambiguously accepted the former view: 
                                                 
179Ibid., 81. 
180Ibid., 82 (Brennan, J. dissenting).  Brennan’s dissent conflated speech, expression, 
assembly, association, and privacy, referring at times to the “rights of association and 
expression,” Ibid., 106, and “the interest in privacy as it relates to freedom of speech and 
assembly.”  Ibid., 107-08.  But he made his most frequent appeals to the constitutional 
rights of “speech and assembly.”  Ibid., 82, 83, 97, 105, 106, 107-08.  Black, Douglas, 
and Warren joined Brennan’s dissent. 
181Ibid.  Brennan wrote: “The Court describes the inquiry we must make in this matter as 
a balancing of interests. I think I have indicated that there has been no valid legislative 
interest of the State actually defined and shown in the investigation as it operated, so that 
there is really nothing against which the appellant's rights of association and expression 
can be balanced.”  Ibid., 106. 
182Ibid., 103. 
183See U.S. Constitution, Amendment I (“Congress shall make no law . . .”). 
184The right of association couldn’t be applied to the federal government through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because that provision applied only to 
“States.”  The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government and forbids the 
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“[t]he precise constitutional issue confronting us is whether the Subcommittee’s inquiry 
into [Barenblatt’s] past or present membership in the Communist Party transgressed the 
provisions of the First Amendment.”185   
Barenblatt presented facts similar to those in Watkins, one of the Court’s 1957 
Red Monday decisions.  The HUAC had summoned Barenblatt, who had taught 
psychology at Vassar, to ask him questions about an alleged affiliation with the 
Communist Party while he had been a graduate student at the University of Michigan.186  
Like Watkins, Barenblatt had refused on First Amendment grounds to answer questions.  
In the earlier case, Chief Justice Warren had skirted the First Amendment challenge and 
instead concluded in general due process terms that Watkins could not reasonably have 
been expected to know which questions from the HUAC were pertinent to its legitimate 
inquiry (Frankfurter later referred to Warren’s efforts as that “god-awful Watkins 
opinion”).187  Harlan, writing for the Court in Barenblatt, distinguished Watkins on the 
basis that the HUAC questions to Barenblatt were pertinent to the inquiry.188  
                                                                                                                                                 
deprivation of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”  See U.S. Constitution, 
Amendment V. 
185Barenblatt, 126.  See also Ibid. (“Undeniably, the First Amendment in some 
circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational 
relationships.”).  Harlan’s conclusion that the right of association limiting the federal 
government was found in the First Amendment is not inconsistent with his view that the 
right of association limiting state action was in the Fourteenth Amendment.  That was, in 
essence, how he viewed rights specifically enumerated in the First Amendment. 
186Barenblatt, 113-114. 
187Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 201 (quoting Frankfurter). 
188Barenblatt, 125. 
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Like Clark in Uphaus, Harlan largely eschewed the right of association and 
instead used a “balancing of interests” analysis.  Frankfurter had been pushing for this 
approach for some time, first in his Dennis concurrence and more recently in his Sweezy 
concurrence.  When Harlan circulated a draft of his Barenblatt opinion, Frankfurter 
responded with the suggestion that Harlan include “a few pungent paragraphs putting the 
case in its setting.”189  This should happen “[b]efore the reader gets involved in the details 
of balancing.”190  Harlan’s revised opinion incorporated Frankfurter’s suggestions and 
emphasized “the close nexus between the Communist Party and violent overthrow of 
government.”191  
As Lucas Powe notes, Harlan never explained how the government’s “right of self 
preservation” related to  “asking a former psychology instructor at Vassar about meetings 
when he was a graduate student.” 192  Moreover, Harlan failed to articulate a single 
interest of Barenblatt’s against which the government’s interests could be balanced, 
noting only that “the record is barren of other factors which, in themselves, might 
sometimes lead to the conclusion that the individual interests at stake were not 
subordinate to those of the state.”193  Black’s dissent quipped that Harlan had rewritten 
the First Amendment to read that “Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of 
speech, press, assembly and petition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the 
                                                 
189Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 202 (quoting Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan, 
June 3, 1959). 
190Ibid. 
191Barenblatt, 120. 
192Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 144. 
193Barenblatt, 134. 
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joint conclusion that on balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms 
is greater than the interest of the people in having them exercised.”194  In a particularly 
poignant passage, Black wrote: 
The fact is that, once we allow any group which has some political aims or 
ideas to be driven from the ballot and from the battle for men’s minds 
because some of its members are bad and some of its tenets are illegal, no 
group is safe. . . . History should teach us [that] in times of high emotional 
excitement, minority parties and groups which advocate extremely 
unpopular social or governmental innovations will always be typed as 
criminal gangs, and attempts will always be made to drive them out.  It 
was knowledge of this fact, and of its great dangers, that caused the 
Founders of our land to enact the First Amendment as a guarantee that 
neither Congress nor the people would do anything to hinder or destroy 
the capacity of individuals and groups to seek converts and votes for any 
cause, however radical or unpalatable their principles might seem under 
the accepted notions of the time.195    
 
Neither Clark in Uphaus nor Harlan in Barenblatt included any discussion about 
the constitutional right of association.  Harlan referred only once to “rights of association 
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”196  Clark mentioned 
“associational privacy” made applicable through “the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”197  But both decisions avoided a direct application of the new 
right.  That would come not in a communist case but in one with facts remarkably similar 
to those in NAACP v. Alabama.  
 
                                                 
194Ibid., 143 (Black, J., dissenting).  Douglas and Warren joined the dissent.  Brennan 
dissented separately. 
195Ibid., 150-51.  Black rested his dissent on the First Amendment rights of speech and 
association. 
196Barenblatt, 127. 
197Uphaus, 78, 77.
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2.  Applying the Right of Association 
In Bates v. City of Little Rock, the Court reviewed the convictions of two records 
custodians who had refused to produce local NAACP membership lists as required by 
ordinances in two Arkansas cities.198  Like the disclosure order that had led to the 
Alabama litigation, the Arkansas ordinances were designed to cripple the NAACP.199  
Relying on the freedom of association, Justice Stewart’s majority opinion cited De Jonge 
and NAACP v. Alabama to link association with assembly: 
Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly 
was considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation 
of a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry—a 
government dedicated to the establishment of justice and the preservation 
of liberty (citing the First Amendment).  And it is now beyond dispute that 
freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing 
grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from invasion by the States.200 
 
As with Harlan’s wording in NAACP v. Alabama, Stewart’s language could be read to 
support either the incorporation argument or the liberty argument.  To confuse matters 
further, Black and Douglas asserted the assembly argument in a joint concurrence: 
We concur in the judgment and substantially with the opinion because we 
think the facts show that the ordinances as here applied violate freedom of 
speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment which this Court 
has many times held was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . One of those rights, freedom of assembly, includes of 
                                                 
198Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
199See Joseph B. Robison, "Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of 
Membership," Columbia Law Review 58 (1958): 614.  Similar statutory efforts unfolded 
in Virginia, Texas, and Tennessee.  Ibid., 616.  Louisiana attacked the NAACP through 
an existing state law that had originally been drafted against the Ku Klux Klan.  Ibid., 
617. 
200361 U.S. at 522-23. 
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course freedom of association; and it is entitled to no less protection than 
any other First Amendment right.201  
 
Ten months after Bates, Stewart again wrote for the majority in Shelton v. 
Tucker.202  The case involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute requiring every teacher 
at a state-supported school or college to file an annual affidavit disclosing all 
organizations to which he or she had belonged or regularly contributed in the previous 
five years.  Although the affidavit requirement wasn’t overtly aimed at the NAACP, the 
Arkansas statute clearly targeted the organization.203  In Bates, Stewart had cited De 
Jonge in linking association to assembly.  In Shelton, he again cited De Jonge but now 
omitted any reference to assembly, referring instead to a “right of free association, a right 
closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the 
foundation of a free society.”204  Unlike the unanimous decisions in NAACP v. Alabama 
and Bates, the Court split 5-4 in Shelton, with Frankfurter and Harlan joined by Clark and 
Whittaker in dissent.  Harlan’s dissent asserted that “[t]he rights of free speech and 
association embodied in the ‘liberty’ assured against state action by the Fourteenth 
                                                 
201Ibid., 527-28 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added).  A note in the 
Virginia Law Review published after Bates suggested that “the concept of ‘freedom of 
association’ illustrates the development of a judicial technique” for dealing with the 
particular kind of situation at issue in NAACP v. Alabama and Bates rather than “an 
enunciation of an independent constitutional right.” Peter R. Fisher, “Freedom of 
Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique?”, Virginia Law Review, 46 
(1960): 730. 
202Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
203B.T. Shelton had refused to file the affidavit due to his membership in the NAACP.  
Ibid., 483.  He had originally challenged both the affidavit requirement and a separate 
Arkansas statue making it unlawful for any member of the NAACP to be employed by 
the State of Arkansas.  Ibid., 484 n.2. 
204Ibid., 486. 
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Amendment are not absolute,” reiterating both his liberty argument and his endorsement 
of a kind of balancing.205   
In 1961, a year after Shelton, Douglas wrote the majority opinion in Louisiana v. 
NAACP.206  The case had arisen in 1956, after Louisiana sought to enjoin the NAACP 
from doing business in the state.  The State asserted that the NAACP had violated two 
state statutes, the first of which prohibited associations from doing business with out-of-
state communist or subversive organizations, and the second of which required 
“benevolent” associations to disclose the names and addresses of all officers and 
members regulating associations.207  The Court struck down both statutes.  Douglas 
dispensed of the first provision on vagueness grounds without referring to the right of 
association.  Turning to the second provision, Douglas wrote that “freedom of association 
is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable to the States by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”208  He interpreted Shelton to have 
emphasized that “any regulation must be highly selective in order to survive challenge 
under the First Amendment”209 and peppered his opinion with other references to the 
First Amendment.  The four justices who had dissented in Shelton concurred in the 
judgment but not in Douglas’s opinion.210  
                                                 
205Ibid., 496 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
206Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). 
207Ibid., 294. 
208Ibid., 296. 
209Ibid. 
210Ibid., 297. 
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3.  Red Cases and Black Cases 
The first four cases in which a majority of the Court had explicitly relied on the 
constitutional right of association (NAACP v. Alabama, Bates, Shelton, and Louisiana v. 
NAACP) had all invalidated regulations aimed at the NAACP.  On a practical level, these 
decisions were critical to the Civil Rights movement.  As Samuel Walker has argued, 
“[t]he NAACP could not have survived in the South, and the civil rights movement 
would have been set back for years, without the new freedom of association 
protections.”211  But if the enforcement of a right of association for members of the 
NAACP sustained that organization’s existence, the failure to enforce that same right on 
behalf of members of the CPUSA almost certainly contributed to its demise.   
A majority of the Court had already shown a reluctance to apply or even 
acknowledge a right of association for communists in Uphaus and Barenblatt.  This trend 
intensified in 1961.  In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB), 
the Court reviewed the Subversive Activities Control Act, which imposed registration 
and disclosure requirements on “subversive” organizations.212  Harry Kalven has 
suggested that SACB “should have been the architectonic case for freedom of 
                                                 
211Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 241.  Membership in the NAACP in the 
South had fallen from 128,000 in 1955 to 80,000 in 1957, and almost 250 branches had 
closed. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 383.  In 
Louisiana, membership plummeted from 13,000 to 1,700 and in South Carolina it fell 
from 8,200 to 2,000.  Ibid.  The litigation that led to NAACP v. Alabama effectively shut 
down the NAACP in that state from the time of the 1956 injunction until the case was 
finally resolved in 1964 (following additional litigation after the Supreme Court’s 
decision).  Ibid. 
212Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (“SACB”). 
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association” because the statute at issue “aimed at sanctioning association and thus 
openly posed the issue that had been disguised as a speech problem in Dennis.”213  
Instead, the Court upheld the entire Act in the same 5-4 split as Uphaus and Barenblatt.  
Frankfurter wrote the lengthy majority opinion, distinguishing the case from NAACP v. 
Alabama, Bates, and Shelton based on “the magnitude of the public interests which the 
registration and disclosure provisions are designed to protect” and “the pertinence which 
registration and disclosure bear to the protection of those interests.”214  Although the 
justices disagreed on the outcome, they all agreed that the right of association applied to 
the federal government through the First Amendment.215   
                                                 
213Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1988) at 264.  Kalven contends that the 212 pages of opinions by the 
justices and the belief that the case involved legislation limited in scope to the 
Communist Party has led it to be “treated as outside the mainstream of First Amendment 
precedent.”  Ibid.  He argues that despite its verbosity, SACB “is quite possibly the 
precedent which carries the greatest threat to political freedoms in the future” and 
deserves a “central place” in First Amendment case law.  Ibid. 
214SACB, 93. 
215Frankfurter titled a section of his opinion “The Freedoms of Expression and 
Association Protected by the First Amendment.”  Ibid., 88. He asserted that “the power of 
Congress to regulate Communist organizations [subject to foreign control] is extensive,” 
but that power was “limited by the First Amendment.” Ibid., 95, 96. Frankfurter 
concluded that the Act’s registration provisions were “not repugnant to the First 
Amendment,” and that certain accounting provisions did not violate “First Amendment 
rights.” Ibid., 103. Douglas’s dissent noted that “[f]reedom of association is included in 
the bundle of First Amendment rights,” Ibid., 171 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing 
NAACP v. Alabama, 460). Brennan’s partial dissent referred to “the rights of freedom of 
advocacy and association guaranteed by the First Amendment.”  Ibid., 191 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting in part).  Warren joined Brennan’s partial dissent.  Black’s dissent never 
explicitly referenced a “First Amendment right of association,” but his opinion made 
clear that he accepted the First Amendment argument.  See, e.g., ibid., 148 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“The freedom to advocate ideas about public matters through associations of 
the nature of political parties and societies was contemplated and protected by the First 
Amendment.”). Although SACB suggested that all nine justices accepted that the right of 
association applied against the federal government came from the First Amendment, the 
source of the right of association constraining state action remained unclear. 
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On the same day that it decided SACB, the Court issued its 5-4 decision in Scales 
v. United States.216  Harlan wrote the opinion upholding a conviction under the Smith 
Act’s membership clause, which he construed as requiring proof of “active” rather than 
merely “passive” membership in the Communist Party.217  Harlan insisted that a 
conviction under the act required the government to establish more than mere 
membership, but “active and purposive membership, purposive that is as to the 
organization’s criminal ends.”218  
All nine justices had backed the right of association for the NAACP in NAACP v. 
Alabama, Bates, and Louisiana.  Stewart’s vote had ensured a similar outcome in 
Shelton.  But in Uphaus, Barenblatt, SACB and Scales, Stewart joined Frankfurter, 
Harlan, Whittaker, and Clark to deny these same associational protections to the CPUSA.  
In the words of ACLU legal director Mel Wulf, there were “red cases and black cases.”219  
Kalven phrased it more bluntly: “[t]he Communists cannot win, the NAACP cannot 
lose.”220  
                                                 
216Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).  The Court also issued its opinion in Noto 
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), which unanimously reversed a conviction under 
the Smith Act’s membership clause.  But Noto relied exclusively on a sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis.  Ibid., 291 (“The only one of petitioner's points we need consider is his 
attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, since his statutory and constitutional challenges 
to the conviction are disposed of by our opinion in Scales, and consideration of his other 
contentions is rendered unnecessary by the view we take of his evidentiary challenge.”). 
217Ibid. 
218Ibid. 
219Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 240. 
220Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, 259.  Cf. Walker, In Defense of America Liberties, 240 
(referring to “a double standard for political groups”). 
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There was certainly a kind of double standard at work, but it wasn’t as stark as 
Wulf and Kalven suggested.  Harlan’s judicial restraint and deference to government 
officials on national security matters made him less than eager to join the Warren Court’s 
curtailment of government inquiries in the name of civil liberties.221  NAACP v. Alabama 
had been an easy case for him because he believed that the State hadn’t shown any 
legitimate interest in the NAACP’s membership list.  Bates differed from NAACP v. 
Alabama and required a balancing of interests.  Although the decision ended up 
unanimous, Harlan had originally drafted a dissent.222  According to Brennan’s 
conference notes, Harlan believed that while “[t]here can be little doubt that much of the 
association information called for by the statute will be of little or no use whatever to the 
school authorities,” he could “not understand how those authorities can be expected to fix 
in advance the terms of their inquiry so that it will yield only relevant information.”223  
Shelton had been even closer than Bates and hinged on Stewart’s vote.  The four 
dissenters (Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, and Clark) believed that the government had 
shown a rational relationship between its articulated interest and the nature of the 
regulation.  And while Stewart disagreed in Shelton, his position in the communist cases 
left open the possibility that a better articulated government interest would prevail over 
an NAACP claim to the right of association.   
 
                                                 
221See Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 339 (noting Harlan’s “reluctance as a Justice to 
second-guess the judgments of government officials regarding national security 
matters”). 
222Ibid., 212. 
223Ibid. (quoting Brennan Papers, Box 407). 
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4.  Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee  
A Supreme Court case connecting communism and the NAACP “was every 
segregationist’s dream” and offered “the South the chance to take out the NAACP by 
painting the organization red.”224   That case began in 1956, when the Florida legislature 
started to investigate an alleged communist influence on the NAACP.  As part of its 
inquiry, the legislative investigation committee subpoenaed the membership list of the 
organization’s Miami branch.  Theodore Gibson, the custodian of the list, refused to 
produce it, asserting that doing so would violate the associational rights of members of 
the NAACP.  He did, however, volunteer to answer questions based on his personal 
knowledge, and when the committee provided him with the names and pictures of 
fourteen individuals, he testified that to his knowledge they were not members of the 
NAACP.  The committee nonetheless cited Gibson for contempt for his failure to produce 
the records, and he was fined $1,200 and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.  The 
Florida Supreme Court upheld his conviction and Gibson appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.   
At the conference following oral argument, Warren protested that affirming 
Gibson would mean overruling NAACP v. Alabama because even under a balancing 
theory the state had shown “no adequate interest.”225  But Harlan viewed the investigation 
as “a bona fide inquiry into Communism” rather than “a plot to destroy [the] NAACP.”226  
The justices voted to uphold the conviction, and it appeared that the government’s 
                                                 
224Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 155. 
225Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 210. 
226Ibid. 
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national security interests would prevail over the NAACP’s right of association.227  
Frankfurter, the senior justice in the majority, assigned the opinion to Harlan.228   
Five months later, before Harlan had circulated a draft of his opinion, Whittaker 
retired from the Court and the case (now deadlocked at 4-4) was held over for 
reargument.229  Then Frankfurter suffered a stroke and left the Court.  When Gibson was 
reargued the following term, Byron White had replaced Whittaker and Arthur Goldberg 
had succeeded Frankfurter.  Goldberg provided the fifth vote for the NAACP.  He 
authored the majority opinion, distinguishing the case from earlier legislative 
investigation cases because Gibson had not been asked about his own associations with 
the Communist Party.230  Samuel Walker suggests that “Gibson was the clearest 
indication of the extent to which the Court granted to the NAACP the protections it had 
refused to extend to the Communists.”231   
                                                 
227Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 155. 
228Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan, 210. 
229Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 156. 
230Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).   Powe 
writes that Goldberg was “looking for a way to protect the NAACP without having to 
overrule all the legislative-investigation cases” Powe, The Warren Court and American 
Politics, 221. Goldberg’s opinion referred to “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of free speech and free association” and “First and Fourteenth Amendment 
associational rights of individuals.” Gibson, 544, 546. Harlan’s dissent argued that the 
Court’s decision forced the legislative committee “to prove in advance the very things it 
is trying to find out.”  Gibson, 576 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
231Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, 241. Cf. Milton R. Konvitz, Expanding 
Liberties: The Emergence of New Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in Postwar America 
(New York: Viking Press, 1967), 109 (“if Alabama or Arkansas or Florida or Louisiana 
had won in the Court, a way would have opened for the South to paralyze the N.A.A.C.P. 
and any other civil rights or civil liberties organization; and since the Bill of Rights is not 
self-executing, but is dependent upon vindication through litigation, the struggle for 
freedom and equality would have been effectively arrested).”  
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Black and Douglas wrote separate concurrences.  In Black’s view that “the 
constitutional right of association includes the privilege of any person to associate with 
Communists or anti-Communists, Socialists or anti-Socialists, or, for that matter, with 
people of all kinds of beliefs, popular or unpopular.”232  Douglas’s concurrence, which 
may have been drafted as a dissent before the case was held over for reargument, read 
more like a college essay than a legal opinion.233  He quoted or cited eight law review 
articles (including one written by Brennan), Yale President A. Whitney Griswold’s 1958 
baccalaureate address, Edwin Corwin’s The Constitution and What it Means Today, 
Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution, Thomas Jefferson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom,” Arthur Schlesinger’s The Rise of the City, James Madison’s Federalist No. 51, 
Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons, and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.234  
Douglas also registered his adherence to the incorporation argument for association.  He 
framed the constitutional issue as “the authority of a State to investigate people, their 
ideas, their activities” and asserted that “[b]y virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment the 
State is now subject to the same restrictions in making the investigation as the First 
Amendment places on the Federal Government.”235  Douglas took direct aim at Harlan in 
a footnote: 
                                                 
232Gibson, 559 (Black, J., concurring). 
233One suspects that Douglas, who had a propensity for writing his opinions quickly, may 
have drafted his concurrence as a dissent before the case was held over and Goldberg’s 
replacement of Frankfurter reversed the outcome.  Cf. Lucas A. Powe, Jr. “Justice 
Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and Rights,” 
Constitutional Commentary 6 (1989): 271 (Douglas “wrote his dissents before the author 
of the majority had put pen to paper”). 
234Gibson, 560 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
235Ibid. 
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Some have believed that these restraints as applied to the States through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are less restrictive 
on them than they are on the Federal Government.  That is the view of my 
Brother Harlan. . . . But that view has not prevailed.  The Court has indeed 
applied the same First Amendment requirements to the States as to the 
Federal Government.236  
 
Douglas thus made clear his belief that the right association originated in the First 
Amendment and not the Fourteenth.  He was far less lucid in attempting to distinguish 
between association and assembly.  He began with a paean to the right of assembly: 
Joining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an associational 
activity that comes within the purview of the First Amendment, which 
provides in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people, peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
“Peaceably to assemble” as used in the First Amendment necessarily 
involves a coming together, whether regularly or spasmodically.  
Historically the right to assemble was secondary to the right to petition, 
the latter being the primary right.  But today, as the Court stated in De 
Jonge v. Oregon, “The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to 
those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”  
Assembly, like speech, is indeed essential in order to maintain the 
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may 
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be 
obtained by peaceful means.  The holding of meetings for peaceable 
political action cannot be proscribed.  A Free Society is made up of almost 
innumerable institutions through which views and opinions are expressed, 
opinion is mobilized, and social, economic, religious, educational, and 
political programs are formulated.237   
 
It appeared, then, that Douglas was gesturing at the assembly argument.  But a few pages 
later, he revisited the “bundle of rights” language that had appeared in his Louisiana v. 
NAACP opinion and his SACB dissent.  He connected this bundle to a “right of privacy”: 
The right of association has become a part of the bundle of rights 
protected by the First Amendment, and the need for a pervasive right of 
privacy against government intrusion has been recognized, though not 
                                                 
236Ibid., 560 n.2 (citations omitted). 
237Ibid., 562-63 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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always given the recognition it deserves.  Unpopular groups like popular 
ones are protected.  Unpopular groups if forced to disclose their 
membership lists may suffer reprisals or other forms of public hostility. 
But whether a group is popular or unpopular, the right of privacy implicit 
in the First Amendment creates an area into which the Government may 
not enter.238   
 
According to Douglas, not only was the right of association somehow derivative of the 
First Amendment right of assembly, it was also “part of the bundle of rights protected by 
the First Amendment” and related to “the right of privacy implicit in the First 
Amendment.”239  
 
5.  Confusion in the Academy 
The new right of association produced a stream of historical and doctrinal 
analyses.  Book length treatments included Glenn Abernathy’s The Right of Assembly 
and Association,240 Charles Rice’s Freedom of Association,241 and David Fellman’s The 
Constitutional Right of Association.242   These works sought to narrate a history of 
association that had been absent from nearly two centuries of American constitutional 
                                                 
238Ibid., 569-570 (citations omitted). 
239Douglas reiterated his arguments for association (some of which were taken verbatim 
from his Gibson concurrence) in a lecture that he delivered at Brown University and 
subsequently published in the Columbia Law Review.  See William O. Douglas, “The 
Right of Association,” Columbia Law Review 63 (1963).  Harlan’s dissent in Gibson 
(joined by Clark, Stewart, and White) ignored Douglas’s attacks on the liberty argument 
for association.   
240Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association, (Columbia : University of 
South Carolina Press, 1961). 
241Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association (New York: New York University Press, 
1962).  
242David Fellman, The Constitutional Right of Association (Chicago : University of 
Chicago Press, 1963). 
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law.  Fellman, for example, suggested that “however ill-defined they may be, the rights of 
association have a definite place in American constitutional law.”243  Rice argued that 
“[t]he right to associate for the advancement of ideas ha[d] been recognized implicitly in 
the past, and it ha[d] underlain important decisions which have been formally ascribed to 
the application of other freedoms.”244 Carl Beck’s Contempt of Congress took the most 
creative route, referring to a nonexistent “freedom of political affiliation clause[] of the 
First Amendment.”245 
Abernathy provided the most comprehensive account of association.  He had first 
speculated about a right of association in a 1953 article published in the South Carolina 
Law Quarterly.246  Quoting extensively from Tocqueville and Arthur Schlesinger, 
Abernathy had suggested that the importance of freedom of association in a democratic 
                                                 
243Ibid. 
244Rice, Freedom of Association, xvii-xviii. 
245Beck, Contempt of Congress, viii.  Beck is not alone in making such a claim: at least 
twenty-five federal district and appellate court opinions refer to a “freedom of association 
clause.”  See, e.g., Swanson v. City of Bruce, 105 Fed. Appx. 540, 542 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(unpublished opinion) (referring to “the freedom of association clause”); Boyle v. County 
of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 1998) (asserting that the plurality opinion in 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 247 (1976) “held that the discharge of a government employee 
because of his political affiliation violates the freedom of association clause of the First 
Amendment”); Darnell v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 924 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(unpublished opinion) (discussing the requirements for a prima facie case under “the 
freedom of association clause of the first amendment”); Grace United Methodist Church 
v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.Supp. 2d 1186, 1203 (2006) (“The First Amendment's Free 
Speech Clause and Freedom of Association Clauses apply to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F.Supp. 2d 528, 543 (2001) 
(“The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to provide little protection 
under the Freedom of Association Clause to commercial enterprises.”). 
246Glenn Abernathy, “The Right of Association,” South Carolina Law Quarterly 6 
(1953): 32-77. 
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society “cannot be overestimated.”247  Noting that the Supreme Court had at that time yet 
to recognize a right of association, he argued that it was nonetheless “a right cognate to 
those of free speech and free assembly.”248  Reviewing Congress’s anti-communist 
legislation and the Court’s Adler decision, Abernathy expressed concern that these 
developments hindered Americans from joining all but the most “ultra-acceptable” 
associations.249  He decried “shotgun legislation which endangers the whole institution of 
voluntary association” and argued for a “broad freedom to associate.”250  But 
Abernathy’s principal concern for free association had little to do with protecting 
unpopular or dissenting groups like the Communist Party.  Rather, his instrumental view 
of association contended that:  
[Associations] serve as a training ground for group participation, 
organization and management of people and programs, and for democratic 
acceptance of the majority will.  They can also serve as a potential 
influence for improvement of communication between the individual and 
the government.  Concerted demands for action by associations of people 
have a better chance for accomplishing the desired governmental action 
than do scattered individual requests.  And the information furnished to 
administrators and legislators by private associations of various kinds is in 
many instances vital to the intelligent treatment of particular problems.251    
 
From this perspective, Abernathy concluded that “political parties are our most important 
associations.”252   
                                                 
247Ibid., 33. 
248Ibid., 75, 34, 33. 
249Ibid., 72. 
250Ibid., 77. 
251Ibid., 75-76.   
252Abernathy, “The Right of Association,” 76. 
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Abernathy’s book-length treatment eight years later underscored the themes of his 
article: 
[E]xperience in various associations is virtually a guarantee of respect for 
the majority view.  It does not necessarily lead to complete acceptance of 
the majority will, but it does lead usually to a sufficient respect for that 
will to enable the group to act in concert once a decision has been made.  
This acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, based in large part on 
experience in associations of various types, is an important explanation of 
the fact that Americans can close ranks and function as a strongly united 
nation after an election which is preceded by almost violent contests 
between the two major political parties.253 
 
Abernathy’s characterization contained two implicit assumptions.  The first was that a 
kind of bounded consensus across groups ensured stability in the midst of disagreement.  
The second was that the internal practices of associations mirrored democratic practices 
in which majority will prevailed.  Neither of these assumptions is inherent in the nature of 
groups.   
Abernathy intimated that NAACP v. Alabama had relied on the assembly 
argument.  He argued that the decision had placed the right of association within an 
“expanded meaning” of the right of assembly,254 and that association was “clearly a right 
cognate to the right of assembly.”255  The right of assembly “need not be artificially 
narrowed to encompass only the physical assemblage in a park or meeting hall.  It can 
                                                 
253Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association, 240. 
254Ibid., 4. 
255Ibid., 173.  Cf. ibid., 252 (“With the increasing emphasis on the right of association as 
a cognate to the right of assembly, it appears that this least-discussed of the First 
Amendment rights is at last acquiring an independent status.”). 
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justifiably be extended to include as well those persons who are joined together through 
organizational affiliation.”256   
Abernathy also noted a constraint of the right of association announced in NAACP 
v. Alabama: 
It must be noted that [NAACP v. Alabama] does not clearly extend the 
First Amendment protection to all lawful affiliations or organizations.  
What Justice Harlan discusses is the association “for the advancement of 
beliefs and ideas.”  Clearly a vast number of existing associations would 
fall within this description, but it is questionable whether the 
characterization would fit the purely social club, the garden club, or 
perhaps even some kinds of trade or professional unions.  No such 
distinction has been drawn in the cases squarely involving freedom of 
assembly questions.  The latter cases emphasize that the right extends to 
any lawful assembly, without a specific requirement that there be an 
intention to advance beliefs and ideas.257 
 
In observing the limitation in scope, Abernathy had detected an important distinction 
between assembly and association.  He quickly brushed it aside: “The practical effect, of 
course, may be unimportant, since fairly obviously the Court would be inclined to 
scrutinize restrictions on social clubs less closely than those on organizations identifying 
themselves more intimately with the political process.”258  But the real danger was greater 
than Abernathy surmised; it becomes apparent when we consider who gets to decide 
whether an organization exists “for the advancement of beliefs or ideas” or is involved 
“intimately with the political process.”  As a practical matter, these kind of legal 
distinctions are always made by some representative of government, which means that 
                                                 
256Ibid. 
257Ibid., 236-37.  Abernathy’s observations foreshadow the kinds of arguments that 
unfolded around the concept of “expressive association” that the Court invented two 
decades later in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.  See Chapter 3. 
258Ibid., 237. 
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the boundaries of the right of association are defined by the subjective political judgment 
of those who exercise coercive power.  And, as Abernathy noted, this limitation is one 
that is absent in the right of assembly.259  
It is not entirely surprising that scholarly treatment of the right of association 
reflected the Court’s own lack of clarity.  Writing in 1964, Thomas Emerson observed 
that “the constitutional source of ‘the right of association,’ the principles which underlie 
it, the extent of its reach, and the standards by which it is to be applied have never been 
clearly set forth” and “the various justices have differed among themselves on all these 
matters.”260  Emerson warned that “a general ‘right of association’ does not carry us very 
far in the solution of concrete issues” and “current problems involving associational 
rights must be framed and answered in terms of more traditional constitutional 
doctrines.”261  But the right of association was in large part a right without a history, or at 
least a constitutional history.  Its contours were more likely to be shaped not by 
traditional doctrine but by the intellectual context in which it emerged.  That context was 
pluralism.   
 
                                                 
259The right of assembly, of course, requires discriminatory judgment by limiting its 
protections to groups that don’t pose a threat of imminent harm to the state.  That 
judgment is a subjective political one made by the state.  But the right of association also 
includes this political judgment and other subjective assessments like the one that 
Abernathy identified. 
260Emerson, "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression," 2. 
261Ibid., 3. 
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D.  PLURALIST POLITICAL THEORY 
I have addressed above two contextual factors that contributed to the 
constitutional framework for the right of association: (1) a political factor (the conflation 
of anti-communist sentiment and the rise of the civil rights movement); and (2) a 
jurisprudential factor (the infighting on the Court over the proper way to ground the right 
of association and the relationship between association and assembly).  I turn now to a 
theoretical factor: the pluralist political theory of the mid-twentieth century.  I argue that 
pluralist assumptions exacerbated the political and jurisprudential factors affecting the 
right of association and that the postwar pluralism popularized by David Truman and 
Robert Dahl helped the right of association gain traction in legal and political discourse.  
The pluralist tradition that began in the early twentieth century changed the way 
in which American political thought conceived of the relationship between groups and 
the state.  Against earlier claims that the state captured the totality of politics and political 
life, pluralism asserted that politics existed in the groups that comprised society.  But 
pluralism replaced the narrative of state theory with its own insistent claim that politics 
relocated among groups achieved a harmonious balance within a broad consensus 
supporting American democracy.  The assumption of balance sprang from the pluralist 
need to attribute the relative stability empirically observable in democratic society to 
something other than centralized state power.  The assumption of consensus perpetuated 
an exaggerated claim of homogeneity in American history and culture that downplayed 
fundamental differences between groups.  These two assumptions were present in early 
pluralists like Arthur Bentley and Harold Laski, and they became even more pronounced 
in postwar pluralists like Truman and Dahl.   
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Truman and Dahl invoked two familiar authorities to support their pluralist 
assumptions: Tocqueville’s Democracy in America262 and Madison’s Federalist No. 
10.263  But their interpretive efforts misread Madison and decontextualized Tocqueville.  
With Madison, they converted a negatively construed “faction” into an inherently 
valuable and implicitly benign “interest.”  With Tocqueville, they extrapolated a theory 
derived from the harmony of interests observed in a homogenous segment of the 
population in preindustrial America to the diversity of interests existing in an increasingly 
fractured industrialized society.  Perhaps most ironically, the pluralist adaptations of 
Madison and Tocqueville jettisoned both theorists’ warnings about the tyranny of the 
majority.  By imposing a balance and consensus that demanded conformity to basic 
majoritarian conceptions of democracy as a predicate to associational autonomy, 
hegemonic rule entered through the back door of pluralism and endorsed the very danger 
against which Madison and Tocqueville had hedged.  These pluralist views—and their 
consequences—set the context for the right of association that emerged in mid-twentieth 
century America.  
 
1.  Power, Balance, and Stability 
Early pluralists challenged the modern state’s claim to sovereignty, which had 
gained prominence in German idealism and entered American political thought through 
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Francis Lieber.264  While Lieber and others had located the locus of power and politics in 
the state, pluralism looked instead at the groups that comprised society.  The pluralist 
argument ran contrary not only to German idealism but also to classical liberalism, which 
in its own way assumed the primacy of the state.265  The critique of state-centered theory 
meant that the state “began to lose ground as an account of political reality.”266  But 
pluralists weren’t anarchists, and without Leviathan, they needed something else to 
account for the relative peace that they observed in American society.  They concluded 
that in the absence of state coercion (the existence of which they downplayed), stability 
came from a balancing of interests and power among the various groups that comprised 
the political life of society.  
The pluralist view of power and balance began with Arthur Bentley’s The Process 
of Government, which provided one of the earliest systematic attempts to challenge state-
centered theory.267  Bentley’s “group basis of politics” focused on interests expressed 
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through group activity.268  He described “the push and resistance between groups” as 
“pressure” and suggested that “[t]he balance of the group pressures is the existing state of 
society.”269  For Bentley, groups formed the fundamental ontology of politics: “When the 
groups are adequately stated, everything is stated.”270   
Despite its frontal attack on state sovereignty, The Process of Government 
received scant attention in its first printing in 1908.  It would, in fact, take a generation 
before political scientists embraced it for its theory and methodology.  But in the 
intervening years, the monist account of state sovereignty suffered a further setback when 
German idealism fell out of favor after the First World War.271  The alternative theory of 
politics that emerged in American political thought arrived through the British pluralist 
Harold Laski.272  
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Laski and other British pluralists challenged the assumption that the state 
absorbed all individual loyalties within a community.273  In Herbert Deane’s words, 
Laski’s early political writings were a “constant polemic” against “the conception that the 
state is to political theory what the Absolute is to metaphysics, that it is mysteriously One 
above all other human groupings, and that, because of its superior position and higher 
purpose, it is entitled to the undivided allegiance of each of its citizens.”274  Laski 
asserted that “the state is only one among many forms of human associations” and he 
advocated a functional decentralization of power in which individuals increasingly turned 
to private groups to meet their interests and needs.275  He believed the transfer of 
governmental functions to private entities divided political power.276  During the early 
1920s, Laski repeatedly “turned to pluralism as both a ‘realistic’ account of politics and 
as the basis of a new democratic theory.”277   
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Pluralist views gained wider acceptance in the 1930s through “mutually 
reinforcing empirical studies of group activity and accounts of the new image of 
democracy which were contrasted with totalitarianism.”278  By the end of the 1930s, 
“liberalism in political science largely meant pluralism, and pluralism was both a 
descriptive and a normative thesis.”279  Pendleton Herring’s 1940 book The Politics of 
Democracy claimed that “along with party integration and governmental accountability, 
political rationality was to be found in the conflict and adjustment between interest 
groups.”280  This meant that “[d]emocracy was not a matter of theology and creeds, but 
the practice of tolerance and compromise.”281  The pluralist notion of balance extended 
from political to economic descriptions with John Kenneth Galbraith’s ideas of 
“countervailing power” and “counterpressures.”282  Meanwhile, lawyer turned sociologist 
David Riesman argued that power was distributed among “veto groups” that displayed a 
“necessary mutual tolerance” and “mirror[ed] each other in their style of political action, 
including their interest in public relations and their emphasis on internal harmony of 
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feelings.”283  Reflecting in 1976, Godfrey Hodgson captured the combination of balance 
and stability that permeated the pluralist era with his observation that “the businessman 
and the unskilled laborer, the writer and the housewife, Harvard University and the 
Strategic Air Command, International Business Machines and the labor movement, all 
had their parts to play in one harmonious political, intellectual, and economic system.”284   
In 1951, David Truman’s The Governmental Process described “the vast 
multiplication of interests and organized groups in recent decades” whose activities 
“imply controversy and conflict, the essence of politics.”285  Truman asserted that “the 
behaviors that constitute the process of government cannot be adequately understood 
apart from the groups.”286  These interests balanced each other: multiple memberships in 
“potential groups” collectively formed a “balance wheel” in politics.287  Truman argued 
that “[w]ithout the notion of multiple memberships in potential groups it is literally 
impossible to account for the existence of a viable polity such as that in the United States 
or to develop a coherent conception of the political process.”288 
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 The most important theorist of postwar pluralism was Robert Dahl.  Although 
Dahl drew upon early pluralists like Laski, his outlook was defined by the “behavioral 
approach” that manifested “a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the achievements of 
conventional political science, particularly through historical, philosophical, and the 
descriptive-institutional approaches.”289  With Dahl’s influence, “[t]he mid-1960s marked 
the apotheosis of pluralism as the substance of the vision of both domestic and 
comparative politics accepted by behavioralism, and it was embedded in most of the 
conceptual schemes for political analysis.”290  Over time, Dahl muted some of his more 
strident assertions, but his initial claims shaped a generation of political science 
scholarship.291   
Dahl sought to provide an account of how power was exercised in political 
decision-making.  He started with the premise that the United States was a “polyarchy,” 
by which he meant a “mixture of elite rule and democracy.”292 Against the “ruling-elite 
model” advanced by sociologists like C. Wright Mills, Dahl argued that power was 
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diffused among a wide diversity of groups.293  Democracy was a “government by 
minorities.”294  Avigail Eisenberg explains the conclusions that flow from this premise: 
The direction that public policy follows depends on the nature of the 
coalition of minorities that dominates the policy-making scene at any 
given instant.  The groups’ reliance on each other creates an informal 
system of checks and balances in which no group is able to dominate the 
others.  There is no chance for a minority to dominate a coalition because 
other minorities within the coalition will defect.  Similarly, majorities are 
unable to pose a threat, since they are comprised of small groups, any of 
which may defect from the coalition if the policy direction changes.295   
 
Paradoxically, then, the lack of widespread agreement produced a stability that prevented 
discord.  For Dahl, the American political system was “a relatively efficient system for 
reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace.”296 
Dahl’s most explicit endorsement of pluralism is found in his 1967 text, Pluralist 
Democracy in the United States.297  He wrote that “multiple centers of power, none of 
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which is or can be wholly sovereign” were “[t]he fundamental axiom in the theory and 
practise of American pluralism.”298  This premise meant that “[b]ecause one center of 
power is set against another, power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled, and limited 
to decent human purposes, while coercion, the most evil form of power, will be reduced 
to a minimum.”299   
Dahl recognized that in polyarchies, “a great many questions of policy are placed 
in the hands of private, semipublic, and local governmental organizations such as 
churches, families, business firms, trade unions, towns, cities, provinces, and the like.”300  
But his list left curiously ambiguous which entities were “private” and which were 
“semipublic.”  Further, Dahl seemed overly sanguine in his assessment that “whenever a 
group of people believe that they are adversely affected by national policies or are about 
to be, they generally have extensive opportunities for presenting their case and for 
negotiations that may produce a more acceptable alternative.”301  Like earlier pluralists, 
Dahl generally failed to account for the kinds of public power now dissipated among 
private groups.  Thus, for example, he contended that most conflict between groups 
would be resolved not by coercion but by “peaceful adjustment.”302  
Some of Dahl’s claims about the “extensive opportunities” for negotiations and 
prospects for “peaceful adjustment” seemed terribly at odds with events unfolding in 
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American society like civil rights sit-ins, campus activism, and protests against the 
Vietnam War.  But as John Gunnell writes, the behavioralism popularized by Dahl meant 
that “[a]t the very historical moment that events such as [these] were taking place, 
political science research seemed to ignore these matters in favor of the study of such 
things as voting.”303  The pluralist narrative that power dispersed among groups led to a 
balanced equilibrium resonated with the statistically driven methods that had entered the 
discipline of political science.   Pluralists, like many of their quantitative heirs in political 
science today, believed that by identifying the proper data and methodology, politics 
could be reduced to a system of solvable equations.  Because equations balanced and 
followed logical patterns, then so must the forms of power that pluralists observed in 
groups.  
 
2.  The Pluralist Consensus 
Even more pronounced than the pluralist gloss on balance was its assumed 
consensus of democratic beliefs and values.  The beginnings of this consensus narrative 
emerged in the era of industrialization.  The economic focus of progressive reforms of the 
early twentieth century had led to “a belief in the capacity of American abundance to 
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smooth over questions of class and power by creating a nation of consumers.”304  In Alan 
Brinkley’s assessment, liberal reformers were confident “that their new consumer-
oriented approach to political economy had freed them at last from the need to reform 
capitalist institutions and from the pressure to redistribute wealth and economic 
power.”305  
The pluralist consensus can be traced to Bentley, who asserted that all struggles 
between groups proceeded within a “habit background.”306  These constraints limited “the 
technique of the struggle” employed by groups such that “when the struggle proceeds too 
harshly at any point there will become insistent in the society a group more powerful than 
either of those involved which tends to suppress the extreme and annoying methods of 
the groups in the primary struggle.”307  These background assumptions had a tremendous 
normalizing effect: “It is within the embrace of these great lines of activity that the 
smaller struggles proceed, and the very word struggle has meaning only with reference to 
its limitations.”308  As Myron Hale concluded: “Bentley’s science of politics ended in a 
science of control within a closed system.”309  
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Bentley’s early hints at a consensus narrative were only later adopted by postwar 
pluralists.  But the idea of consensus was in the air elsewhere in American political 
thought.  Writing in 1939, John Dewey concluded that American culture had produced “a 
basic consensus and community of beliefs.”310  Fourteen years later, Daniel Boorstin 
echoed Dewey in heralding the national consensus of liberal values as part of the “genius 
of American politics.”311  The growing consensus was also buttressed by historians like 
Louis Hartz, whose 1955 The Liberal Tradition in America argued that the “moral 
unanimity” of Americans stemmed from a “nationalist articulation of Locke” that had 
been the only significant intellectual influence upon the American Founders.312  While 
earlier historians like Charles Beard had focused on tensions arising from class 
distinctions, mid-twentieth century scholarship heralded “the consensus, rather than the 
conflict, between Americans.”313  By the late 1950s, the consensus surrounding the 
liberal endorsement of a welfare and labor system predicated on a fundamental belief in 
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the capitalist state was pervasive enough for Daniel Bell to declare the “end of 
ideology.”314   
Truman’s The Governmental Process suggested that as important as organized 
groups were “potential” groups that reflected “those interests or expectations that are so 
widely held in the society and are so reflected in the behavior of almost all citizens that 
they are, so to speak, taken for granted.”315  These “widely held but unorganized 
interests” constituted the “rules of the game.”316  And the rules of the game enforced by 
unorganized interests constrained the practices of organized interests.317  In other words, 
a sufficiently homogenous background consensus shared by all citizens not only 
sustained the public order (which, for Truman, included “reinforcing widely accepted 
norms of ‘public morality’”), but also bounded the extent to which groups diverged from 
that shared consensus.318  Broad compliance was critical because “the existence of the 
state, of the polity, depends on widespread, frequent recognition and conformity to the 
claims of these unorganized interests and on activity condemning marked deviations from 
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them.”319  The rules of the game gave politics a “sense of justice,” and violating them 
“normally will weaken a group’s cohesion, reduce its status in the community, and 
expose it to the claims of other groups.” 320  
But Truman also recognized that his balance wheel would encounter friction 
resulting from differences in group experiences, frames of reference, and 
“rationalizations.”321  To illustrate how the normative effects of a group on its members 
could lead to beliefs outside of the mainstream, Truman posited the example of military 
training: 
A group of professional military officers, recruited at an early age, trained 
outside of civilian institutions, and practising the profession of arms in 
comparative isolation from other segments of the society, easily may 
develop the characteristics of a caste.  Such a group not only will generate 
its own peculiar interests but also may arrive at interpretations of the 
“rules of the game” that are at great variance with those held by most of 
the civilian population.  In such a case multiple membership in other 
organized groups is slight and that in potential widespread groups is 
unlikely.322  
 
For Truman, this unattended divergence from the rules of the game threatened the health 
of democracy, and it was advancing within groups far less innocuous than the United 
States military.  Communist organizations provided one example of worrisome groups 
falling outside of the consensus.  The rise of the Civil Rights movement in the South 
provided another: 
The emergence in the disadvantaged classes of groups that reflect 
materially different interpretations of the widespread interests may 
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encourage conflict and at the same time provide an inadequate basis for 
peaceful settlement.  The appearance of groups representing Negroes, 
especially in the South, groups whose interpretations of the “rules of the 
game” are divergent from those of the previously organized and privileged 
segments of the community, are a case in point.323 
 
Truman believed that widespread divergence could be mitigated because the rules 
of the game could be “acquired by most individuals in their early experiences in the 
family, in the public schools (probably less effectively in the private and parochial 
schools), and in similar institutionalized groups that are also expected to conform in some 
measure to the ‘democratic mold.’”324  He didn’t expressly acknowledge it, but the 
imposition of a “democratic mold” collapsed pluralism into a position similar to the state-
centered idealism that it had originally challenged: lurking behind a seemingly benign 
agreement of values was the normative (and coercive) association of the state.  As Earl 
Latham observed in 1952, the state was the  “custodian of the consensus” and “helps to 
formulate and to promote normative goals, as well as to police the agreed rules.”325  
Reflecting the degree to which pluralism had diverged from its initial anti-statist claims, 
Latham continued that “[i]n the exercise of its normative functions,” the state “may even 
require the abolition of groups or a radical revision of their internal structure.”326 
Like other pluralists who had preceded him, Dahl placed American politics within 
a broad consensus: 
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Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is 
the underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society 
among a predominant portion of the politically active members.  Without 
such a consensus no democratic system would long survive the endless 
irritations and frustrations of elections and party competition.  With such a 
consensus the disputes over policy alternatives are nearly always disputes 
over a set of alternatives that have already been winnowed down to those 
within the broad area of basic agreement.327  
 
For Dahl, this consensus was not a normative aspiration but an empirical fact.328  Under 
his influence, methodological assumptions set the rules of debate over what counted as 
politics and scholarship on politics, and in this way, behavioralists enforced their own 
normative consensus on political thought.  The dominance of research paradigms 
buttressed normative claims, and consensus about methodology uncritically reinforced 
consensus about substance. 
Dahl argued that the pluralist consensus included “a belief in democracy as the 
best form of government, in the desirability of rights and procedures insuring a goodly 
measure of majority rule and minority freedom, and in a wide but not necessarily 
comprehensive electorate.”329  Writing in 1961, he asserted that: “To reject the 
democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an American.  As a nation we have taken 
great pains to insure that few citizens will ever want to do anything so rash, so 
preposterous—in fact, so wholly un-American.”330   
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Dahl believed that the “ideological convergence reflecting a wide acceptance by 
Americans of their institutions” made it “extraordinarily difficult (and, up to now, 
impossible) to gain a big public following for a movement that openly seeks 
comprehensive, radical, or revolutionary changes in a large number of American 
institutions.”331  As a result, “radical movements” had been wholly ineffective in 
American politics:  
Throughout the history of the United States, political life has been almost 
completely blanketed by parties, movements, programs, proposals, 
opinions, ideas, and an ideology directed toward a large mass of 
convergent “moderate” voters.  The history of radical movements, whether 
of right or left, and of antisystem parties, as they are sometimes called, is a 
record of unrelieved failure to win control over the government.332   
 
But as long as groups operated within the boundaries of consensus, Dahl believed that the 
American political system provided “a high probability that any active and legitimate 
group will make itself heard effectively at some state in the process of decision.”333  
 The consensus assumption of pluralism laid the foundation for the freedom of 
association in two ways.  First, it established an implicit expectation that groups were 
valuable to democracy only to the extent that they reinforced and guaranteed democratic 
premises.  The corollary to this claim meant that groups antithetical to these premises 
were neither valuable to democracy nor worthy of its protections.  Second, because the 
consensus excluded groups beyond the margins of acceptability, the pluralist gloss on the 
groups that remained within its boundaries was unqualifiedly positive.  Groups were not 
                                                 
331Dahl, Democracy in the United States, 52. 
332Ibid., 50. 
333Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 150. 
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only fundamental to American politics, but they created harmony and balance through 
reasoned and appropriately constrained disagreement.   
The idea that groups were valuable to democracy only to the extent that they 
supported democracy was bereft of either authority or tradition in American politics.  
There were, of course analogies to totalitarianism, but pluralists were attempting to define 
themselves in opposition to the oppressive tendencies they observed in European politics.  
To substantiate their views about consensus and power, they needed to appeal to the 
American context.  On the subject of groups and associations, Madison and Tocqueville 
were the obvious candidates.        
 
C.  Pluralist Interpretations of Madison and Tocqueville 
Madison had argued in Federalist No. 10 that one of the most important 
advantages of “a well constructed union” was its “tendency to break and control the 
violence of faction.”334  The “latent causes of faction” were “sown in the nature of 
man.”335  As Madison elaborated: 
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, 
and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment 
to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power; or 
to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to 
the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed 
them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to 
vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good.336  
 
                                                 
334Madison, “Federalist No. 10.” 
335Ibid. 
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Factions, by Madison’s definition, were adverse “to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.”337 
Pluralists looking back at Madison through the lens of the presumed consensus of 
mid-twentieth century America read his negative connotations out of the Federalist.  
Truman, for example, suggested that Madison’s factions “carry with them none of the 
overtones of corruption and selfishness associated with modern political groups.”338  
Theodore Lowi charged that Truman’s reasoning turned Madison on his head: 
Note, for example, the contrast between the traditional and the modern 
definition of the group: Madison in Federalist 10 defined the group 
(“faction”) as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole who are united an actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or 
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”  Modern 
political science usage took that definition and cut the quotation just 
before the emphasized part.  In such a manner, pluralist theory became the 
handmaiden of interest-group liberalism, and interest-group liberalism 
became the handmaiden of modern American positive national 
statehood.339 
 
                                                 
337Ibid., Cf.  Bernard Brown, "Tocqueville and Publius," in Reconsidering Tocqueville's 
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339Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States 
(New York: Norton, 1979), 55.  Cf. ibid., 36 (in contemporary pluralism, “[g]roups 
became virtuous; they must be accommodated, not regulated”). 
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Unlike Truman, Dahl recognized Madison’s belief “that a faction will produce 
tyranny if unrestrained by external checks.”340  But Dahl misread Madison’s 
apprehension to pertain solely to “majority factions.”341  Although nothing in Madison’s 
account assigned an inherently positive value to divided interests, Dahl contended that 
“no political group has ever admitted to being hostile to” the “permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.”342  Rather, the “numerous, extended, and diverse” minority 
interests were part of “the restraints on the effectiveness of majorities imposed by the 
facts of a pluralistic society.”343  These varied interests operated within a broad consensus 
and posed no inherent danger to democracy.  Dahl thought that Madison had 
underestimated “the importance of the inherent social checks and balances existing in 
every pluralistic society” that came through these interests.344  Madison had not 
appreciated “the role of social indoctrination and habituation in creating attitudes, habits, 
and even personality types requisite to a given political system.”345  
Lance Banning argues that the “pluralist misreading” of Federalist No. 10 
attained its “widest influence” through Dahl.346  The “cruder forms” of this misreading 
suggested “that Madison delighted in the clash of special interests and identified the 
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outcome of such clashes with the public good.”347  Quoting Daniel Walker Howe, 
Banning notes that “‘[f]action’ was not a value-free concept for Publius; a faction was by 
definition evil.”348  Madison biographer Ralph Ketcham also dissents “from the view that 
sees Madison, especially in his tenth Federalist Paper, as validating modern conflict-of-
interest politics.”349  By disregarding the dangers inherent in minority factions, pluralism 
transformed Madison’s faction into a domesticated group whose interests were broadly 
aligned with those of the modern liberal state.350 
Unlike Madison, Tocqueville drew no negative conclusions about “voluntary 
associations.”351  He instead “subverted” Madison’s analysis of factions and “regarded 
associations as a valuable way of connecting people by overcoming some effects of 
                                                 
347Ibid. Cf. Brown, "Tocqueville and Publius," 45-46 (suggesting that Dahl reads The 
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 167 
individualism.352  Tocqueville’s optimism stemmed in part from his idealized view of 
associations in America: 
In America the citizens who form the minority associate, in order, in the 
first place, to show their numerical strength, and so to diminish the moral 
authority of the majority; and, in the second place, to stimulate 
competition, and to discover those arguments which are most fitted to act 
upon the majority; for they always entertain hopes of drawing over their 
opponents to their own side, and of afterward disposing of the supreme 
power in their name.  Political associations in the United States are 
therefore peaceable in their intentions, and strictly legal in the means 
which they employ; and they assert with perfect truth that they only aim at 
success by lawful expedients.353  
 
In other words, Tocqueville presupposed that associations in America would never 
seriously threaten the stability of government in America.  He elaborated, tellingly, that 
“[i]n a country like the United States, in which the differences of opinion are mere 
differences of hue, the right of association may remain unrestrained without evil 
consequences.”354   
Dahl believed that Tocqueville was “struck by the degree of political, social, and 
economic equality among Americans” and had “made this observation the very kernel of 
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his famous analysis of American democracy.”355  He maintained, based on his reading of 
Tocqueville, that “Americans almost unanimously agree on a number of general 
propositions about democracy.”356  Writing in 1961, Dahl contended: 
Throughout the country then the political stratum has seen to it that new 
citizens, young and old, have been properly trained in “American” 
principles and beliefs.  Everywhere, too, the pupils have been highly 
motivated to talk, look and believe as Americans should.  The result was 
as astonishing an act of voluntary political and cultural assimilation and 
speedy elimination of regional, ethnic, and cultural dissimilarities has 
history can provide.  The extent to which Americans agree today on key 
propositions about democracy is a measure of the almost unbelievable 
success of this deliberate attempt to create a seemingly uncoerced nation-
wide consensus.357   
  
Importantly, Dahl recognized that Tocqueville had written in a preindustrial era different 
than the current landscape:  
The America that Tocqueville saw . . . was the America of Andrew 
Jackson.  It was an agrarian democracy, remarkably close to the ideal 
often articulated by Jefferson.  Commerce, finance, and industry erupted 
into this agrarian society in a gigantic explosion.  By the time the 
[nineteenth] century approached its last decade, . . . the America of 
Tocqueville had already passed away.358   
 
                                                 
355Dahl, Democracy in the United States, 87.  Dahl notes that African-Americans were an 
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356Dahl, Who Governs?, 312.  Dahl criticized Tocqueville’s argument “that the stability 
of the American democratic system depends . . . on an almost universal belief in the basic 
rules of the democratic game.”  Ibid.  But while Dahl highlighted disagreement over 
“specific applications” of democratic principles to “crucial cases,” he asserted a basic 
agreement about those principles. 
357Ibid., 318. 
358Ibid., 2.  Cf. Dahl, Democracy in the United States, 89 (“The vast private corporations 
created by industrial capitalism had not yet arrived; the giant factories, the great 
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But Dahl insisted that despite the growing inequality of resources following the changes 
in the early twentieth century, a “universal creed of democracy and equality” persisted in 
mid-twentieth century America.359  
The pluralist appropriation of Tocqueville’s account of associations overlooked 
two complications.  The first was that Tocqueville’s case study of America in the 1830s 
had focused on an extraordinarily homogenous population, thus giving him an overly 
sanguine view of harmony amidst difference.  Rogers Smith has noted that Tocqueville 
and later accounts that drew upon him: 
. . . center on relationships among a minority of Americans—white men, 
largely of northern European ancestry—analyzed in terms of categories 
derived from the hierarchy of political and economic status such men held 
in Europe: monarchs and aristocrats, financial and commercial burghers, 
farmers, industrial and rural laborers, indigents.  Because most European 
observers and most white American men regarded these categories as 
politically basic, it is understandable that from America’s inception they 
thought that the most striking fact about the new nation was the absence of 
one specific type of fixed, ascriptive hierarchy.  There was no hereditary 
monarchy or nobility native to British America itself, and the Revolution 
rejected both the authority of the British king and aristocracy and the 
creation of any new American substitutes.  Those genuinely momentous 
features of American political life made the United States appear 
remarkably egalitarian in comparison to Europe.360 
 
But as Smith observes, the “relative egalitarianism that prevailed among white men” left 
unaddressed immense inequities pertaining to gender, race, culture, religion, and sexual 
orientation.361  When associations expanded to these interests—as they increasingly did 
by the mid-twentieth century—differences of opinion were no longer merely differences 
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of hue, and Tocqueville’s ideal theory lost its descriptive purchase.  Pluralists to a large 
degree failed to recognize the limits of Tocqueville’s understanding of equality and as a 
result adopted an understanding of balance and consensus that excluded significant 
classes of people from its description of the political process.  As Grant McConnell 
argued: “. . . farm migrant workers, Negroes, and the urban poor have not been included 
in the system of ‘pluralist’ representation so celebrated in recent years.”362  McConnell 
insisted that: “However much these groups may be regarded as ‘potential interest 
groups,’ the important fact is that political organization for their protection within the 
pluralist framework can scarcely be said to exist.”363   
The second problem with relying on Tocqueville to buttress pluralist accounts of 
mid-twentieth century America was the degree to which the relationship between public 
and private had been radically altered in the years since Democracy in America.  
Tocqueville had assumed a political order bifurcated between a relatively limited 
government (which exercised law, authority, and coercion), and a larger sphere that 
consisted of nongovernmental social and economic relations.364  The theoretical impetus 
for this split came from a Lockean liberalism whose “most distinctive feature” was “its 
insistence that government should be limited so as to free individuals to undertake private 
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as well as public pursuits of happiness, even if this option erodes public spiritedness in 
practice.”365  The separation of public and private by Locke and other classical liberals 
created a sphere autonomous from government control.  But it also tacitly granted greater 
political legitimacy to the public realm, a realm that soon became synonymous with the 
state.   
This conceptual framework was not especially problematic when the right of 
assembly entered the American constitutional scheme through the First Amendment.  In 
1791, the state was relatively limited in scope and left a broad non-public realm free from 
coercive regulation.366  The extent to which early American citizens viewed this non-
public realm as “private” is difficult to pinpoint, but it is sufficient to observe that they 
believed it fell outside of the relatively limited public controlled by government.  But 
while the early assemblies may have been separated from public power, they were 
nonetheless public in the sense of being visible to others and political in the sense of 
demonstrating and advocating an alternative way of life.  The Democratic-Republican 
Societies gathered and feasted and paraded, suffragist groups formed conventions and 
marches, and abolitionists rallied citizens to awareness and action.  
The early American understanding of public and private for the most part endured 
at the time of Tocqueville’s visit to the United States.  Tocqueville believed that citizens 
in Jacksonian democracy conceived of a narrow public realm confined to governmental 
functions: “[i]n the American republics the activity of the central Government never as 
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yet has been extended beyond a limited number of objects sufficiently prominent to call 
forth its attention.”367  Because he viewed the nongovernmental sphere as more 
determinative in shaping the lives and values of citizens than the more narrowly defined 
“government,” he saw associations as necessary to maintaining democratic order through 
civic virtue.368  
The difficulty in the pluralist adaptation of Tocqueville’s framework was that 
what was considered within the reach of “government” or “public” in mid-twentieth 
century America was far greater than Tocqueville had ever conceived.  The growth of the 
market economy had initially reinforced Lockean understandings of public and private.369  
But unprecedented advances in industrialization and bureaucracy that led to quasi-public 
corporations eventually rendered obsolete simplistic dualisms of public and private.  
Early twentieth-century legal thinkers began to question the assumption that “private law 
could be neutral and apolitical” amidst “a widespread perception that so-called private 
institutions were acquiring coercive power that had formerly been reserved to 
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governments.”370  Legal realists characterized “the distinction in classical liberalism 
between private and public law as arbitrary, demonstrating that all private transactions 
involved the state and that all law was, in an important sense, public law.”371   
Following these realist premises, New Deal reformers invaded the private realm 
with governmental programs, regulations, and bureaucrats.  The New Deal assumed that 
“the instruments of government provided the means for conscious inducement of social 
change” and established “an indeterminable but expanding political sphere.”372   The 
Supreme Court mounted a spirited but short-lived resistance to this ideology in the mid-
1930s, and a decade later the Court embraced the new liberalism.  In 1948, the Court 
evidenced its acceptance of regulation of economic activity in Shelley v. Kraemer, which 
placed private contracts and covenants within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.373  
At the same time that the government expanded its reach into previously private 
domains, corporations, universities, and unions grew in number and size and increasingly 
assumed quasi-governmental functions.  In Henry Kariel’s description, “[o]rganizational 
giants such as General Motors, the Teamsters Union, the Farm Bureau, and the American 
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Medical Association . . . emerged as full-fledged political regimes” and blurred “the 
formerly useful distinction between the public and the private.”374  Even as the pluralist 
critique of state-centered theory redirected the study of politics toward the group, “the 
discovery that precious little in human life is immune to bureaucratization . . . dispelled 
some of the magic of the group.”375  The giant private bureaucracies were not akin to 
“that wonderful and wholly legitimate conglomeration of little groups which visitors 
from abroad [had] traditionally identified with Americanism.”376  They were rather “a 
newer set of large-scale organizational power blocs” that had come to “comprise most of 
the public order and occupy much of the public mind.”377  Dewey suggested an “eclipse 
of the public” had created “many publics.”378   
Tocqueville had seen only one public, and its normative influence had been 
overshadowed by the private associations that he observed.  By the middle of the 
twentieth century, that was no longer the case.  The conception of “public” had moved in 
two directions.  First, the increased role of government as welfare provider had expanded 
the governmental public realm into previously private domains.  Second, private 
organizations had grown closer to coercive government in form and substance as they 
took on more public functions.  Lost in this mix was a subtle transformation in the 
understanding of the “political,” which by the middle of the twentieth century had been 
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confined to those “interests” and “pressure groups” directly engaged with governmental 
processes.  That characterization was doubly problematic: it kept hidden groups exerting 
economic coercion in the private sector but at the same time depoliticized groups that 
were neither governmental nor economic.  Truman and Dahl recognized the changing 
roles of public and private, but they largely embraced the New Deal expansion as an 
unqualified good and interpreted the public infusion into private organizations as a 
favorable dissipation of public power.  
Critics soon exposed the pluralist oversights.  In 1966, Grant McConnell’s Private 
Power and American Democracy challenged the “comfortable assumption that interest 
groups will balance each other in their struggles and produce policies of moderation.”379  
McConnell questioned the pluralist assumption that “private associations” were, in fact, 
private.  He argued that the facile distinction between “public” and “private” had “been 
seriously blurred in recent years.”380  McConnell suggested that the infusion of quasi-
public authority upon private associations could not be ignored: “[w]hen, under the guise 
of serving an ideal of democracy as the self-government of small units, the coercive 
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power of public authority is given to these groups, their internal government becomes a 
matter of serious concern.”381    
McConnell also challenged the pluralist balance assumption “that private 
associations are mutually countervailing,” which he viewed as a “a modern gloss on the 
argument of Madison and his colleagues in the Federalist Papers.”382  The pluralist 
account suggested that “by opposing each other, private associations supposedly check 
any overly greedy attempts by particular associations to extend their power” such that “in 
the large community democracy is insured.”383  McConnell responded that in practice, 
“private associations tend to be jealous of rivals.”384  These associations “seek to prevent 
the rise of competitors in the fields they have marked as their own” and “[o]ften, when 
such rivals do exist, there is bitter conflict between them, conflict that has as its object the 
destruction of one or the other.”385   
Other challenges to pluralist arguments came from Michael Rogin, Theodore 
Lowi, and William Connolly.  Rogin argued that the pluralist theory of group politics had 
reintroduced “social cohesion in a constitutional, industrial society.”386  This underlying 
                                                 
381Ibid., 341-42. 
382Ibid., 123. 
383Ibid. 
384Ibid., 124. 
385Ibid. 
386Michael Paul Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter 
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967), 10.  Pluralism was “not simply a defense of shared 
power or a sympathy for diverse values” but also a “theory of history in which 
industrialization is the major actor.”  Ibid., 10. Industrialization had destroyed “traditional 
stability,” but its success “enable[d] group politics to dominate a society.”  Ibid. 
 177 
“[s]ocial consensus plays an overwhelming role in the pluralist vision” and had 
“define[d] out of existence any conflict between groups and the public interest.”387  Lowi 
contended that Dahl’s conception “relie[d] on an extremely narrow definition of coercion, 
giving one to believe that coercion is not involved if physical force is absent” and  
“depend[ed] on an incredibly broad and idealized notion of what is peaceful about 
peaceful adjustment.”388  Lowi charged that ignoring these complexities meant that 
“interest group liberalism” helped create “the sense that power need not be power at all, 
control need not be control, and government need not be coercive.”389  Connolly similarly 
asserted that pluralists like Dahl had disregarded “notable discontinuities” between the 
conditions of postwar American society and the “basic preconditions to the successful 
operation of pluralist politics” that Tocqueville had stipulated.390  For example, Connolly 
suggested that “the emergence of the large-scale, hierarchical organization has 
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significantly altered the character of the voluntary association” since the time of 
Tocqueville’s writing.391  
As the critics intimated, because pluralist theory of the 1950s assumed the status 
quo of an enlarged public sphere, its endorsement of group sovereignty was really 
epiphenomenal to a further legitimization of the public welfare function of the state and 
the increasingly bureaucratized corporations and universities that mimicked state 
functions and organization.392  The blending and overlap of public and private 
fundamentally altered the political arrangements about which Tocqueville and Madison 
had theorized.  Contrary to some pluralist beliefs, dispersed power didn’t disappear or 
dissipate; it just became less visible.   
 
E.  THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY  
It is important to note that while Madison and Tocqueville held different views 
about the inherent nature of groups, both theorists turned to groups as a check against 
majority rule.  Madison thought that majorities could be “unjust and interested” and 
sacrifice to their “ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens.”393  He relied on factions to ensure that a majority would be “unable to concert 
and carry into effect schemes of oppression.”394  Tocqueville warned similarly of the 
                                                 
391Ibid.  Connolly suggests that Madison and Tocqueville provided the “intellectual 
springboards” for many pluralist thinkers.  Ibid., 4. 
392See generally, Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in 
Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 315-92, 557-
606. 
393Madison, “Federalist No. 10.”  Cf. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 248. 
394Madison, “Federalist No. 10.” 
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“tyranny of the majority.”395  He contended that the majority “often has despotic tastes 
and instincts,” and he called the “omnipotence of the majority” the “greatest danger for 
American Republics.”396  As Sheldon Wolin suggests, by the second volume of 
Democracy in America, Tocqueville had moved away from concern over an explicitly 
legislative imposition of majority will to a more nuanced form of cultural hegemony.397  
Wolin surmises that for Tocqueville: 
The danger was not that a legislative majority might ride roughshod over 
minority rights but a strange lack of opposition to the dominant set of 
values—and this despite an unprecedented degree of liberty and fully 
guaranteed rights of expression.  He insisted that there was no country in 
which there was less intellectual independence and freedom of discussion 
than in America.  His explanation was that in a democracy the majority 
combined physical, moral, and legal authority.  Democracy’s vaunted 
inclusiveness did not extend to the critic who espoused unorthodox views; 
he would eventually feel the whole weight of the community against 
him.398  
 
Madison and Tocqueville implicitly recognized that the capacity for groups to exist 
detached from and even antithetical to the will of the majority in some ways reflected an 
anti-democratic freedom.  Mid-twentieth century pluralism never acquiesced in this 
description, but I think it is exactly right: group autonomy presupposes the risk of volatile 
disagreement rather than stability to the democratic experiment.   
That risk went largely unacknowledged by the pluralist political thought that 
pervaded the background in which the constitutional freedom of association emerged.  
                                                 
395Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 305. 
396Ibid., 305-06, 303.  Wolin believes that Tocqueville “concluded that in America there 
were insufficient legal safeguards against the tyranny of the majority.” Wolin, 
Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 250. 
397Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 251. 
398Ibid., 250-51. 
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The pluralist consensus assumption established boundaries within which measured 
disagreement could unfold but through which dissenting voices were marginalized or 
silenced.  The pluralist balance assumption asserted a harmonious stability between those 
associations that remained within the consensus boundaries.  Together, consensus and 
balance depoliticized political dissidents and disguised political power.  The result 
provided an explanation for a stable democratic polity, but it was a skewed explanation.  
Pluralists (and Supreme Court justices) exalted associational autonomy largely because 
the associations accepted by the consensus neither threatened democratic stability nor 
diverged from democratic values.   
 
F.  CONCLUSION 
In the next chapter, I will explore the transformation of the right of association 
during the equality era, including the important case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
decided by the Court in 1984.  That transformation, I will argue, has contributed to a 
significant weakening of group autonomy and deepened the chasm between the 
contemporary freedom of association and the historical right of assembly.  But what has 
not been fully recognized about the current vulnerability of associations is the degree to 
which the current predicament owes in part to the factors influencing the original 
recognition of the right of association—and its departure from the freedom of assembly—
fifty years ago.  The three factors that I have suggested shaped the right of association in 
NAACP v. Alabama and subsequent cases in the 1960s in many ways paved the way for 
the transformation that occurred in Roberts.  The largely unquestioned pluralist consensus 
that gave the Court its baseline for acceptable forms of association in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s opened the door for the egalitarianism that emerged in the 1970s and placed 
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certain discriminatory associations beyond its contours.  The Court’s disparate treatment 
of communist and civil rights associations in the 1950s and 1960s carved a path for later 
cases like Roberts to deny associational protections to certain kinds of groups even in the 
absence of any imminent threat to democratic security or stability.  And the early 
jurisprudential arguments over the constitutional source of association facilitated 
Brennan’s later distinction between a right of expressive association connected to the 
First Amendment and a right of intimate association tied to personal liberty.  These 
developments have in some ways left group autonomy vulnerable to the tyranny of the 
majority.   
 
  
 
III.  The Transformation of Association in the Equality Era 
I have termed the second constitutional epoch of the right of association the 
equality era.  This era spans roughly from the mid-1960s to the end of the twentieth 
century.1  It includes the transformation of the right of association into intimate and 
expressive components in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.2  As I suggested at the end of 
the last chapter, this transformation in many ways took its cues from the foundations 
established during the national security era.  But the equality era also introduced its own 
political, jurisprudential, and theoretical factors that influenced associational freedom.  
As in the previous chapter, I want to focus on one of each of these factors: (1) the pursuit 
of civil rights policy objectives through antidiscrimination legislation (a political factor); 
(2) the emergence of a constitutional right to privacy and the relationship between 
privacy and association (a jurisprudential factor); and (3) the prominence of Rawlsian 
                                                 
1It is likely that the equality era of the right of association came to a close at the dawn of 
the twenty-first century amidst new concerns over domestic terrorism.  The doctrinal 
implications of new laws governing the relationship between groups and the state remain 
to be seen.  At a minimum, the clear and present danger standard appears to have 
reemerged with respect to claims of association by violent terrorist organizations.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Lindh, "Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Counts Two Through Nine of the Indictment on Freedom of Association, Overbreadth 
and Vagueness Grounds,” June 5, 2002. Cf. Kersch, “’Guilt By Association’ and the 
Postwar Civil Libertarians,” 74 (“the ongoing ‘war on terror’ raises many of the same 
questions that the mid-century civil libertarians grappled with during the height of the 
Cold War”).  See also David Cole and James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the 
Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (New York: 
New Press, 2002). 
2Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
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liberalism and the academic and popular debates that unfolded within its parameters (a 
theoretical factor).  I will argue that each of these factors further contributed to the 
decline of group autonomy.  Implicit in my historical narrative is my view that this 
decline is bad for liberalism, even when attributable to an increased recognition of other 
liberal values. 
The primary political factor affecting the right of association in the equality era 
involved ongoing efforts to attain meaningful civil rights for African Americans.  As the 
Civil Rights movement gained acceptance as part of the democratic creed, the focus of 
civil rights activists shifted from protecting their own associational freedom (as 
represented in the NAACP cases chronicled in the last chapter) to pursuing 
antidiscrimination objectives by challenging the “right to exclude” of segregationists.  
Questions about the limits of the right to exclude became increasingly complex when 
civil rights litigation moved from public to private associations.  
The jurisprudential factor affecting the right of association in the equality era was 
the development of another constitutional right that appeared nowhere in the 
Constitution: the right to privacy.  Privacy and association had been linked in some of the 
Court’s earliest cases on the freedom of association, but new connections emerged in the 
1965 decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.3  Griswold’s framework eventually led to the 
right of intimate association recognized in Roberts.   
The theoretical factor dominating the equality era was the rise of Rawlsian 
liberalism.  Rawlsian questions about the relationship between liberty and equality, the 
limits of public reason, and the contours of individual autonomy dominated scholarly 
                                                 
3Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
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discussions about associational freedom during the equality era.  Rawlsian premises also 
permeated the legal academy during this time, and they are evident in Roberts and the 
scholarly commentary that followed the Court’s decision.   
Unlike the emergence of association in the national security era, the 
transformation of association in the equality era was already a few decades removed from 
the disappearance of the right of assembly in legal and political discourse.  One of my 
objectives in retracing the transformation of association in the equality era is to highlight 
how these changes further deviated from the premises of assembly in ways detrimental to 
group autonomy.  I have previously highlighted three such changes: (1) the rejection of 
dissenting and destabilizing groups in the interests of balance and consensus; (2) the 
depoliticization and privatization of some practices that once counted as part of public 
life; and (3) the supplanting of assemblies that were forms of expression by associations 
that were merely means of expression.  As with the last chapter, my primary objective 
here is to highlight the historical plausibility of these changes.  In the next chapter, I will 
explore the implications of these changes when I compare the right of assembly to the 
right of association.    
 
A.  CIVIL RIGHTS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
The right of association that emerged in the national security era introduced 
crucial protections to the NAACP and its efforts to promote equality and civil rights for 
African Americans.4  During the equality era, freedom of association claims shifted from 
civil rights activists to segregationists who maintained a right to exclude.  The same 
                                                 
4See Chapter 2.   
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associational principles that had previously been emphasized to protect the NAACP were 
now muted in the interests of furthering civil rights policy objectives.  
 
1.  Integration in Public Settings 
Herbert Wechsler had infamously argued the year after NAACP v. Alabama that 
the right to exclude was implicated in any effort at integration.5  Wechsler had directed 
part of his critique against Brown v. Board of Education.6  His argument lacked 
plausibility in public settings like the schools at issue in Brown—it made little sense to 
argue that segregationists had a freedom to associate (or a right to exclude) in situations 
where the government provided a public good or service.7  Moreover, within a decade of 
Brown, integration in public settings fit comfortably within the “national democratic 
creed.”  As Brown made clear, the America represented by the federal government and 
the northern states now demanded equal treatment for African Americans.8  That 
consensus supported forced integration in public education, public transportation, public 
                                                 
5Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law 
Review 73 (1959): 1.  Wechsler argued that “the question posed by state-enforced 
segregation [was] not one of discrimination at all” but represented “the denial by the state 
of the freedom to associate.”  Ibid., 34.  Conversely, “integration force[d] an association 
upon those for whom it [was] unpleasant or repugnant.”  Ibid. 
6Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996), 179 (“Wechsler’s objection to Brown is silly with respect to 
public schools. . .”).   
8See Chapter 2 (discussing the views of the federal government and the northern media 
about Brown). 
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buildings, and public recreational facilities.9  It even extended to private entities doing 
business on public property.10  By 1961, integration policy applied “to virtually any 
private concern operating on public property,”11 and three years later, segregation in 
“most forms of public life” had come to an end.12  By the end of the 1960s, the consensus 
about integration in public life had grown even stronger.13 
 
2.  Integration in Private Settings 
There was less consensus about integration in non-public settings.  Once 
integration efforts shifted from public to private settings, Wechsler’s critique that 
“integration force[d] an association upon those for whom it [was] unpleasant or 
repugnant” gained traction.14   Writing in 1984, Justice O’Connor may have been 
justified in claiming that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose 
                                                 
9See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education; Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) 
(interstate transportation); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (airports); Johnson v. 
Virginia 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms) (per curiam); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 
131 (1966) (libraries); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 (1963); Muir v. Louisville Park 
Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); 
New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958). 
10Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private restaurant owner 
who refused service based on customer’s race violated Fourteenth Amendment because 
restaurant was located in a building leased from a state entity).   
11Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 65. 
12Ibid., 97. 
13Cf. ibid. (“By the late 1960s and early 1970s there was not as large-scale or as deep-
seated a social and cultural aversion to desegregation as there had been in the pre-1964 
years.”).   
14Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles,” 34.   
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employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial 
transactions, without restraint from the State.”15  But at the dawn of the equality era, this 
interpretation was far from self-evident.  
Widespread challenges to private sector segregation began with the sit-ins that 
started in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 and soon spread throughout the South.  
The Supreme Court reviewed sixty-one sit-in cases and sided with the demonstrators in 
almost all of them.16  But it stopped short of banning discrimination in non-public 
settings.  As Gerald Rosenberg has suggested, changes in private businesses affected by 
these early sit-ins owed little to legal enforcement.  Rather, “[e]conomic pressure, not 
constitutional mandate, appears the best explanation for the success of the sit-ins.”17  
The legal landscape governing integration in private settings changed drastically 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18  Title II of the Act extended to places of “public 
accommodation.”19  The sweeping legislation encompassed most for-profit businesses but 
exempted private clubs or other establishments “not in fact open to the public.”20  By 
1969, the Court had endorsed both the scope and authority of the Act, holding it 
                                                 
15Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
16Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, 66 n.30. 
17Ibid., 142.  
18Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, July 2, 1964. 
19Ibid. 
20Section 201(b) and (e).  Section 201(b) specifically named restaurants, cafeterias, 
lunchrooms, lunch counters, soda fountains, other facilities “principally engaged in 
selling food for consumption on the premises,” gasoline stations, motion picture houses, 
theaters, concert halls, sports areas, stadiums, and other places of “exhibition or 
entertainment.”  See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1969) (listing provisions). 
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applicable in Daniel v. Paul to an Arkansas amusement park with relatively thin ties to 
interstate commerce.21   
In 1968, the Court handed another important resource to advocates of private 
sector integration with its decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer.22  Justice Stewart relied 
on a Reconstruction era statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided that “All 
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property.”23  Stewart concluded that the Act barred racial discrimination in 
the sale or lease of private property.24  The following year, the Court extended the reach 
of Jones to membership in a community park and playground in Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park.25  Douglas’s majority opinion concluded that an association could not be 
considered a private social club if its only selective element was race.26  In 1973, the 
Court reached a similar result with respect to a private swimming pool in Tilman v. 
                                                 
21Daniel v. Paul, 298.  The ties to interstate commerce (which were required for the 
federal law to reach the club) included the facts that some of the items sold in the club’s 
snack bar used ingredients produced and processed out of state, that the Club leased 15 
paddle boats from an Oklahoma company, and that its juke box and records were 
manufactured out of state.  Ibid., 305, 308.  The Court rejected the club’s claims that it 
was a private club exempt from the Act because it charged patrons a 25-cent 
“membership” fee and distributed “membership” cards.  Ibid., 301-302. 
22Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).  
23 The act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982.  The fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 had taken effect while Jones was before the Court and were not applicable to 
the case. 
24Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 444.  
25Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
26Ibid.  
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Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn.27  Because race constituted the pool’s only selective 
membership requirement, the Court found “no plan or purpose of exclusiveness” and 
concluded that the pool’s structure and practices were “indistinguishable” from those of 
the association in Sullivan.28 
 
3.  The Limits of State Action 
The reach of antidiscrimation law into private action met its limits in Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. Iris.29  The case began when the operators of Moose Lodge No. 107 
refused to serve an African-American named K. Leroy Irvis.30  Irvis, who also happened 
to be a member of the State House of Representatives, filed a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Board.  He asserted that Moose Lodge’s refusal to serve 
to him constituted state action because the Pennsylvania liquor board had licensed the 
facility to sell alcoholic beverages.31   
Moose Lodge indicated that it would likely surrender its license in order to 
maintain its racist practices if the Court ruled against it.32  But the Lodge contended that 
                                                 
27Tilman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973). 
28Ibid., 438. 
29Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
30Irvis was a guest of a member of the Lodge.  The local lodge was bound by the 
constitution and bylaws of the Supreme Lodge, which restricted membership and member 
guests to whites.  Ibid., 165-66. 
31Ibid., 165. 
32See Reply Brief of Appellant Moose Lodge No. 107 at 3-4, 5 (“[t]he immediate 
consequence of [the loss of the liquor license], one could reasonably suppose, would be 
that members bent on conviviality would operate a locker system.  Thus they would use 
their own bottles, no sales of liquor would take place, and the Moose Lodge would 
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the loss of the license would nonetheless be detrimental because “profits from the bar 
make possible virtually every private club’s continued existence.”33  Irvis replied that 
while the members of Moose Lodge were “free to associate with whom they please,” they 
had no “concomitant right to receive a club liquor license.”34  And in response to the 
Lodge’s claim that the loss of the license would threaten its existence, Irvis expressed 
doubt over “just how significant and valuable a privilege the right to associate is” if 
Moose Lodge were to fold “absent the privilege granted by the holding of a club liquor 
license.”35   
Irvis’s argument has superficial appeal but is problematic for two reasons.  First, 
it ignores the possibility that the selling of alcohol to keep the club financially solvent 
might be instrumental to the attainment of other goods derived from association.  To take 
an obvious example, the members of Moose Lodge likely attained some psychological 
benefit by gathering in a segregated setting.  That might not be a morally commendable 
good, but it is a good nonetheless distinct from the financial benefits of the sale of 
alcohol.  A second problem with Irvis’s logic is that it implicitly implicates the panoply 
of other government licensing schemes applicable to private clubs.  State and local 
governments administer not only liquor licenses but also regulate everything from food 
                                                                                                                                                 
supply only set-ups and mixers. . . . [M]atters remain as before—with the single 
exception that Moose Lodge members cannot buy drinks at a bar but must bring their 
own bottles to the club lockers”) (quoted in Anthony G. Aiuvalasit, Jr., “Moose Lodge v. 
Irvis: The Undecided Decision,” New England Law Review 8 (1973): 269). 
33Ibid., 56 (quoted in Aiuvalasit, “Moose Lodge,” 270). 
34App. Brief at 46 (quoted in Aiuvalasit, “Moose Lodge,” 269). 
35Ibid.  Cf. ibid. at 270 (“if Moose Lodge were to close due to the lack of a liquor license 
the only associational right lost to its members would be the ability to gather together for 
the purpose of drinking discount liquor”). 
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service to fire code compliance.  If every issuance of a government license constituted 
state action, then a club seeking to avoid the imprimatur of government sponsorship 
would be extremely limited in its activities. 
The Court rejected Irvis’s argument that constitutional concerns attached any time 
that a private entity “receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is 
subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.”36  That would “utterly emasculate the 
distinction between private as distinguished from State conduct.”37  Moose Lodge was “a 
private club in a private building.”38   
Douglas dissented, arguing that “special circumstances” pertaining to 
Pennsylvania’s “complete and pervasive” licensing scheme rose to the level of “an 
invidious form of state action.”39  But while disagreeing with the majority’s holding, 
Douglas offered strong words about the associational protections that he would ostensibly 
extend to private groups absent state action, asserting that the First Amendment created 
“a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering with private clubs or 
                                                 
36Moose Lodge, 173. 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid., 175.  Cf. ibid., 171 (“Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary meaning of 
that term. It is a local chapter of a national fraternal organization having well defined 
requirements for membership. It conducts all of its activities in a building that is owned 
by it. It is not publicly funded. Only members and guests are permitted in any lodge of 
the order; one may become a guest only by invitation of a member or upon invitation of 
the house committee.”). 
39 Ibid., 180, 181, 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Douglas found additional problems with 
Pennsylvania’s “complex quota system” of issuing licenses.  Ibid., 182.   
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groups.”40  In language that would be hard to reconcile with most of the Court’s civil 
rights cases, Douglas elaborated that: 
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all 
black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all 
Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government 
may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The 
individual can be as selective as he desires.41   
 
4.  Private School Segregation 
In concluding that Pennsylvania’s liquor license did not constitute sufficient state 
action to force integration on Moose Lodge, the Court had implied that private clubs 
remained free to discriminate on the basis of race.  By this time, the Court had also made 
clear that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 together reached 
most entities that could not be characterized as private clubs.  And, as Sullivan and 
Tilman had made clear, clubs whose only selective membership requirement was race did 
not count as private.  One question unaddressed amidst these developments concerned the 
associational rights of students attending segregated private schools, whose numbers had 
grown exponentially in the South since Brown.42   
Preliminary challenges to private school segregation focused on government 
financial support.  In the late 1960s, the Court affirmed a number of lower court decisions 
                                                 
40Ibid., 179. 
41Ibid., 179-80. 
42Rosenberg reports that the number of all-white private schools in Louisiana went from 
sixteen before Brown to fifty-three after Brown.  Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, 83.  In 
Mississippi, seventeen private schools other than Catholic schools enrolled 2,362 students 
(916 of whom were black) during the 1963-1964 school year.  By 1970, the number of 
schools had increased to 155 with an enrollment of around 42,000 students, nearly all of 
whom were white.  Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973). 
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enjoining state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private 
schools.43  In 1973, it addressed in Norwood v. Harrison the propriety of state-funded 
textbook loans to students attending these schools.44  The Court concluded that the 
textbook loans were “not legally distinguishable” from tuition grants.45  Norwood also 
provided the Court’s first attempt to address directly the conflict between 
antidiscrimination efforts and the right of association.  Summarizing recent legislative 
and judicial developments, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that: 
Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of 
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but 
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. And 
even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation 
in certain circumstances.46 
  
Burger also noted that because “the Constitution may compel toleration of private 
discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such 
discrimination.”47  
As with its approach to private clubs in Moose Lodge, the Court did not leave 
unbounded the extent to which state action could be imputed to private schools.  In 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, the justices addressed the use of public recreational 
                                                 
43See, e.g., Brown v. South Carolina Board of Education, 296 F.Supp. 199 (D.C.S.C. 
1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U. S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial 
Assistance Comm'n, 275 F.Supp. 833 (ED La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U. S. 571 
(1968). 
44Norwood v. Harrison. 
45Ibid., 463. 
46Ibid., 470.  The Court was referring to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and also 
noted that “Congress has made such discrimination unlawful in other significant 
contexts.”  Ibid. 
47Ibid., 463. 
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facilities by private segregated school groups.48  Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion 
noted that in contrast to the relatively easy question about integrating public facilities and 
programs, “[t]he problem of private group use is much more complex.”49  The dispositive 
question was whether the use of public facilities made the government “a joint participant 
in the challenged activities.”50  The Court concluded that municipal recreational facilities 
including parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, and zoos were 
sufficiently akin to “generalized governmental services” like traditional state monopolies 
such as electricity, water, and police and fire protection.51  Accordingly, the use of these 
facilities by private groups that discriminated on the basis of race did not rise to the level 
of government endorsement of discriminatory practices.52  But Blackmun went even 
further: the exclusion of a discriminatory group from public facilities would violate the 
group’s freedom of association.53  In strong language that didn’t appear elsewhere in the 
Court’s civil rights cases, Blackmun noted that “the freedom to associate applies to the 
beliefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible” and “tends to produce the 
diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures 
                                                 
48Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).  The decision came after repeated 
instances of Montgomery’s blatant disregard of mandates to integrate its public facilities. 
49Ibid., 572. 
50Ibid., 573 (quoting). 
51Ibid., 574. 
52Blackmun observed that the result might be different if “the city or other governmental 
entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities” in a manner suggestive of 
discriminatory intent.   Ibid., 574.   
53Ibid., 575.  Blackmun quoted from Douglas’s Moose Lodge dissent. 
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peaceful orderly change.”54  At the same time, he cautioned that “the very exercise of the 
freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for others.  Invidious 
discrimination takes its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not subject to 
affirmative constitutional protection when it involves state action.”55  
Blackmun’s recognition of the freedom of association for racially discriminatory 
private schools didn’t last long.  Two years after Gilmore, in Runyon v. McCrary, the 
Court construed another provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to preclude racial 
discrimination by “private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools.”56  Rejecting 
the suggestion that the legislation “[did] not reach private acts of racial discrimination,”57 
Justice Stewart wrote that: 
From [the principle of the freedom of association] it may be assumed that 
parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational 
institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and 
that the children have an equal right to attend such institutions.  But it does 
not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such 
institutions is also protected by the same principle.58 
 
Stewart buttressed his position in Runyon with a carefully edited quotation from 
Norwood.  Burger had written in Norwood that “. . . although the Constitution does not 
proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination.”59  Stewart’s quotation 
omitted Burger’s prefatory clause and asserted: “As the Court stated in [Norwood], ‘the 
                                                 
54Ibid. 
55Ibid. 
56Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). 
57Ibid., 173. 
58Ibid., 176 (emphasis added). 
59Norwood v. Harrison, 469-70 (emphasis added).  
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Constitution . . . places no value on discrimination.’”60  The abbreviated language stood 
for a broader legal principle than Norwood had conveyed.  In Norwood, the Court had, in 
effect, prevented government subsidization of a disfavored social practice.  Runyon 
precluded the practice itself.   
Stewart’s distinction between advocacy (expressing the belief that racial 
segregation is desirable) and practice (excluding racial minorities from private schools) 
may have produced a socially desirable result, but it undeniably constrained the freedom 
of association.  On Stewart’s reasoning, one could associate to express an odious belief 
but not to engage in an odious practice, even if that practice posed no imminent danger.  
Stewart reiterated this narrow understanding of the right of association in cases beyond 
the confines of civil rights. Writing for the majority in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education, a 1977 case involving an “agency shop” arrangement for state government 
employees, he described “the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of 
advancing beliefs and ideas.”61  And four years later, writing for the Court in Democratic 
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, a case involving political parties, Stewart 
referred to the “freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared 
beliefs.”62  That same year, Burger echoed Stewart’s view in Citizens Against Rent 
Control v. Berkeley.63 Although acknowledging that “the practice of persons sharing 
common views banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the 
                                                 
60Runyon v. McCrary, 176. 
61Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (emphasis added). 
62Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981) 
(emphasis added). 
63Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (emphasis added). 
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American political process,” Burger asserted that the real value of association is “that by 
collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices 
would be faint or lost.”64  This kind of reasoning endorsed an instrumental conception of 
association that would be made explicit in Roberts. 
 
  5.  The Cost of Achieving Policy Objectives 
 The decade lasting from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s marked significant 
strides toward equality for African Americans with the coalescence of efforts by the three 
branches of the federal government to rid the country of segregationist practices.65  By 
the end of that period, integration was indisputably part of the national democratic creed.  
Most Americans outside the South even accepted the Court’s conclusion that the “badges 
and incidents of slavery”66 justified some incursions into private discrimination.  Of 
course, these efforts met with only limited success when more subtle forms of racism and 
discriminatory practices migrated into increasingly private and undetectable realms.   
 Given the breadth and depth of racism then and now, the reach of 
antidiscrimination law to private settings during the first part of the equality era is not 
hard to defend, and I have no desire to challenge it.  But what cannot be lost in the moral 
endorsement of the policy objectives and outcomes of the civil rights litigation is the cost 
of those efforts to the freedom of association.  While few today would object to the 
substantive outcomes of compelled integration in private settings, they came at the 
                                                 
64Ibid., 294 (emphasis added).  
65Gerald Rosenberg’s important study emphasizes that these changes did not come about 
from the Court alone.  See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, 39-169. 
66Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 439. 
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expense of a right of association that could stand against majoritarian impulses and 
consensus beliefs.   
 
B.  ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY 
The clash between integration and the right to exclude developed in parallel to a 
line of cases that emphasized a wholly different aspect of associational freedom: privacy.  
Frankfurter and Douglas had linked association and privacy in cases during the national 
security era.67  And Harlan had referred to the “the vital relationship between freedom to 
associate and privacy in one’s associations” in NAACP v. Alabama.68  But the connection 
deepened after the Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.69  Because privacy, like association, appeared nowhere in the text of the 
Constitution, the Court’s earlier recognition of the right of association in NAACP v. 
Alabama became an important example of the kind “penumbral” reasoning that justified 
the right of privacy in Griswold.  
There was, however, a definitional problem with the meaning of privacy in the 
context of association.  Brandeis and Warren’s classic definition of the right “to be let 
                                                 
67See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 560 
(1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
68NAACP v. Alabama, 462.  Harlan continued that: “Inviolability of privacy in group 
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of 
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”  Ibid. 
69Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).   
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alone” conveyed a sense of individual autonomy.70  But references to privacy in the 
association cases during the national security era had more to do with protecting the 
boundaries of group autonomy than endorsing individual autonomy.  That kind of privacy 
didn’t mean “not public”; groups like the NAACP and the Communist Party had in fact 
clamored for public visibility and recognition.  Before Griswold, privacy in the context of 
association existed largely to facilitate public and political actions rather than to protect 
secret or intimate actions.   
 
1.  Recognizing a Right to Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut 
Griswold struck down a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives 
and the giving of medical advice about their use, and specifically, the application of this 
law to the use of contraceptives by married persons.  Warren assigned the opinion to 
Douglas.  In a draft that he shared only with Brennan, Douglas made scant reference to a 
right of privacy and rested his argument almost entirely on the First Amendment freedom 
of association.71  Douglas argued that while marriage did “not fit precisely any of the 
categories of First Amendment rights,” it was “a form of association as vital in the life of 
                                                 
70Louis Brandeis and Sam Warren, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4 
(1890): 193, 195.  This kind of individualism would eventually undergird the modern 
right to privacy. 
71Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 237.  Douglas’s only mention of privacy in the draft came in the 
concluding paragraph, where he linked privacy to association, as he had done in his 
Gibson concurrence: “The prospects of police with warrants searching the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives is repulsive to 
the idea of privacy and association that make up a goodly part of the penumbra of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights.” Ibid., 236 (quoting Douglas’s draft opinion).  Schwartz 
writes that Douglas’s sole mention of privacy in the last sentence of his draft “is scarcely 
enough to make it the foundation for any constitutional right of privacy, particularly for 
the broadside right established by the final Griswold opinion.”  Ibid., 230. 
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a man or woman as any other, and perhaps more so.”72  He reasoned that “[w]e would, 
indeed, have difficulty protecting the intimacies of one’s relations to [the] NAACP and 
not the intimacies of one’s marriage relation.”73  
 After reviewing the draft, Brennan urged Douglas to abandon his exclusive 
reliance on the right of association.74  Brennan argued that marriage did not fall within 
the kind of association that the Court had recognized for purposes of political advocacy.75  
(Black had quipped during the justices’ conference on the case that “[t]he right of a 
husband and wife to assemble in bed is a new right of assembly to me.”)76  Brennan 
suggested that Douglas instead analogize the Court’s recognition of the right of 
association to a similar broadening of privacy into a constitutional right.  Neither privacy 
nor association could be found in the text of the Constitution.  If association could be 
recognized as a freestanding constitutional right, then so could privacy.  Douglas 
followed Brennan’s suggestions and wrote that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of 
                                                 
72Ibid., 235 (quoting Douglas's draft opinion).  Despite his reliance on the First 
Amendment throughout his argument, Douglas concluded his draft with broader 
references to privacy and the Constitution: “The prospects of police with warrants 
searching the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives is repulsive to the idea of privacy and of association that make up a goodly 
part of the penumbra of the Constitution and Bill of Rights.” Ibid., 236. 
73Ibid., 235. 
74Ibid., 237.  Brennan argued that Douglas’s expanded view of association would extend 
First Amendment protection to the Communist Party.  Ibid., 237-38. 
75Ibid., 237.   
76Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: The Personalities and Rivalries that Defined 
America (New York: Times Books, 2007), 129.   
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Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance.”77  
 In addition to its recognition of privacy, Douglas’s final opinion also contained 
some extended (and not altogether coherent) language about the constitutional source of 
the freedom of association.  In locating one of the penumbras of privacy in the First 
Amendment, Douglas wrote: 
In NAACP v. Alabama, we protected the “freedom to associate and 
privacy in one’s associations,” noting that freedom of association was a 
peripheral First Amendment right.  Disclosure of membership lists of a 
constitutionally valid association, we held, was invalid “as entailing the 
likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by [the NAACP’s] 
members of their right to freedom of association.”  In other words, the 
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from 
governmental intrusion.  In like context, we have protected forms of 
“association” that are not political in the customary sense but pertain to the 
social, legal, and economic benefit of the members [citing NAACP v. 
Button].78  
 
In a dissenting opinion issued just a month prior to Griswold, Douglas had referred to a 
singular “right of assembly and association.”79  But now he argued that NAACP v. 
Alabama and Button “involved more than the ‘right of assembly.’”80  Instead: 
The right of “association,” like the right of belief, is more than the right to 
attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or 
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other 
lawful means.  Association in that context is a form of expression of 
opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its 
                                                 
77Griswold v. Connecticut, 484. 
78 Ibid., 483.  
79Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965)  (Douglas J., dissenting) (quoting the Papal 
encyclical Pacem in Terris).  
80Griswold v. Connecticut, 483.  
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existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully 
meaningful.81   
 
Douglas’s thin conception of the right of assembly as no more than “the right to 
attend a meeting” departed from his past descriptions of that right.  Having thus confined 
assembly, Douglas suggested that the right of association was “necessary in making the 
express guarantees [of the First Amendment] fully meaningful.”  But there was no 
inherent reason that assembly required a separate right of association.  The Court had 
long ago set forth the broad contours of the rights of speech and assembly in Thomas v. 
Collins: 
If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be 
made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of 
requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and 
making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their 
exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order.  
So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech 
and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction.82 
 
Douglas, in fact, had quoted the above language in his 1961 dissent in Communist Party 
v. Subversive Activities Control Board, adding that “[t]he vices of registration [of an 
organization] may be not unlike those of licensing.”83  Yet despite his repeated arguments 
against this kind of prior restraint in the area of free speech, he failed to make the same 
connection to assembly.84  
                                                 
81Ibid., 483 (citation omitted).  
82Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) 
83Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 
1, 170 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
84See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 423 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“There is no free speech in the sense of the Constitution when permission must be 
obtained from an official before a speech can be made. That is a previous restraint 
condemned by history and at war with the First Amendment.”); Kingsley International 
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Douglas nevertheless maintained an important understanding of association in 
Griswold that would be lost a decade later in Stewart’s instrumental characterization in 
Runyon.  Douglas argued that the right of association “includes the right to express one’s 
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other 
lawful means.”85  In other words, as he had argued in a dissent four years earlier, 
“[j]oining is one method of expression.”86    For Douglas, the act of association was itself 
an intrinsically valuable form of expression.  For Stewart, it became merely an 
instrumental means of facilitating expression.  
Douglas’s reasoning in Griswold failed to convince all of his colleagues.  Harlan 
“fully agree[d] with the judgment of reversal” but rejected the incorporation argument 
that he saw as implicit in Douglas’s insistence that “the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is 
found to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights.”87  
Harlan based his objection on the now familiar liberty argument: “the proper 
constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pictures Corp. v. New York, 360 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1959) (Douglas J., dissenting) (“I can 
find in the First Amendment no room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial, 
reading a news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a movie.”); New York 
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720-25 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).   
85Griswold v. Connecticut, 483.    
86Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961)  (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
87Griswold v. Connecticut, 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”88  Black also disagreed with 
Douglas’s penumbral argument.  His dissent lamented that:  
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally 
guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a 
constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and 
more or less restricted in meaning.  This fact is well illustrated by the use 
of the term “right of privacy” as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
“Privacy” is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be 
shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the other hand, easily be 
interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things other than searches 
and seizures.  I have expressed the view many times that First Amendment 
freedoms, for example, have suffered from a failure of the courts to stick 
to the simple language of the First Amendment in construing it, instead of 
invoking multitudes of words substituted for those the Framers used.89   
 
Black’s words couldn’t have been more ironic in light of his repeated endorsement of the 
right of association, which had certainly been a failure “to stick to the simple language of 
the First Amendment in construing it.”  Moreover, as the Court’s association cases in the 
national security era had shown, substituting a new right of association for the right of 
assembly had been “one of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding” the 
constitutional protections for communists and civil rights activists. 
 
  2.  Reinterpreting Privacy: Eisenstadt v. Baird 
In 1972, the Court extended Griswold’s holding to unmarried persons desiring 
access to contraception.90  Brennan’s majority opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird relied 
                                                 
88Ibid., 500. 
89Ibid., 509 (Black, J., dissenting).  
90Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).    
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heavily on Griswold but not on Douglas’s reasoning.  In Griswold, Douglas had 
maintained that part of the right to privacy rested on the “association” of marriage:  
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than 
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming 
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not 
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a 
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.91   
 
In Eisenstadt, Brennan shifted the focus away from Douglas’s emphasis on the marital 
relationship:  
It is true that, in Griswold, the right of privacy in question inhered in the 
marital relationship.  Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity, 
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals, 
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.  If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.92  
 
Brennan’s language thus converted a concept rooted in association between people to a 
right of individual autonomy.  As H. Jefferson Powell writes, “Brennan’s reading of 
Griswold turned Douglas’s reasoning on its head” and signaled “the identification of a 
radically individualistic liberalism as the moral content of American constitutionalism.”93  
Ironically, Brennan’s reasoning drew upon the liberty argument that Harlan had advanced 
                                                 
91Griswold v. Connecticut, 486.  
92Eisenstadt v. Baird, 453. Douglas concurred in the result, but wrote that “[t]his to me is 
a simple First Amendment case, that amendment being applicable to the States by reason 
of the Fourteenth.”  Ibid., 455 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
93H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993), 176, 177.   
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in NAACP v. Alabama and other cases (including his Griswold concurrence).94   The right 
of privacy utterly detached from the right of association had no First Amendment basis; it 
came rather from the “liberty” of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—exactly where Harlan had argued against Brennan that the right of 
association was itself located.95   
   
C.  THE RISE OF RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM 
As the Court and commentators proceeded with separate analyses of association 
in civil rights and privacy decisions, John Rawls introduced to political and legal 
discourse a theoretical resource with significant implications for the right of association.  
The appearance of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 breathed new life into the 
discipline of political theory, which had increasingly been exiled from political science 
by the behavioralism of postwar pluralists.96  But while Rawls came to be viewed as a 
kind of normative antidote to the ostensibly descriptive pluralist claims that pervaded 
political science in the 1950s and 1960s, his basic framework echoed many pluralist 
assumptions.  As John Gunnell has written, that “[t]he new pluralism is, in many respects, 
                                                 
94The flexible approach to liberty that Frankfurter and Harlan had championed against the 
incorporation theories of Black and Douglas was actually a far greater resource for 
“judicial activism” in which the Court supplanted legislative policy judgments with its 
own.  Frankfurter and Harlan’s adherence to judicial restraint kept them from using 
“liberty” to this end, but they provided the analytical roadmap for other justices less 
inclined to show restraint.  
95Powell writes that Eisenstadt “clearly marked the reemergence of substantive due 
process as a mode of constitutional argument that the Court considered legitimate.”  
Powell, Moral Tradition, 176.  
96John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press (revised edition), 1999 
(1971)).  As Dahl and other pluralists insisted on empiricism and inductive research, the 
normative claims of political theorists became less central to the discipline.   
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not the same as the old pluralism . . . but it is, at bottom, the same theory.”97  The 
continuity is particularly evident with respect to questions about group autonomy.  
Pluralist political thought insisted on a consensus bounded by the democratic creed; 
Rawlsian liberalism presumed an “overlapping consensus” in which egalitarianism rooted 
in an individualist ontology trumped and thus bounded diversity.  Pluralists attributed 
harmony and balance to group interaction to explain the relative stability that they 
perceived; Rawls feared a loss of stability and made the preservation of peaceful 
interactions a cornerstone of his normative theory.  Like the pluralist assumptions that 
preceded them, the Rawlsian premises of consensus and stability pervaded political 
discourse and influenced the ways in which the equality era reshaped the right of 
association. 
   
  1.  The Rawlsian Framework 
Rawls has inspired an enormous secondary literature, and it is not my intention 
here to summarize the many applications and critiques of his theory of justice.  Rather, I 
am only interested in covering the background necessary to interrogate his views about 
the freedom of association.  Because Rawls’s theory developed throughout the equality 
era, and because more refined articulations appear in his later works, I draw upon some 
of these later sources and assume they are in continuity with his original theory unless 
otherwise indicated.  
Rawls’s theory was self-avowedly motivated out of a concern for political 
stability that could avoid the kind of sectarian religious violence that followed the 
                                                 
97John Gunnell, “The Real Revolution in Political Science,” PS: Political Science 37 
(2004), 49.  
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European Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.98  He believed this 
stability could be attained through the “well-ordered society,” that is, “a society 
effectively regulated by a public political conception of justice.”99  In this society, 
“everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of 
justice.”100  This agreement could be reached without “the oppressive use of state 
power.”101  Rawls initially asserted that citizens, in spite of their differences, could pursue 
a common understanding of justice from an “Archimedean point . . . by assuming certain 
general desires, such as the desire for primary social goods, and by taking as a basis the 
agreements that would be made in a suitably defined initial situation.”102  He later came 
to believe that liberal society could never overcome the interminable disagreement that 
flowed from what he called “conflicting and incommensurable doctrines.”103  But he 
insisted that we might nonetheless attain political stability that was more than a mere 
modus vivendi.104  Rawls believed that while “reasonable pluralism” permitted “a 
diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines,” we could discover an “overlapping 
consensus” about justice from among these comprehensive doctrines by constraining 
                                                 
98John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), xvii, 
148. 
99Ibid., 35.  
100Ibid.  Cf. ibid., 140-44.  Rawls notes this is “a highly idealized concept.”  Ibid., 35. 
101Ibid., 35.  Rawls rejects the notion of “a continuing shared understanding” based on 
“one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.”   
102Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 232.  
103Rawls, Political Liberalism, 135.  
104Ibid., 148. 
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dialogue to “public reason.”105  He thought that the overlapping consensus of reasonable 
belief would produce agreement over the “basic structure” and the “primary social 
goods” of society, which include rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and 
self-respect.106 
Rawls’s “basic liberties” loosely track constitutional rights, and they include the 
freedom of association.107  The freedom of association is related to what Rawls calls 
                                                 
105Ibid., 36. 
106Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 6, 79, 386.  
107Rawls omits the freedom of association from his list of these liberties in A Theory of 
Justice but includes it in Political Liberalism.  Compare Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 53 
(listing “freedom of speech and assembly” but not association) with Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 291, 335.  Kevin Kordana and David Tabachnick have suggested that “the 
Rawlsian texts appear not to be consistent with regard to the status of the right to freedom 
of association” and “[t]he status of a right to freedom of association” among the basic 
liberties is “neither obvious nor uncontroversial.” Kevin A. Kordana and David Blankfein 
Tabachnick, “The Rawlsian View of Private Ordering,” Social Philosophy and Policy 25 
(2008): 288, 290.  I am not convinced by this interpretation; Rawls certainly seems to 
describe something akin to freedom of association in his account of the basic liberties in 
A Theory of Justice even if he does not name it as such.  See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
195-96 (“There are firm constitutional protections for certain liberties, particularly 
freedom of speech and assembly, and liberty to form political associations.  The principle 
of loyal opposition is recognized, the clash of political beliefs, and of the interests and 
attitudes that are likely to influence them, are accepted as a normal condition of human 
life. . . . Without the conception of loyal opposition, and an attachment to constitutional 
rules which express and protect it, the politics of democracy cannot be properly 
conducted or long endure.”); cf. John Rawls, “Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of 
Justice,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 94 (writing in 1962 that “although tolerant sects have a right not 
to tolerate an intolerant sect when they sincerely and with reason believe that their own 
security and that of the institution of liberty is in danger, they have this right only in this 
case”).  And as early as 1975, Rawls noted that a well-ordered society “ensures an equal 
liberty and freedom of association.”  John Rawls, “Fairness to Goodness” in John Rawls: 
Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
275.  But this quibble is tangential to my consideration of Rawls’s understanding of 
association because Kordana and Tabachnick agree that at least some component of the 
right of association is included among the basic liberties.  Kordana and Tabacnick, “The 
Rawlsian View of Private Ordering,” 290 (freedom of association is a “complex right”). 
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“private society,” which “is not held together by a public conviction that its basic 
arrangements are just and good in themselves.”108  As a result, “there are many types of 
social union and from the perspective of political justice we are not to try to rank them in 
value.”109  In fact, “[a] well-ordered society, and indeed most societies, will presumably 
contain countless social unions of many different kinds.”110  Importantly, “government 
has no authority to render associations either legitimate or illegitimate any more than it 
has this authority in regard to art or science.”111  
Yet at the same time, Rawls’s vision for stability depends on consensus, and 
consensus can only be reached by constraining certain modes of discourse through public 
reason.  Rawls maintains that public consensus is possible because political views can be 
detached from comprehensive doctrines: “we always assume that citizens have two 
views, a comprehensive and a political view; and that their overall view can be divided 
into two parts, suitably related.”112  He offers his most refined version of the public 
reason constraint in a 1997 essay titled “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.”113  There 
                                                 
108Rawls, Theory of Justice, 457, 458. 
109Ibid., 462.  
110Ibid.  
111Ibid., 186.  
112Ibid., 140. To this end, Rawls advocated that a “political conception” of justice could 
be attained “without reference” to comprehensive doctrines.  Ibid., 12.  For Rawls, 
comprehensive doctrines “belong to what we may call the ‘background culture’ of civil 
society” which “is the culture of the social, not of the political.”  Ibid., 14. Rawls’s 
distinction between the “social” and the “political” is particularly troubling, as if “the 
culture of daily life, of its many associations” could exist in a social realm uninhibited by 
the legal framework established by the political.  Ibid. 
113John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Chicago Law Review 64 (1997). 
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he writes that the requirement of public reason “still allows us to introduce into political 
discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided 
that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies 
our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”114 
 
2.  Rawls and Association 
 Rawls’s commitment to stability and consensus in the basic structure of society on 
the one hand, and his recognition of the freedom of association in private society on the 
other, leads to an ambiguity about the boundaries of associational autonomy.  Feminist 
theorists have famously called attention to this ambiguity with respect to the family.115   It 
also exists with other kinds of groups.  As Nancy Rosenblum observes, “[o]ne possibility 
is that associational life is part of the ‘basic structure’ of a well-ordered society, whose 
organization and norms must conform to principles of justice because their efforts on 
defining men’s rights and duties and influence their life-prospects ‘are so profound and 
present from the start.’”116  But “[e]xcept for serfdom and slavery Rawls does not identify 
arrangements that must be prohibited as a condition for the morality of association.”117  
Accordingly, Rosenblum argues that “[w]e can conclude that associations do not fail in 
serving their formative moral purposes by being incongruent with the public norms of 
                                                 
114Ibid., 776 (emphasis added).  This “proviso” echoes his view in Political Liberalism 
that citizens can invoke comprehensive doctrines “provided they do this in ways that 
strengthen the idea of public reason itself.” Rawls, Political Liberalism, 247. 
115See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic, 
1989).  
116Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 54.  
117Ibid.  
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liberal democracy, or by being insufficiently complex and comprehensive to move 
members in the direction of appreciation for principles of justice.”118  Rather, “the 
morality of association provides a pluralist background culture, much of it incongruent 
with liberal democracy.”119   
 On my reading, Rawls’s ambiguity ultimately leads to an unacceptable incursion 
into group autonomy.  The problem becomes evident when a claim to one of the primary 
goods (e.g., self-respect) clashes with a claim to freedom of association and must be 
adjudicated by a court.  Because Rawls requires public reason from “the discourse of 
judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court,” there is every 
indication that the dispute will have to be resolved on the basis of public reason.120  But 
what if the practices underlying a claim to freedom of association cannot be reduced to 
public reason?   
Suppose, for example, that a private association of men wants to exclude women 
and that the exclusion damages the self-respect of those women.  The conflict requires an 
outcome that prioritizes one basic good over another.  Rawls may at first glance seem 
agnostic about the resolution.  But suppose the reasons that the men have for desiring 
exclusivity derive from beliefs and values internal to their tradition and practices that 
neither accord with nor subscribe to Rawlsian public reason.  We might consider several 
such possibilities: an emotive explanation (e.g., “we feel better when we gather 
exclusively as men”), an expressive explanation (e.g., “we believe that our gathering of 
                                                 
118Ibid.  
119Ibid.  
120Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 767.  
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men best expresses to the world our fundamental beliefs”), or a theological explanation 
(e.g., “we gather exclusively as men based on our understanding of God’s command to 
us”).  By imposing the constraint of public reason, Rawls precludes the judge or judges 
resolving the dispute from relying on these arguments.   
The only remaining arguments that satisfy public reason are seemingly 
tautological claims about the importance of free association (or a derivative claim of the 
importance of emotion, expression, or religion) for its own sake, and these will surely fail 
against the countervailing claim of damaged self-respect, which is “perhaps the most 
important primary good.”121  But the analysis leading to this conclusion proceeds within a 
constrained discourse.  There is nothing inherent in a procedural scheme of justice that 
requires either public reason or the outcome it generates.  And despite Rawls’s aspiration 
to reach agreement through discussion, decisions based upon public reason will 
ultimately be enforced by the coercive and violent imposition of the law.122   
It is important to recognize the logical consequences of Rawls’s public reason 
constraint even when they aren’t immediately triggered.  For example, a group unable to 
articulate a public reason defense of its practices may nevertheless flourish under a 
Rawlsian scheme as long as it is unchallenged.  But that group’s freedom is contingent on 
                                                 
121Rawls, Theory of Justice, 386.  As Corey Brettschneider argues, “the test for the 
reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines is substantive and not merely formal,” and 
“nonjustifiable principles expressed in the language of public reason are still 
nonjustifiable.”  Corey Brettschneider, “The Politics of the Personal: A Liberal 
Approach,” American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 22.  
122See generally Robert Cover, “Violence and the Word,” Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 
1601.  Cover begins his article with the chilling pronouncement that “[l]egal 
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”  Ibid.  He later notes that “[t]he 
violence of judges and officials of a posited constitutional order is generally understood 
to be implicit in the practice of law and government. Violence is so intrinsic to this 
activity, so taken for granted, that it need not be mentioned.”  Ibid. 
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the absence of a challenge based on public reason.  When a group encounters a constraint 
justified in terms acceptable to public reason, it must either modify its practices or cease 
to exist unless it can offer a defense grounded in public reason.123   
 
3.  Rawls and Legal Theory 
Rawls may not have been cited in the legal decisions that reshaped the freedom of 
association in the first part of the equality era, but his influence was close at hand.  His 
framework was soon adopted by legal academics eager to provide intellectual cover to 
the Warren Court’s decisions.  And even if Rawls himself remained ambiguous about the 
substantive implications of his theory, some of his followers in the law schools did not.  
In 1969, Frank Michelman’s forward in the Harvard Law Review adopted a Rawlsian 
framework for analyzing income and wealth inequality.124  Eight years later, Kenneth 
Karst’s forward employed a Rawlsian approach to conclude that the “substantive core” of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was “a principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively 
guarantees to each individual the right to be treated by the organized society as a 
respected, responsible, and participating member.”125  The Rawlsian influence in the legal 
                                                 
123This conclusion is consistent with what Corey Brettschneider calls “the principle of 
publicly justifiable privacy” that he sees implicit in Rawls.  Brettschneider, “The Politics 
of the Personal,” 25.  The principle holds that “[t]o the extent that private life affects the 
ability of citizens to function in society and see others as free and equal citizens, it should 
be in accordance with public reason.”  Ibid. 
124Frank Michelman, “Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” Harvard Law Review 83 (1969).  Laura Kalman writes that by 1973, 
Michelman was less enamored of Rawlsian solutions.  Kalman, The Strange Career of 
Legal Liberalism, 67. 
125Kenneth Karst, “Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
Harvard Law Review 91 (1977): 4. 
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academy did not go unchallenged, and Laura Kalman suggests that “[i]n the end, Rawls 
proved helpful only to legal scholars predisposed toward political liberalism who were 
looking for a way to justify its continuance.”126  But in the first part of the equality era, 
those scholars held significant sway in the law schools and on the courts. 
One of the most important legal scholars shaped by Rawlsian premises was 
Ronald Dworkin.  Dworkin’s legal theory made explicit an important assumption 
underlying Rawls’s theory of justice: the protection of individual rights acted against a 
majoritarian conception of democracy.127  The “constitutional conception” of democracy 
held out rights as “trumps” that limited majoritarian preferences to the extent that they 
imposed on fundamental values like “equal concern and respect.”128  This meant that “a 
society in which the majority shows contempt for the needs and prospects of some 
minority is illegitimate as well as unjust.”129  But Dworkin’s theory also exposed (and 
replicated) a tension inherent in Rawls’s theory of justice: anti-majoritarianism was 
conditioned on a defense of liberal values.  Once illiberal minorities laid claim to 
fundamental liberal rights, the conflict between competing liberal claims became 
unavoidable: members of a group seeking to engage in illiberal practices that infringed 
upon the liberal rights of other members or nonmembers could also consistently claim the 
liberal right to group autonomy.130  Unlike Tocqueville and Madison, Rawls and Dworkin 
                                                 
126Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, 67. 
127See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
128Ibid., 17. 
129Ibid., 25. 
130For purposes of this argument, I am assuming that the right to group autonomy and 
opposing liberal rights are all individual rights.  An individual’s right to group autonomy 
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fail to recognize the importance of anti-majoritarian groups irrespective of the substantive 
content or values of those groups.  For Madison and Tocqueville, group autonomy is 
simply a boundary marker that doesn’t engage in a substantive weighing of values.  For 
Rawls and Dworkin, group autonomy and freedom of association are conditioned by 
equality, self-respect, and perhaps other liberal values.  It is only when the majority fails 
to recognize fundamental liberal rights (as those rights are defined by Rawls and 
Dworkin) that strong principles of group autonomy come into play.131  
 
D.  ROBERTS V. UNITED STATES JAYCEES   
The influence of Rawlsian liberalism and the two strands of case law that 
emerged over the right to exclude and the right to privacy coalesced in Roberts v. United 
                                                                                                                                                 
is violated if the state imposes unwanted membership requirements upon that person’s 
group.  
131I recognize that I am making a critical and perhaps controversial interpretation of 
Dworkin, but I think it is right.  For examples of others seeing similarities between the 
constraining effects of Rawls’s public reason and Dworkin’s law as integrity, see Paul F. 
Campos, “Secular Fundamentalism,” Columbia Law Review 94 (1994), 1826-27 (“Law 
as integrity parallels the idea of public reason legitimating the exercise of coercive state 
power ‘in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them 
as reasonable and rational.’”); Edward J. McCaffery, “Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out,” 
California Law Review 85 (1997), 1057 (“Dworkin’s method can be understood as a form 
of public reason in the law.”); George Rutherglen, “Private Law and Public Reason,” 
Virginia Law Review 92 (2006), 1511 (“Dworkin would not have to modify much of his 
legal or political theory to limit the range of political discourse to what Rawls recognizes 
as reasonable.”).  But see Lawrence B. Solum, “Public Legal Reason,” Virginia Law 
Review 92 (2006), 1474-75 (“Dworkin’s imaginary judge Hercules sees no limit to the 
conceptual ascent that may be required to resolve a hard case.”).  Dworkin himself has 
resisted comparisons between law as integrity and Rawlsian public reason, arguing 
recently that he has “great difficulties” with Rawls’s distinction “between political values 
on the one hand and comprehensive moral convictions on the other.”  Ronald Dworkin, 
Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 253. 
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States Jaycees, the most important case on the freedom of association in the equality era.  
In a sweeping decision with significant consequences for associational freedom, the 
Court simultaneously endorsed the implicit connection between privacy and association 
and severely curtailed the right to exclude.  
 
1.  The Jaycees 
The background to Roberts began in 1974 and 1975, when the Minneapolis and 
St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regular members, in violation 
of the national organization’s bylaws.132  According to the national organization, women 
could be “Associate Individual Members” who were ineligible to vote, hold office, or 
receive certain national awards but could “otherwise participate fully in Jaycee 
activities.”133  After the national organization threatened to revoke their charters, the two 
Minnesota chapters filed sex discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of 
Human Rights based on the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which declared that it was an 
unfair discriminatory practice: 
To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public 
accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national 
origin, or sex.134   
 
                                                 
132Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 614. 
133United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1563 (8th Cir. 1983). Cf. Roberts, 
621 (“despite their inability to vote, hold office, or receive certain awards, women 
affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and 
engage in many of the organization's social functions”). 
134Minn. Stat. § 363.o3(3) (1982).  The threshold question of whether the Jaycees fell 
under the scope of the Act as a “public accommodation” had been decided by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and accepted by the federal courts as a factual determination.  
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In response, members of the national organization filed suit, alleging that the Act violated 
their rights of speech and association.135 
 
2.  Brennan’s Opinion 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act without a dissent.136  
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion asserted that previous decisions had identified two 
separate constitutional sources for the right of association.137   One line of decisions 
protected “intimate association” as “a fundamental element of personal liberty.”138  
Another set of decisions guarded “expressive association,” which was “a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
                                                 
135An important fact sometimes lost in the retelling of Roberts is that the litigation 
reflected an internal debate among the Jaycees—the national organization had sued the 
local Minnesota chapters.  At stake were two competing visions of the future of the 
organization.  It is plausible—perhaps even likely—that the vision favoring the full 
inclusion of women would have won out absent interference by the courts.  In fact, as 
Judge Arnold pointed out in the lower court opinion, the question about whether to admit 
women had “been vigorously debated within the organization,” and while the national 
organization had defeated a resolution favoring the admission of women on three 
occasions prior to the Roberts litigation, each time a larger minority had voted in favor of 
the resolution. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 1561.  
136Burger and Blackmun recused themselves from the case: Burger had been chapter 
president of the St. Paul Jaycees, and Blackmun had been a former member of the 
Minneapolis Jaycees. 
137Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 617, 618.   
138Ibid., 618.  Brennan appears to have taken the category of intimate association from an 
influential 1980 article in the Yale Law Journal.  See Kenneth L. Karst, "The Freedom of 
Intimate Association," Yale Law Journal 89 (1980): 629.  Karst contended that Griswold 
had established a freedom of “intimate association,” which Karst suggested was “a close 
and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some significant way 
comparable to a marriage or family relationship.”  Ibid.  Justice Blackmun cited Karst’s 
article twice in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
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Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise 
of religion.”139  Expressive association to pursue “a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends” was “implicit in the right to engage 
in activities protected by the First Amendment.”140  
The constitutional sources of Brennan’s categories of intimate and expressive 
association roughly tracked the liberty argument and the incorporation argument.  But in 
a bizarre doctrinal twist, the intimate association corresponding to the liberty argument 
now commanded greater constitutional protection than the expressive association 
corresponding to the incorporation argument, a reversal of the positions debated on the 
Court during the national security era.  Brennan contended that intimate and expressive 
association represented, respectively, the “intrinsic and instrumental features of 
constitutionally protected association.”141  These differences meant that “the nature and 
degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending 
on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at 
stake in a given case.”142  As a result, any group that the Court classified as an expressive 
non-intimate association (the component of association derived from the incorporation 
argument) is invariably relegated to a lower constitutional status.143  
                                                 
139Ibid. 
140Ibid., 622. 
141Ibid., 618. 
142Ibid. 
143Ibid.  Cf. Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 41 (contending that Brennan regarded expressive association “as 
instrumental and therefore subject to greater government intrusion”); George Kateb, "The 
Value of Association," in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: 
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Brennan began his analysis by considering whether the Jaycees was an intimate 
association and announced that “several features of the Jaycees clearly place the 
organization outside of the category of relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional 
protection.”144    In the second section of his opinion, Brennan concluded that the Jaycees 
was an expressive association.  He appeared to recognize the significance of the 
consequences of the Minnesota law to the Jaycees: 
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure 
or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept 
members it does not desire.  Such a regulation may impair the ability of 
the original members to express only those views that brought them 
together.  Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom 
not to associate.145 
 
And in a critical comment, Brennan noted that “[a]ccording protection to collective effort 
on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural 
diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”146  The 
sentiment could have come straight from Madison and Tocqueville (absent their pluralist 
gloss).  It reflected the importance of dissenting groups that the freedom of assembly had 
once recognized.   
Brennan quickly downplayed these concerns in light of “Minnesota’s compelling 
interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens.”147  He reasoned that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 46 (“Running through Brennan’s opinion is the 
assumption that all nonintimate relationships are simply inferior to intimate ones.”).   
144Ibid.   
145Ibid., 623. 
146Ibid., 622. 
147Ibid., 623. Although Brennan applied strict scrutiny language to his review of the 
regulation of expressive association, the compelling interest that he identified in 
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Minnesota furthered its compelling interest by assuring women equal access to the 
leadership skills, business contacts, and employment promotions offered by the 
Jaycees.148  Because the Jaycees’s willingness to admit women as Associate Individual 
Members presumably already afforded them all of these opportunities (the associate 
status precluded only voting, holding office, and eligibility for national awards), it is 
unclear how forced admission of women as full members helped to eradicate gender 
discrimination in Minnesota.149  But even more troubling than Brennan’s failure to link 
remedy and harm was his claim that the forced integration of women would have no 
effect on the expressive interests of the Jaycees.150  There was, according to Brennan, “no 
basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members 
[would] impede the organization’s ability to engage in . . . protected activities or to 
disseminate its preferred views.”151    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“eradicating discrimination” easily satisfied his review.  Because an interest in ending 
discrimination will always be implicated in a case involving anti-discrimination 
legislation, it is unclear how much protection strict scrutiny really offers expressive 
associations seeking to discriminate in their membership based on an ascriptive trait.   
148Ibid., 626. 
149 I am not suggesting that the limitations imposed on Associate Individual Members are 
insignificant.  But the pertinent legal inquiry is whether prohibiting these limitations 
furthers the compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination, and it is difficult to 
see how it does given the opportunities available to women as Associate Individual 
Members.  The right to vote in a Jaycees’s referendum is not the same as the right to vote 
in a governmental election.  At the very least, the Court failed to show how its remedy of 
forced inclusion furthered the compelling interest that it identified.  
150Brennan wrote that “[T]he Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any 
serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive association.”  Ibid., 626. 
151Ibid., 627.    
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3.  O’Connor’s Concurrence 
Justice O’Connor’s oft-cited concurrence in Roberts criticized Brennan’s 
reasoning.152  Contrary to Brennan, O’Connor viewed expressive association as more 
than instrumentally valuable.  She asserted that: “[p]rotection of the association’s right to 
define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive 
association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of 
that voice.”153  If the Jaycees was in fact an expressive association, O’Connor believed it 
would be entitled to protection from intrusion by the state’s antidiscrimination legislation. 
Rather than distinguishing between expressive and non-expressive associations, 
O’Connor instead proposed drawing a line between predominantly expressive and 
predominantly commercial organizations.  She acknowledged that while the Jaycees was 
not a political organization, “the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the 
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what it does.”154  Nevertheless, she reasoned 
that the Jaycees’s attention to and success in membership drives meant that it was “first 
and foremost, an organization that, at both the national and local levels, promotes and 
practices the art of solicitation and management.”155  Accordingly, “[t]he State of 
Minnesota ha[d] a legitimate interest in ensuring nondiscriminatory access to the 
commercial opportunity presented by membership in the Jaycees.”156  For these reasons, 
                                                 
152Ibid., 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
153Ibid., 633. 
154Ibid., 639 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure). 
155Ibid. 
156Ibid., 640. 
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the Jaycees for O’Connor presented a “relatively easy case for application of the 
expressive-commercial dichotomy.”157 
 
 4.  The Artificiality of Intimate Association 
In my view, the most serious doctrinal flaw in Roberts is Brennan’s distinction 
between intimate and expressive association.  This approach to claims of group autonomy 
sacrifices too much out of the gates, and without a principled reason for doing so.  Under 
Brennan’s reasoning, non-intimate associations receive a lower level of constitutional 
protection and are assumed to be merely instrumentally valuable to expression.  
Moreover, almost every group facing a challenge to its autonomy will fail to meet 
Brennan’s criteria for an intimate association.  The justifications for the division between 
intimate and expressive association are deeply flawed and cannot be sustained upon 
critical reflection.  
Brennan begins his argument by highlighting the role of intimate associations as 
groups that mediate between state and individual.  Notice both the grammar and content 
of his argument: 
[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture 
and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals 
and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers 
between the individual and the power of the State.158  
 
Brennan’s rhetoric attempts to draw the reader into a kind of Tocquevillean ethos in 
which intimate associations at once facilitate support for and resistance to “the Nation.”  
But the argument lacks coherence and specificity.  What exactly are the national culture 
                                                 
157Ibid., 638. 
158Ibid., 618-619. 
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(singular) and traditions (plural) that “shared ideals and beliefs” cultivate?  How do 
personal bonds “foster diversity” and act as “critical buffers” from state power?  More to 
the point, why are these functions unique to intimate associations?  If Brennan’s 
argument is that intimate associations sustain some kind of national culture through 
shared ideals and beliefs, why can’t non-intimate associations also serve as “schools of 
democracy”?159  Indeed, as Nancy Rosenblum has argued: “the onus for cultivating the 
moral dispositions of liberal democratic citizens falls heavily on voluntary groups such as 
the Jaycees and their myriad counterparts.”160  Conversely, if Brennan means to position 
intimate associations as “mediating structures” between individuals and the state,161 he 
ought to recognize that some of the largest (and least “intimate”) groups have the 
capacity to provide the strongest forms of resistance to incursions by the state.  
 Brennan next enlists cherished notions of liberty and autonomy in support of his 
construction of intimate association: 
[T]he constitutional shelter afforded [intimate associations] reflects the 
realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from 
close ties with others.  Protecting these relationships from unwarranted 
state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define 
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.162    
 
Brennan’s phrases—emotional enrichment, defining one’s identity, and the concept of 
liberty—again call to mind lofty aspirations, but the meaning of his words is remarkably 
vague.  If individuals draw “emotional enrichment” from close ties with others, then how 
                                                 
159Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve trans. 1899), 511. 
160Nancy Rosenblum, “Compelled Association,” 76. 
161Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: From State to Civil 
Society (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976). 
162Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 619. 
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do they also “independently” define their own identity?  And why is this understanding of 
identity formation central to any concept of liberty?  Are there not notions of selfhood 
and liberty that recognize the interdependence rather than the independence of people? 
As before, Brennan’s words fail to explain why his proffered reasons extend only 
to intimate associations.  People form close ties with others through all kinds of 
associations.  Some business relationships blossom into close friendships that last a 
lifetime; some marriages fail in a matter of months.163  Self-definition also comes from 
myriad forms of associations.  One’s decision to join the ACLU or to make a financial 
contribution to Greenpeace can speak volumes about his or her identity.   
Brennan wants both to link intimate association to the central values of the 
American experiment and to distinguish it from other forms of association.  He fails to do 
either, perhaps because he lacks the resources, perhaps because these kinds of distinctions 
are too contrived.  We are left wondering whether we really inhabit a world in which this 
discrete category of intimate association fills the role that Brennan ascribes to it.   
Despite having failed to offer a convincing justification for privileging intimate 
associations, Brennan introduces criteria for identifying these groups.  He defines an 
intimate association as “distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high 
degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from 
others in critical aspects of the relationship.”164  He notes that factors relevant to 
                                                 
163Or hours.  See “Britney Spears Sheds Another Husband,” New York Times, Section E, 
August 1, 2007 (referencing Spears’s annulment of marriage to her childhood friend, 
Jason Alexander, 55 hours after they wed). 
164Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 620.  Brennan continued that: “As a general matter, 
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that 
have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal 
liberty.” Ibid. 
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determining intimacy include “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other 
characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent.”165  
The size of an association is central to Brennan’s argument.  He has reported in 
the first part of his opinion that the Jaycees was a 295,000-member organization in 1981, 
the year in which the federal litigation commenced.166  He now observes that even “the 
local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups.”167  The 
Minneapolis chapter, for example, had “approximately 430 members.”168  These figures 
are meant to push the reader toward the conclusion that the Jaycees falls clearly outside 
of the bounds of an intimate association.  But Brennan’s numbers also direct attention 
away from the actual relationships that undoubtedly form in local chapters of a large 
national organization.  It is hard to imagine the Minneapolis Jaycees meeting together 
without meaningful interaction between members.  
Brennan’s focus on selectivity of membership as an indicator of intimacy fares 
even worse.  Book clubs, gardening clubs, and even some recreational sports leagues are 
completely unselective in their membership.  Yet these kinds of associations often foster 
intimate connections among their members.  Perhaps sensing the thinness of his 
distinction, Brennan buttresses his argument for selectivity by citing Tillman, Sullivan, 
and Daniel, the civil rights cases holding that associations whose only selective 
membership criterion was race did not qualify as private clubs exempt from federal civil 
                                                 
165Ibid., 620.  
166Ibid., 613 (“At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had approximately 295,000 
members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state organizations.”).   
167Ibid., 621. 
168Ibid. 
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rights statutes.169  Those decisions were widely endorsed, but their reasoning is not self-
evident, and the perils of a single selective membership requirement are less evident in 
situations not involving racial inequality.  Moreover, the reasoning of the civil rights 
cases doesn’t even squarely address the Jaycees because the group had not one but two 
conditions for full membership: gender and age.170 
Brennan furthers his argument about the Jaycees’s lack of selectivity by observing 
that women and nonmembers—“strangers,” actually—are present at the group’s events: 
[D]espite their inability to vote, hold office, or receive certain awards, 
women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in 
selected projects, and engage in many of the organizations social 
functions.  Indeed, numerous nonmembers of both genders regularly 
participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of 
many members to associate with one another, including many of the 
organization's various community programs, awards ceremonies, and 
recruitment meetings.  
 
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective.  
Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance 
of the association involves the participation of strangers to that 
relationship.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the 
distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the 
decision of its members to exclude women.171  
 
We are again left with words that add ambiguity without substance.  For example, how 
do we know which activities are central to the decision of members to associate with one 
another?  Similarly, on what basis can Brennan purport to know “the activity central to 
                                                 
169Ibid., 621 (citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U.S. 431 
(1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); and Daniel v. Paul, 
395 U.S. 298 (1969)). 
170This, of course, demonstrates that the Court’s real concern in Tillman was not that race 
was the only selective membership requirement but that it was a membership requirement 
at all.  Presumably, it would have made little difference to the Court in Tillman if the 
swimming pool had restricted membership to whites under the age of fifty. 
171Ibid., 621. 
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the formation and maintenance of the association”?  Even if he is right, what is the 
significance of the fact that nonmembers (“strangers to [the] relationship”) participated in 
“various community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings”?  Isn’t this 
the case with many organizations that rent space, cater events, or otherwise open their 
activities to the public?  
One question left unanswered by Brennan’s opinion was precisely what kinds of 
groups could invoke the right of intimate association.  Writing after Roberts, Douglas 
Linder offered some possibilities: 
A four-couple bridge club or a college fraternity or sorority, for example, 
may satisfy Brennan’s criteria of relative smallness, selectivity, seclusion 
and congeniality.  To the extent these associations’ “purposes” might 
include sharing “personal aspects of one’s life,” the match would be fairly 
complete.  Presumably then, an interference with such an association 
might be vulnerable to constitutional attack.172    
 
In other words, with Roberts, the heightened protections for group autonomy extended by 
the freedom of assembly for almost two hundred years to dissenting religious minorities, 
abolitionists, suffragists, laborers, and civil rights workers had now been reduced to 
benefiting bridge clubs, fraternities, and sororities.173 
 
                                                 
172Douglas O. Linder, “Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United States Jaycees,” 
Michigan Law Review 82 (1984): 1886. 
173It may not even extend to fraternities and sororities.  See Chi Iota Colony of Alpha 
Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that an 
all-male Jewish fraternity at a state university is not an intimate association and 
upholding enforcement of the university’s nondiscrimination policy against the fraternity 
for its refusal to admit women). 
 229 
E.  AFTER ROBERTS  
Roberts was not well received in academic circles, and commentators have 
roundly criticized Brennan’s reasoning.  Nancy Rosenblum observed that: “The Jaycees’ 
‘voice’ was undeniably altered once it was forced to admit young women as full members 
along with young men.”174  Aviam Soifer contested that: “Surely the Jaycees . . . will be a 
different organization.  Surely that difference will be felt throughout an intricate web of 
relationships and different voices in immeasurable but nonetheless significant ways.”175 
And George Kateb suggested that: “Brennan’s claim that young women may, after their 
compulsory admission, contribute to the allowable purpose of ‘promoting the interests of 
young men’ is absurd.”176  
 
1.  Duarte and New York State Club Assn. 
Despite its critical reception in academic circles, Roberts opened a large hole in 
the already attenuated freedom of association, and the Court followed its reasoning in two 
subsequent cases involving private organizations that refused membership to women.  In 
1987, the Court held in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte177 that the Rotary Club had no First Amendment right to exclude women.  The 
                                                 
174Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the 
Dynamic of Exclusion," in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 78. 
175Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep, 40.  
176Kateb, "The Value of Association," 55. 
177Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 
(1987). 
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following year, in New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York,178 the Court upheld 
anti-discrimination laws applied to a consortium of New York City social clubs.  Justice 
White’s opinion narrowed the scope of expressive association by announcing that a group 
must demonstrate that it was “organized for specific expressive purposes” and that “it 
will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot 
confine its membership” to certain classes of people.179  White emphasized that the right 
to associate was by no means absolute: it did not mean “that in every setting in which 
individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective process of 
inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution.”180 
  
2.  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 
 In 1995, the Court reviewed a challenge from the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) over its exclusion from a Boston parade jointly 
commemorating St. Patrick’s Day and Evacuation Day.181  Since 1947, the parade had 
been organized by the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, a private 
organization.182  GLIB challenged its exclusion from the parade under Massachusetts’s 
                                                 
178New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
179Ibid., 13. 
180Ibid. 
181Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
560 (1995).  Evacuation Day commemorated the day that royal troops and loyalists fled 
the city during the Revolutionary War.  Ibid. 
182Until 1992, the City permitted the Council to use the City’s official seal, provided 
printing services to the Council, and provided direct funding.  Ibid., 561.  But GLIB did 
not contest the lower court’s conclusion that the parade did not constitute state action.  
Ibid., 566.  
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public accommodations law.183  Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court rejecting GLIB’s 
claim relied on free speech rather than free association principles.  Souter first classified 
the parade as a form of expression.184  Because the organizers were private speakers, they 
were free to select the content of their message.185  Therefore, they could properly reject 
GLIB’s request to march in the parade.  In fact, “whatever the reason” the parade 
organizers had for excluding GLIB, their decision “boils down to the choice of a speaker 
not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the 
government’s power to control.”186  Hurley’s free speech analysis seemed fairly 
straightforward, but it was difficult to reconcile with the Court’s approach to association 
in Roberts, Duarte and New York State Club Assn.  
 
3.  Boy Scouts v. Dale 
One final development unfolded at the close of the equality era.  In 2000, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.187  The Court 
concluded by a 5-4 vote that the right of expressive association permitted the Boy Scouts 
to exclude from their membership a homosexual scoutmaster despite a New Jersey 
                                                 
183Ibid., 566. 
184Ibid., 568. 
185Ibid., 573.  The Court also noted that the organizers wished to preclude the gay 
message, not gay participants. 
186Ibid., 575. 
187Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  The facts of Dale are covered 
extensively in the literature.  See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, "Freedom's Associations," 
Washington Law Review 77 (2002): 666-74; Evelyn Brody, "Entrance, Voice, and Exit: 
The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association," U.C. Davis Law Review 35 
(2002): 848-54. 
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antidiscrimination law that prohibited such exclusions in places of public 
accommodation.188  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority began by placing 
the case within the framework of expressive association:  
To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment’s 
expressive associational right, we must determine whether the group 
engages in “expressive association.”  The First Amendment’s protection of 
expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come 
within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether 
it be public or private.189 
  
Rehnquist distanced himself from some of the Court’s earlier views on expressive 
association.  Although New York State Club Association appeared to have narrowed the 
right of expressive association to groups that were organized “for specific expressive 
purposes,”190 Rehnquist argued that: 
[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the “purpose” of disseminating 
a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment.  An association must merely engage in expressive activity 
that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.191 
 
For Rehnquist, the proper inquiry was “whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an 
assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public 
                                                 
188The Supreme Court deferred to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s determination that the 
Boy Scouts were a public accommodation within the meaning of the statute. 
189Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 648.  The Boy Scouts did not argue that they should be 
classified as an intimate association.   
190New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 13. 
191Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 655.  Justice Stevens challenged Rehnquist’s 
reasoning: “to prevail on a claim of expressive association in the face of a State’s 
antidiscrimination law, it is not enough simply to engage in some kind of expressive 
activity.”  Ibid., 682 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
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or private viewpoints.”192  And this inquiry required that the Court defer to an 
organization’s purported views: 
[I]t is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values 
because they disagree with those values or find them internally 
inconsistent.  As is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, 
the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular 
expression as unwise or irrational.193  
 
These strong words hardly seemed credible after Runyon and Roberts.  Justice Stevens’s 
dissent highlighted the doctrinal tension that Dale created:  
[U]ntil today, we have never once found a claimed right to associate in the 
selection of members to prevail in the face of a State’s antidiscrimination 
law.  To the contrary, we have squarely held that a State’s 
antidiscrimination law does not violate a group’s right to associate simply 
because the law conflicts with that group’s exclusionary membership 
policy.194   
 
Dale’s holding in favor of the Boy Scouts should not be mistaken as a deepening 
of the right of association.  The Court reaffirmed the fundamental division between 
intimate and expressive association in Roberts.195  After Dale, expressive associations are 
                                                 
192Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 650. 
193Ibid., 651 (citations and quotations omitted). 
194Ibid., 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
195Cf. Richard A. Epstein, “The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy 
Scouts,” Southern California Law Review 74 (2000) 119, 125 (“The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dale did not overtly challenge the conceptual framework established in 
Roberts; indeed, it self-consciously purported to build on it.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
“What is Really Wrong With Compelled Association?” Northwestern University Law 
Review 99 (2005) 839, 841 (“The Court’s framing of the issues [in Dale] grew straight 
out of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roberts v. Jaycees.”); Andrew Koppelman, “Should 
Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to Discriminate?” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 67 (2004): 27, 57 (“Dale is a mess, but the upshot of the mess is 
that we still have the old message-based rule of Roberts.”).  But see Tobias Barrington 
Wolff and Andrew Koppelman “Expressive Association and the Ideal of the University in 
the Solomon Amendment Litigation,” Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (2008): 101 (“The 
decision in Dale represented an enormous departure from its predecessors” and “the 
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no less vulnerable (even under the purported protections of strict scrutiny), and the 
victory for the Boy Scouts is likely more attributable to political factors present at the 
time of the decision than to a deepening concern for associational freedom.196 
At the close of the equality era, the right of association bore little resemblance to 
the right of assembly that had existed for almost two hundred years of our nation’s 
history.  The confluence of a growing Civil Rights movement and the dominance of 
Rawlsian liberalism meant that when equality of opportunity collided with group 
autonomy, equality won.  An already attenuated right of association established during 
the national security era now gave way to even more incursions into group autonomy in 
the equality era.  These developments were facilitated by an odd connection between 
association and privacy that produced a right of intimate association and, in doing so, 
jettisoned all other groups to a tenuous category of expressive association.  By the end of 
the equality era, a right of association now quite removed from the right of assembly had 
fundamentally changed the nature of protections for group autonomy.  In the next 
chapter, I delve more deeply into these changes and their consequences. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court adopted a posture of almost complete deference to an association’s claim that an 
antidiscrimination law’s interference with decisions about a small number of members 
would undermine the group’s expressive practice”); Samuel Issacharoff, “Private Parties 
with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan 
Competition,” Columbia Law Review 101 (2001) 274, 297-298 (arguing that Dale 
eschewed “the functional analysis of Roberts”).  
196In 2006, the Court rejected an attempt to expand the scope of Dale in Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). See generally, Wolff 
and Koppelman, “Expressive Association and the Ideal of the University in the Solomon 
Amendment Litigation.” 
  
 
IV.  A Theory of Assembly  
I have to this point narrated the stories of the rights of assembly and association.  I 
have suggested that when we juxtapose the histories of these rights against one another, 
the shift from assembly to association has transgressed upon the dissenting, public, and 
expressive group.  These changes facilitate the transmission of some liberal values into 
groups.  But they also weaken the liberal value of group autonomy and its correlative 
limitation on state power.  I believe this attenuated group autonomy is too great a cost to 
pay in our constitutional democracy.  Moreover, I don’t think it can be remedied within 
the current path dependent reasoning that has arisen in cases like NAACP v. Alabama, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, and Roberts v. United States Jaycees.1  To restore an adequate 
constitutional framework for group autonomy, we need to look beyond association and 
recover the language and theory of peaceable assembly. 
In this chapter, I provide a framework for protecting the dissenting, public, and 
expressive assembly.  I then suggest a legal test for evaluating a claim of peaceable 
assembly.  I close by shifting to a different mode of writing to illustrate my arguments: a 
hypothetical dissent in Roberts suggesting that assembly remains a plausible resource for 
group autonomy within our constitutional tradition. 
                                                 
1Cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 100 (discussing the role of “entrenched” judicial decisions that contribute to a 
“limited path dependency of precedent”).  As an illustration of the entrenchment of 
constitutional association that precludes a robust understanding of group autonomy, 
consider the pervasive adherence by courts to the expressive and intimate distinction in 
Roberts. 
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A.  ASSEMBLY AS DISSENT  
 The first characteristic of assembly is that it is inherently dissenting.2  In previous 
chapters, I have shown how this characteristic has been lost with the bounded consensus 
accompanying the turn to association.  I have traced the theoretical roots of this 
consensus from mid-twentieth century pluralism through Rawlsian liberalism.  I have 
shown how the consensus excluded communist groups during the national security era 
and segregationist groups during the equality era.  Neither communists nor 
segregationists make for particularly sympathetic victims of exclusion.  But taken 
together, the experiences of these groups demonstrate that consensus is marked by a 
moving boundary.  That boundary at any given time is set by majoritarian influences in 
government (particularly the federal government) and the degree to which popular 
sentiment supports those influences.3   
If contemporary reflections about the limits of group autonomy stopped with the 
fate of communists and segregationists, few of us would be directly affected.  But the 
norms underlying consensus are more pervasive than these explicit denials of autonomy, 
and they reach deep into the internal practices of groups.  For example, a number of 
contemporary political theorists support imposing consensus norms, arguing that the state 
is justified in reshaping or even eliminating illiberal group practices through methods 
                                                 
2We can see why this is the case when we realize that groups happily conforming to 
consensus norms have little reason to invoke a claim to group autonomy.   
3Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, in my view, fits squarely within this characterization.  
The Boy Scouts prevailed not because of a principled decision upholding the freedom of 
association but because at the close of the last century, the forced inclusion of a gay 
person in an organization like the Boy Scouts fell outside of the national consensus. 
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ranging from compulsory education to direct intervention.4  Nancy Rosenblum has 
suggested that these kinds of arguments “all aim at congruence between the internal life 
and practices of voluntary groups and the public culture of liberal democracy.”5  This 
“logic of congruence” requires “that not only political institutions and public 
accommodations but also voluntary social groups function as mini-liberal democracies, 
with a view toward cultivating and sustaining self-respect.”6  Rosenblum recognizes that 
under the logic of congruence, all associations are vulnerable to “the social preferences of 
the party in power.”7   
 Rawls’s public reason constraint leads to a similar logic of congruence.  Chandran 
Kukathas notes the problems with the consensus norms implicit in public reason: 
[I]mportant though debate may be, it is not always an adequate substitute 
for demonstration through practice.  This is all the more so when the 
subject of dispute is how one should live.  Not all people are capable of 
articulating their reasons for thinking their way of life is better—or even 
just better for some.  (Nor, for that matter are all capable of articulating 
their reasons for regarding some influences as malign or corrupting.)  
Indeed, they may not be aware of many of the advantages (though also, of 
course, disadvantages) of their practices simply because these are side 
effects which have not much to do with why they prefer to stick to their 
ways.  Nonetheless, in being able to live a particular way of life they may 
                                                 
4See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural 
Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Brian Barry, Culture and 
Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Susan Moller Okin, “’Mistresses 
of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit,” Ethics 112 
(2002): 205-30. 
5Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the 
Dynamic of Exclusion," in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 75. 
6Ibid., 92.  Cf. ibid, 75 (the logic of congruence “dictates that associations mirror public 
norms”). 
7Ibid., 90. 
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be quite capable of demonstrating (intentionally or not) its merits.  Some 
need to practise in order to preach.8  
 
My own argument is that the freedom of assembly facilitates “practicing in order to 
preach.”  In this sense, my view finds some commonality with the “liberal archipelago,” 
Kukathas’s metaphor for “a society of societies which is neither the creation nor the 
object of control of any single authority” but is nevertheless “a form of order in which 
authorities function under laws which are themselves beyond the reach of any singular 
power.”9 
Kukathas adopts the pluralist insight that “political society” is “no more than one 
among many associations” and “does not subsume all other associations.”10  But unlike 
the postwar pluralist push for consensus or the Rawlsian emphasis on stability, Kukathas 
proposes a more modest modus vivendi.11  He dismisses talk of social unity as “positively 
undesirable, if not altogether dangerous.”12  Stability and social value “can only be 
bought at the cost of toleration” because “articulating a political conception of justice, 
and presenting it as the first principle governing conduct in the public realm, subordinates 
toleration, entrenches a particular comprehensive moral conception, and excludes certain 
                                                 
8Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 138.   
9Ibid., 8-9. 
10Ibid., 75. 
11Kukathas explicitly endorses the modus vivendi that Rawls rejects as insufficient.  Ibid., 
100.  See also John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (New York: New Press, 2000), 19-22 
(arguing that a modus vivendi is the best for which we can hope). 
12Ibid., 20.  Nor does Kukathas think diversity is particularly important.  Ibid., 20, 29, 32.   
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moral ideals as unacceptable.”13  Kukathas is aware that these strong claims have 
consequences:  
[T]his understanding of toleration does not allow us to recognize political 
society as a kind of moral community.  It does not admit that a society as a 
whole (encompassing many different communities) may have certain 
important shared moral standards which help to define it, and which may 
legitimately be imposed on those who deviate from them.  The 
understanding of toleration here, it might be argued, weakens political 
society.14 
 
I am sympathetic to Kukathas’s challenges to assumptions about the merits of 
social unity, consensus, and stability.  And his candid recognition of the costs that his 
alternative imposes is refreshing.  Yet his argument is weakened by his metaphor of the 
liberal archipelago (which invokes a spatial separation between groups that belies the 
actual proximity, overlap, and conflict of groups in the modern nation-state), and the 
degree to which he ignores complications like the right to exclude and national security 
concerns.  It would be unfair of me to press these critiques too far; Kukathas, after all, is 
not writing from a uniquely American perspective, and he intends his theory to apply to 
many kinds of liberal societies.  But if we want to employ his theoretical arguments in the 
United States, we must take account of American constitutional history.  That history 
includes the theoretical challenges of the right of association as it emerged during the 
national security era and the equality era.  It forces us to confront the tensions created by 
a recognition of group autonomy and the ways in which our laws and judicial decisions 
have responded to those tensions.  I will address some of these tensions in the sections 
that follow.  Nevertheless, I am largely in agreement with Kukathas because I remain 
                                                 
13Ibid., 133.   
14Ibid., 135.  
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skeptical of liberal claims to social unity, consensus, and stability, as well as liberalism’s 
pretensions of neutrality.15  The failure to recognize dissenting assemblies glosses over 
difference; it does not resolve it.  Once we acknowledge the perpetual nature of 
difference and dissent, modus vivendi becomes a reasonable possibility rather than a 
straw man to overcome.   
 
B.  THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY 
 The second characteristic of assembly is that it is public, by which I mean it 
insists upon its own political space and competes with alternative notions of political life.  
Although not part of government, assembly rejects attempts to privatize its purpose and 
message as outside of the public realm.  These assertions are not self-evident in 
contemporary political thought, where “public” is usually synonymous with 
“government.”  But early American constitutionalism recognized a public nature to 
nongovernmental groups.  This understanding of public disappeared amidst changes to 
public and private that I have addressed in previous chapters.  These changes redefined 
the meaning of public and equated it with actual or implied state authority (an example is 
the expansive meaning given to the category of “public accommodation”).  Conversely, 
nongovernmental groups came to be seen as private.  In the national security era, 
pluralists omitted nongovernmental groups from their balance wheel when they 
                                                 
15For more of the critique of this claim to neutrality, see my discussion of Rawls and 
Dworkin in Chapter Three.  See also Larry Alexander, “Illiberalism All the Way Down,” 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 12 (2002): 630 (liberalism’s “role of neutral 
umpire is completely chimerical”).  
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characterized parties and pressure groups as the exclusive brokers of public power.  In the 
equality era, nongovernmental groups lost any remaining sense of political relevance or 
engagement when Griswold and Eisenstadt shifted the concept of associational privacy to 
an individualized privacy focused on self-definition. 
 The problem with conflating “public” and “government” is twofold.  First, the 
intimation that “nongovernmental” means “private” misleadingly suggests a lack of 
political relevance for groups to whom this label attaches.  In this view, the “real” 
account of what it means to live together in a shared space is reserved for groups that 
comprise or interact with state authority, and in this way, the monist theory of the state 
challenged by early pluralism resurfaces in different form.  The public assembly resists 
this conclusion and maintains that groups apart from state authority may, in fact, 
represent highly visible forms of politics.  The meanings they “discover and assign to the 
world may be radically distinct from those that are assigned by the political sovereign.”16 
The second problem with distinguishing between public and private based upon 
governmental influence or authority is that the degree to which a group’s activities 
approximates governmental functions is highly context dependent.  The kinds of power 
wielded by groups do not align neatly with categories of public and private.  We can see 
some of these problems in Amy Gutmann’s attempt to limit the scope of Roberts by 
arguing that a “small exclusive country club, whose activities consist of golf, tennis, 
                                                 
16Stephen Carter, The Dissent of the Governed: A Meditation on Law, Religion, and 
Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 27.  Cf. Michael Walzer, 
Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1971). 
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swimming, and socializing, is private in a way that the Jaycees is not.”17  Gutmann’s 
argument depends on the location of the club and the supply and demand for the goods it 
offers.  It is, in other words, highly contextualized.  In some small towns, the country 
club may be the social hub in which networking occurs, deals are brokered, and careers 
are made or broken.  Or the club may offer a good not available elsewhere in the town.18  
In these circumstances, the club may be far more “public” than the St. Paul and 
Minneapolis Jaycees.  If the club discriminated on the same basis as the Jaycees, it is hard 
to justify from a liberal theoretical perspective why it would be less subject to regulation 
than the Jaycees.  The sad fact is that illegitimate discrimination depriving people of 
opportunities for growth, self-respect, social connections, and financial success occurs in 
all kinds of nongovernmental groups.  But regulating this discrimination should not be 
contingent on fictional categories of public (imbued with state authority) or private 
(without political relevance).  Many groups exist apart from government and significantly 
affect the lives and opportunities of others.   
To call to mind another example, a number of academics critical of illiberal 
groups like the Jaycees rose to prominence within their scholarly disciplines based on 
exclusive and discriminatory forms of private networking.  The beneficiaries of these 
social arrangements may take solace in the lack of overt discrimination along racial or 
gender lines, but more subtle forms of racism, classism, and elitism pervade much of the 
                                                 
17Amy Gutmann, "Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay," in Freedom of 
Association, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 13. 
18For example, the club may run an elite athletic program highly sought after by members 
of the town.  Or perhaps some of the excluded townspeople value golf more highly than 
other activities and the club provides the only (or perhaps simply the best) option for golf 
in the area. 
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decisionmaking and networking that advanced their careers.  Academic placements, 
publications, and prestigious opportunities are driven largely by personal networking 
among those already occupying powerful roles, and others perhaps equally or even more 
qualified are deprived of opportunities.  It is not readily apparent how theorists of 
liberalism can condemn the exclusionary practices of nongovernmental groups like the 
Jaycees but tacitly endorse, and in fact thrive upon, the exclusionary practices of groups 
like the Harvard Faculty Club.19   
We are better off jettisoning artificial distinctions between public and private in 
determining the boundaries of group autonomy.  At the same time, we cannot be naïve 
about the tremendous power of nongovernmental economic coercion that sustains deep 
and widespread oppression, particularly given the quasi-governmental functions now 
fulfilled by many commercial organizations.  But a concern for limiting the influence of 
these organizations should not drive us to overregulation and unnecessary incursions into 
the internal practices of a broad range of groups.  We ought to be able to draw pragmatic 
even if imperfect lines of demarcation.   
Justice O’Connor’s Roberts’s concurrence attempted this kind of line-drawing.  
But her categories of “commercial” and “noncommercial” and her assessment of how she 
would distinguish between them are far too subjective.20   In my view, we can make a 
                                                 
19Cf. Matt Zwolinski, “Why Not Regulate Private Discrimination?” San Diego Law 
Review 43 (2006): 1052 (“The feeling of social isolation that results from private 
discrimination can be psychologically devastating.  This is especially true for children, 
who are particularly prone to question their own self-worth in reaction to discrimination 
from their peers, but the effects hold for adults as well.  Private discrimination can have a 
tremendous impact on the psychological well-being of even the most self-assured 
adults.”). 
20For a partial critique of O’Connor’s subjectivity, see my discussion of her Roberts’s 
concurrence in the next section of this chapter. 
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clearer and less subjective distinction between profit-based and nonprofit entities.21   A 
reasonable starting point for this distinction is the Internal Revenue Code’s classification 
for the kinds of groups that qualify for tax-exempt status.22  The major categories of these 
groups include: 
• religious, charitable, scientific, and educational organizations 
• civic leagues and organizations 
• labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations 
• business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, and boards of 
trade 
• clubs “organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes,” 
and 
• fraternal organizations23   
                                                 
21I recognize that the term “nonprofit” is itself somewhat vague and imprecise.  But it is 
preferable to other terms (like “noncommercial”) already entrenched in discussions about 
the limits of group autonomy. 
22It may be useful at this point to address an objection to my line-drawing based upon the 
subsidization of nonprofits through tax exemptions.  The Supreme Court has noted that 
“both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy” because “[a] tax 
exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of 
tax it would have to pay on its income” and “[d]eductible contributions are similar to 
cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual’s contributions.”  Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).  Indeed, “every tax exemption 
constitutes a subsidy that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become 
indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’” Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989).  I 
have no objection to these characterizations of tax benefits.  On one level, they 
demonstrate the practical challenges confronted by any group attempting to remain truly 
private in the United States.  But as a practical matter, we need to look beyond widely 
available tax benefits for indicators of government sponsorship because “[t]he expansion 
of the modern state means that most civil associations are now entangled with it in one 
way or another.”  William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value 
Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 114. 
23See Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(1-8) (2008).  The largest class of exempt 
organizations is covered in subsection (c)(3), which includes “[c]orporations, and any 
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention 
of cruelty to children or animals. . . .” 
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Groups falling within these conceptual categories should fall under the protections of 
assembly irrespective of their legal status under the Code.24  To this end, it is necessary to 
make two important modifications to the IRS classifications to prevent an exception from 
swallowing the rule: (1) lifting the restriction against political advocacy applied to some 
groups; and (2) removing the public policy constraint. 
 The restriction against political advocacy applies to religious, charitable, 
scientific, and educational groups, and groups that choose to engage in political advocacy 
jeopardize their tax-exempt status.25  Irrespective of the wisdom of this policy decision, it 
makes no sense to extend the exemption restriction to the definition of peaceable 
assembly, which explicitly envisions the kinds of dissenting, public, and expressive 
groups that might engage in political advocacy. 
 The public policy constraint stems from the Internal Revenue Service’s decision 
to revoke federal tax-exempt status to groups that discriminated on the basis of race but 
otherwise met the exemption criteria.  The Supreme Court endorsed this IRS policy in 
Bob Jones University v. United States.26  To reach its result, the Court concluded that 
                                                 
24This is admittedly an extremely broad definition.  It would include, for example, a book 
club (which in most cases is hard to envision as a dissenting, public, and expressive 
assembly) and a private research university (which wields tremendous power and 
influence even though technically “not for profit.”  I am by no means suggesting that the 
“not for profit” distinction is flawless, but it does improve upon the subjectivity and 
whimsicality of other attempts at line-drawing.   
25See ibid., § 501(c)(3) (“no substantial part” of group’s activities can be “carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation” and group cannot 
“participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), 
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office”). 
26Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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underlying the tax code was “the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on 
meeting certain common-law standards of charity—namely, that an institution seeking 
tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public 
policy.”27  But whether the tax code treats a group as tax-exempt is a different matter than 
whether that group may appeal to the protections of assembly.28  In my view, we ought to 
protect the broadest possible range of peaceable assembly, including those assemblies 
whose beliefs and practices we find detestable.   
Importantly, I make no claim that the tax-exempt distinction perfectly curtails the 
use of quasi-governmental power.  Coercive private power remains in the Jaycees, the 
Moose Lodge, and the Boy Scouts.  It also exists in the local country club, the Harvard 
Faculty Club, residential community associations, private colleges and universities, and 
many other groups.29  But protecting the autonomy of diverse groups that are neither 
governmental nor profit oriented means allowing for some of these uses of power.   
On a theoretical level, this position is at odds with the private desegregation cases 
like Tilman and Sullivan.  But it is important not to let theory over-determine results, 
particularly when we are talking about the very real effects of law.  In theory, it would be 
highly problematic if the kind of peaceable assembly for which I am arguing legitimated 
widespread and systematic suppression on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, or 
sexual preference.  In theory, the autonomy that I am arguing for all nongovernmental, 
                                                 
27Ibid., 586.  The Court determined that “there can be no doubt as to the national policy” 
against racial discrimination.  Ibid., 598. 
28The contrast is roughly that between Norwood and Runyon.  See Chapter 3. 
29See generally Rosenblum, Membership and Morals (discussing the power residing in 
some of these groups).    
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nonprofit groups opens the door for that possibility in sectors like higher education.  In 
practice, there is no plausible argument that this will be happening in contemporary 
American society.30  A closer issue, much discussed in multiculturalist literature, is 
whether the state should permit private primary and secondary education of children to 
reinforce illiberal norms.31  But the objection is that these forms of education are 
reinforcing illiberal and at times intolerant perspectives, not that these forms of education 
are excluding or depriving others of opportunities.  That, I think, is a small price for 
liberalism to pay for a genuine recognition of group autonomy.  
  
C.  ASSEMBLY AS EXPRESSION 
The final characteristic of assembly that I wish to highlight is that its very 
existence is a form of expression.  The expressive assembly embraces a broad conception 
of the coherence and meaning of communal acts.  It recognizes communicative 
possibility in joining, excluding, gathering, proclaiming, engaging, or not engaging.  This 
understanding of expression is curtailed by the Roberts construction of expressive 
association, which reduces the group to an instrumental shell that merely facilitates more 
limited modes of expression.  But there is no reason to negate the expressive meaning of 
the group itself.  By way of analogy, the First Amendment category of symbolic speech 
                                                 
30If the political arrangements in the United States were ever to return to a situation 
where this was a genuine possibility, the specific boundaries that I have drawn might 
need to be rethought.  
31See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural 
Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Amy Gutmann, Democratic 
Education (Princeton University Press 1999).  For a critique of these perspectives 
offering a different alternative, see Romand Coles, Beyond Gated Politics: Reflections for 
the Possibility of Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 239-
63. 
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embraces a wide range of activities that aren’t intuitively communicative: flag burning, 
camping, and nude dancing, among others.32  Given the breadth of free speech doctrine, it 
is problematic to construe group expression more narrowly.  Nevertheless, determining 
the meaning of a group or its actions is not a simple matter.  Two examples from case law 
illustrate this point.   
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos,33 the Court concluded that the Mormon Church could deny a non-
church member employment as a building engineer in a gymnasium operated by the 
church and open to the public.  Although decided on Establishment Clause grounds, the 
case raised important questions about the meaning of group expression.  We can see this 
in the district court’s conclusion that none of the engineer’s duties at the gym were “even 
tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual of the Mormon Church or 
church administration.”34  As Justice Brennan argued in his concurrence, “the character 
of an activity is not self-evident.”35  It might be, for example, that the gym provided a 
forum for ministry and outreach that the Mormons viewed as intricately tied to their 
                                                 
32See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Court assumes that “sleeping in the park” 
might be expression covered by the First Amendment but upholds ban on overnight 
sleeping as a content neutral restriction); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 
(1991) (“nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct 
within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only 
marginally so”). 
33Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
34Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 594 F.Supp. 791, 802 (Utah 1984).   
35Amos, 343 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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purposes and values.  If that were the case, then the engineer’s role might well matter to 
the expressive purposes of the group.  As to whether the Mormon Church should be 
permitted to “condition employment in certain activities on subscription to particular 
religious tenets,” Brennan wrote that: “[w]e are willing to countenance the imposition of 
such a condition because we deem it vital that, if certain activities constitute part of a 
religious community’s practice, then a religious organization should be able to require 
that only members of its community perform those activities.”36  Brennan’s arguments 
may have special force with respect to religious groups, but they are also generalizable to 
nonreligious groups.  They hint at the difficulty in determining the expressive purpose 
and meaning of a group’s activity from the outside.  
Amos highlights the difficulties of interpreting whether a discrete activity reflects 
the purposive expression of a group.  Roberts illustrates a related but more complicated 
question: how to characterize the nature of a group as a whole.37  Recall that Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence concluded that the Jaycees’ attention to and success in 
membership drives meant that it was “first and foremost, an organization that, at both the 
national and local levels, promotes and practices the art of solicitation and 
management.”38  Other language in her concurrence suggested an even lower bar for 
classifying an association as commercial: 
In my view, an association should be characterized as commercial, and 
therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership 
and other associational activities, when, and only when, the association’s 
                                                 
36Ibid., 342-43. 
37Cf. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 6 (“There are always alternative 
understandings of an association’s nature and purpose, and competing classifications.”). 
38Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First 
Amendment.  It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in 
protected expression that state regulation of its membership will 
necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective voice that 
would otherwise be heard.39 
 
O’Connor’s reasoning here is problematic on three counts.  First, as Larry Alexander 
notes, “[l]aws regulating membership in any organization—including commercial ones—
will affect the content of that organization’s expression.”40  Second, O’Connor’s 
requirement that an association be “predominantly engaged” in protected expression to 
avoid being classified as commercial leaves vulnerable to regulation associations that 
because of their size or unpopularity must devote a substantial portion of their activities 
to fundraising or other commercial activities.41  Finally, it is unclear which activities are 
“of the type protected by the First Amendment.”  For example, while the scope of the 
Jaycees’s activities is absent from the descriptions provided in either the Court’s opinion 
or O’Connor’s concurrence, Judge Arnold’s opinion in the court below explains that: 
Some of what local chapters do is purely social. They have parties, with 
no purpose more complicated than enjoying themselves. Some of it is 
civic. They have conducted a radio fund-raising drive to combat multiple 
sclerosis. They have conducted a women's professional golf tournament. 
They have engaged in many other charitable and educational projects for 
the public good. (And there is no claim, incidentally, of any discrimination 
in the offering to the public of the benefits of these projects. Money raised 
to fight disease, for example, is not used to benefit only male patients.) 
And they have advocated, through the years, a multitude of political and 
                                                 
39Ibid., 636. 
40Larry Alexander, “What is Freedom of Association and What is Its Denial?” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 25 (2008): 7. 
41One of the clearest illustrations of this consequence is the effect of charitable 
solicitation regulation on small or unpopular charities.  See, e.g., Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 799 (1988).  See also John 
Inazu, “Making Sense of Schaumburg: Seeking Coherence in First Amendment 
Charitable Solicitation Law” Marquette Law Review 92 (2009) (forthcoming). 
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social causes. Governmental affairs is one of the chief areas of the 
organization's activity. Members on a national, state, and local basis are 
frequently meeting, debating issues of public policy, taking more or less 
controversial stands, and making opinions known to local, state, and 
national officials.42 
 
Arnold elaborated that: 
The Jaycees does not simply sell seats in some kind of personal-
development classroom. Personal and business development, if they come, 
come not as products bought by members, but as by-products of activities 
in which members engage after they join the organization. These activities 
are variously social, civic, and ideological, and some of them fall within 
the narrowest view of First Amendment freedom of association.43 
 
His view is consistent with the Jaycees’ own assertions that they were:  
. . . organized for such educational and charitable purposes as will promote 
and foster the growth and development of young men's civic organizations 
in the United States, designed to inculcate in the individual membership of 
such organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and 
as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity 
for personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent 
participation by young men in the affairs of their community, state and 
nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young 
men of all nations.44   
 
Parsing which of these activities constitute the organization’s “predominate” 
activities is a difficult interpretive task, and one in which O’Connor shows no 
signs of having engaged.  
In contrast to O’Connor’s thin characterization of the Jaycees, we might 
consider Iris Marion Young’s rich description of separatist groups in the women’s 
movement.  Young writes that: 
                                                 
42United States Jaycees v. McClure, 1569. 
43Ibid.   
44Roberts v. United States Jaycees, Brief of Appellee United States Jaycees, 1984 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237 at *5. 
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Feminist separatism rejected wholly or partly the goal of entering the 
male-dominated world, because it requires playing according to the rules 
that men have made and that have been used against women, and because 
trying to measure up to male-defined standards inevitably involves 
accommodating or pleasing the men who continue to dominate socially 
valued institutions and activities.  Separatism promoted the empowerment 
of women through self-organization, the creation of separate and safe 
spaces where women could share and analyze their experiences, voice 
their anger, play with and create bonds with one another, and develop new 
and better institutions and practices. 
 
Most elements of the contemporary women’s movement have been 
separatist to some degree.  Separatists seeking to live as much of their 
lives as possible in women-only institutions were largely responsible for 
the creation of the women’s culture that burst forth all over the United 
States by the mid 1970s, and continues to claim the loyalty of millions of 
women—in the form of music, poetry, spirituality, literature, celebrations, 
festivals, and dances.  Whether drawing on images of Amazonian 
grandeur, recovering and revaluing traditional women’s arts, like quilting 
and weaving, or inventing new rituals based on medieval witchcraft, the 
development of such expressions of women’s culture gave many feminists 
images of a female-centered beauty and strength entirely outside capitalist 
patriarchal definitions of feminine pulchritude.  The separatist impulse 
also fostered the development of the many autonomous women’s 
institutions and services that have concretely improved the lives of many 
women, whether feminists or not—such as health clinics, battered 
women’s shelters, rape crisis centers, and women’s coffeehouses and 
bookstores.45 
 
Young’s reference to movements, institutions, and culture encompasses a host of groups 
with diverse and multifaceted purposes.  Their free expression preserved a space of 
difference and a different form of the political.  Indeed, Young’s description of the 
women’s movement captures much of what I am trying to convey about the meaning of 
assembly.  But it is predicated on a refusal to focus only on the separatism of these 
groups.  Of course, it is important to recognize that the women’s groups that Young 
describes were situated much differently than a group like the Jaycees.  But the groups 
                                                 
45Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 161-62. 
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share in common a desire to have the multidimensional nature of their activities and 
purposes protected against those who seek to silence them.   
 
D.  A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSEMBLY 
With the above discussion as an extended prolegomenon, I now want to set out a 
possible legal framework for the right of assembly.  But first it is important to note that 
my argument for assembly does not claim that unbounded group autonomy is either 
preferable or possible.  To borrow from Stanley Fish, there is “no such thing as free 
assembly.”46  The state always constrains.  The pertinent inquiry is therefore not whether 
the state can constrain group autonomy, but the conditions under which those constraints 
will be imposed.  In response to this question, liberalism itself offers some tentative 
answers.  For example, Galston argues that “[l]iberalism requires a robust though 
rebuttable presumption in favor of individuals and groups leading their lives as they see 
fit” and “against external interference with individual and group endeavors.”47  And Jeff 
Spinner-Halev adds that liberalism’s traditional strength “is its ability to balance different 
                                                 
46Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a Good Thing, Too (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 104 (“Speech, in short, is never a value in and of 
itself but is always produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the 
good to which it must yield in the event of conflict.”).  Cf. Peter de Marneffe, "Rights, 
Reasons, and Freedom of Association," in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 146 (“Some may think of rights as 
‘absolute,’ believing that to say that there is a right to some liberty is to say that the 
government may not interfere with this liberty for any reason.  But if this is how rights 
are understood, there are virtually no rights to liberty—because for virtually every liberty 
there will be some morally sufficient reason for the government to interfere with it.”). 
47William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for 
Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3. 
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and important values, between autonomy and pluralism, equality, and tolerance,” and a 
“liberalism without balance is too much in danger of overreaching itself.”48   
Embodying these aspirations requires a different framework than that provided by 
the right of association.  I now propose one such alternative framework.  My analysis 
proceeds in two stages.  First, it asks whether a group is a peaceable assembly.  This 
definitional question requires subjective judgment but no balancing of interests.  Second, 
it asks whether the autonomy of a peaceable assembly should be curtailed or undermined 
in furtherance of some other interest.  As I discuss below, these interests might include 
enforcing the criminal law, protecting national security, administering medical care to 
minors, and overcoming extreme economic coercion.  In my view, the balancing of 
interests in the latter stage should weigh heavily in favor of the assembly and 
infringement on group autonomy should be exceedingly rare.   
 
  1.  Threshold Requirements of Peaceable Assembly 
 The first part of my legal test is whether a gathered group constitutes a peaceable 
assembly.  To meet this threshold, I suggest that the group must be:  
• nongovernmental 
• nonprofit 
• externally peaceable  
• internally peaceable 
 
I recognize that there is some subjectivity in choosing these initial criteria.  But as I 
explain below, these limitations are both sensible and coherent in light of the history and 
tradition of the right of assembly. 
                                                 
48Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Autonomy, Association, and Pluralism,” in Minorities Within 
Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity eds. Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161.   
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The nongovernmental requirement arises from the recognition that assembly 
protects forms of gathering outside of state activity.  Compelled integration in public 
schools raises no serious concerns about a “right to exclude” in a framework of assembly 
because the people gathered as part of a government-sanctioned group have no vested 
interest in the composition or entry requirements of that group.  The legal test for the 
nongovernmental nature of an assembly can be drawn from the constitutional framework 
for what constitutes “state action.”  But it cannot in my view completely adopt the state 
action doctrine, which, as a legal fiction, has extended to a number of non-state actors 
and settings.  Thus, for example, my understanding of the nongovernmental requirement 
would not exclude (in the first stage of the assembly analysis) the community park in 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,49 the swimming pool in Tilman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Assn,50 or the private school in Runyon v. McCrary.51  Nor would it adopt the 
“public accommodation” language that the Court has applied to groups like the Boy 
Scouts and the Jaycees.   
The second threshold requirement is that the group must be not for profit.  There 
is nothing in the text of the right of assembly that precludes commercial entities, but 
doing so is, to my understanding, the only way that we can begin to account for the 
significant changes between public and private in the past century that have not only 
depoliticized the kinds of groups that contribute to our democratic experience but also 
transfused power to groups that threaten to undermine democracy through unchecked 
                                                 
49Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
50Tilman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973). 
51Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
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market forces.  As I argued in the preceding section, the nonprofit category should 
encompass all groups that would qualify as tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue Code 
(after lifting the political advocacy and public policy constraints).   
The final two definitional requirements I propose stem from the limit of 
peaceability in the text of the First Amendment’s assembly clause.  Because peaceability 
and the related concept of harm can be stretched to encompass any number of coercive 
actions, it is important at this stage of the legal test to limit its reach to acts or threats of 
physical violence to body or property.  This standard is akin to John Stuart Mill’s defense 
of “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others.”52   
External peaceability is relatively easy to identify: riots, conspiracies, and other 
forms of gathering that plot or enact physical violence are excluded from the protections 
of free assembly.  But the history of assembly makes painfully evident that even this 
standard remains vulnerable to manipulation.  Dennis and other cases during the height of 
McCarthyism attest that courts are capable of gross misconstructions of what transgresses 
external peaceability. 
Internal peaceability pertains to harms inflicted by members of a group upon other 
members of the group.  The most cited examples of internal harms include child and 
spousal abuse, and the withholding of medical care for children on religious grounds.  For 
reasons that I hope will be apparent (even if not persuasive), I make an analytical 
distinction between those acts that directly inflict harm (like child and spousal abuse) and 
those that might lead to harm (like the withholding of medical care).  Consistent with my 
                                                 
52John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Norton, 1975), 13.   
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approach to external peaceability, I treat the former as outside of the bounds of peaceable 
assembly.  But I defer consideration of the latter to the second stage of my analysis.53 
 
 2.  Balancing the Interests 
 The constitutional protections for group autonomy only extend to peaceable 
assembly.  When a group falls outside of this definition, courts have no interests to 
balance. But once a group has satisfied the four requirements of a peaceable assembly, 
we should recognize that any restriction on that group infringes upon the constitutionally 
protected value of group autonomy.  In my view, the interpretive difficulties we face in 
attempting to construe the meaning, purpose, and value of a group’s actions or practices 
justify a strong presumption in favor of any claim to group autonomy by a peaceable 
assembly.  For this reason, we must resist jumping too quickly to familiar constitutional 
balancing tests or even the language of “strict scrutiny” applied in evaluating regulations 
affecting expressive associations.  Otherwise, we risk succumbing to what Robert Cover 
called the state’s “jurispathic” tendencies.54  Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome the 
presumption favoring group autonomy.  Recognizing exceptions is not a weakness of the 
                                                 
53To state this more directly, I do not consider the withholding of medical care for 
religious reasons to exclude a group from the definition of a peaceable assembly. 
54Martha Minow defines “jurispathic” as referring to “the power and practice of a 
government that rules by displacing, suppressing, or exterminating values that run 
counter to its own.”  Martha Minow, “Introduction,” in Narrative, Violence, and the Law: 
The Essays of Robert Cover, eds. Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 1-2.  Minow writes that Cover “set in 
motion three captivating arguments: (1) government should be understood as one among 
many contestants for generating and implementing norms; (2) communities ignored or 
despised by those running the state actually craft and sustain norms with at least as much 
effort and worth as those espoused by the state; and (3) imposition of the state’s norms 
does violence to communities, a violence that may be justifiable but is not to be preferred 
a priori.”  Ibid., 2. 
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theory but simply an acknowledgment that at some point other interests outweigh the 
value of protecting the practices of the group.  I can think of four examples of when a 
competing interest might trump a claim to group autonomy by a peaceable assembly.55   
 
   a.  Criminal Law 
 The first interest that might overcome a claim to peaceable assembly is a violation 
of the criminal law not involving harm to people or property.56  I leave this open to a 
balancing analysis because the non-violent violation of a criminal law should not mean a 
per se exclusion from the protections of peaceable assembly.  That would preclude all 
forms of civil disobedience and attempts to inculcate alternative practices and ways of 
life by knowingly violating the law.57  Our constitutional history is replete with examples 
of oppressing nonviolent practices out-of-step with majoritarian values: upholding anti-
                                                 
55It is important to note that one can disagree with the weight that I assign to these 
competing interests and the balancing that I propose and still endorse my call to return to 
the language of peaceable assembly. 
56Recall that the first stage of my analysis holds that groups whose actions physically 
harm people or property do not fall within the scope of peaceable assembly.  
57A peaceable assembly might construe an act underlying civil disobedience as other than 
a violation of the criminal law.  See Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law 
Review 97 (1983), 46-47 (“[T]he community that has created and proposed to live by its 
own, divergent understanding of law makes a claim not of justifiable disobedience, but 
rather of radical reinterpretation.  If one addresses the status of "civil disobedients" from 
the perspective of the state's courts, one can hardly avoid framing the jurisprudential 
question as one of the individual's obligation to the state's law.  From a general 
jurisprudential perspective, however, to concede so central a role to the courts (in any 
sense other than as a sociological datum—that is, a recognition that courts in the United 
States do wield the heaviest stick and, as a result, are often the voice most carefully 
attended to) is to deny to the jurisgenerative community out of which legal meaning 
arises the integrity of a law of its own.”).  
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polygamy laws targeted at Mormons,58 enforcing injunctions against civil rights 
protesters,59 enforcing anti-sodomy laws against gay men,60 and prohibiting the use of 
peyote in Native American religious ceremonies,61 to name a few.  Nevertheless, there 
may be some instances when a violation of the criminal law not involving harm to people 
or property overcomes a claim to peaceable assembly.  Otherwise, the claim of assembly 
could be used to circumvent any law passed in furtherance of the health and welfare of 
society.  For example, in my view, the state’s interest in preventing drug abuse would 
trump the assembly claim of a group wanting to use heroin or methamphetamines.62  
Similarly, a brothel could not raise an assembly claim to subvert the state’s anti-
prostitution laws.  A more commonplace example might be a protest or demonstration 
that blocks access to a public good or route, in violation of an anti-loitering law.  Each of 
these groups is a nongovernmental, noncommercial, peaceable assembly, but each one 
might nevertheless face restrictions based upon its violations of the criminal law. 
 
 
                                                 
58Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
59See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).  
60Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
61Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
62The societal harms caused by these drugs are clearly on a much different order than the 
harms associated with the use of small amounts of peyote.  An interesting question is how 
a group claiming a right to ingest peyote for other than religious reasons would fare under 
my assembly test.  I think it is the case that the group would be protected by the right of 
assembly.  But this doesn’t mean the inevitable demise of an anti-peyote drug law: the 
balance might tip in favor of the state’s interest if the peyote use became particularly 
frequent or widespread. 
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  b.  National Security 
There may be instances where national security concerns override a claim to 
peaceable assembly.  For example, if a church sheltered a terrorist who had knowledge of 
an imminent attack (perhaps out of the not implausible concern that the government 
might use unethical methods of interrogation on the terrorist), the state’s national security 
interest might overcome the church’s claim to peaceable assembly.  But our history 
shows that state officials are too often swayed by frenzied interests dressed as national 
security concerns.  To provide maximum protection against this abuse of power, an 
override of peaceable assembly for national security reasons should require nondelegable 
approval authority from the President.  This high level of approval authority already 
exists in another context when national security interests might override a claim to 
peaceable assembly.  The Taft-Hartley Act grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to 
enjoin a labor strike that threatens “national health or safety” upon petition of the 
Attorney General at the direction of the President.63  Taft-Hartley injunctions must meet a 
high standard: they have been sought only thirty-three times, and courts have held that 
the national health or safety standard cannot be met solely by economic concerns but 
must pertain to a colorable threat to national security.64  Any expansion of this kind of 
                                                 
6329 U.S.C. §§ 176-180. 
64Compare United States v. Avco Corp. Lycoming Division, Statford, Conn., 270 F.Supp. 
665 (D. Conn. 1967) (strike of workers at military aircraft and aircraft engine plant that 
produced engines or components for aircraft being used in combat in Vietnam “would 
indeed be a strike at the jugular vein of the United States and of the free world”), with 
United States v. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, Local 418, 335 F.Supp. 
501 (D. Ill. 1971) (Taft-Hartley “precludes the enjoining of a strike on purely economic 
grounds absent some element of national defense” and strike was “totally devoid of any 
threat to the national defense or any war effort as such.”). 
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infringement on peaceable assembly outside of the labor context should require a 
similarly high threshold.  
 
c.  Withholding of Medical Care 
I have left as an open question subject to balancing whether the state’s interest in 
forcing the provision of its medical care on children is enough to overcome a group’s 
claim to peaceable assembly.  I share Chandran Kukathas’s suspicion that the 
condemnation of  “non-standard medical treatments” gives us no reason to assume that 
the state’s judgment will be any less subject to abuse.65  Kukathas suggests that a less 
interventionist approach could rely on “the pressures of civil association more generally, 
which induce a measure of conformity to the standards of the wider society.”66  I am not 
as optimistic as he is about the openness of groups to the pressures of proximate 
associations.  But I share his concern about unreflective endorsement of the alternative, 
even in the “extreme cases” that on first glance appear to call for intervention.  The risk 
of jumping to conclusions is highest when we encounter practices that strike us as 
particularly distasteful.  For example, although William Galston calls for a fairly broad 
form of liberal pluralism, arguing that “there can be no presumption that a state may 
intervene in [voluntary] associations just because they conduct their internal affairs in 
                                                 
65Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 143-48.  Kukathas argues in response to Brian 
Barry’s argument for using the state to protect the interests of children “as far as 
possible.” 
66Ibid., 147.  Cf. ibid., 143-44 (“in a society governed by toleration, it is not going to be 
possible for individuals or groups easily to arrogate to themselves the power to do 
entirely as they wish with others—including their children” because “they will be bound 
by the norms or conventions or the laws of the communities to which they belong—
which may in turn be shaped by requirements laid down by other associations of which 
these groups are themselves parts.”). 
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ways that diverge from general public principles,” he also contends that a civil 
association cannot “endanger the basic interests of children by withholding medical 
treatment in life-threatening situations.”67  For Galston, this example is beyond challenge.  
But determining a child’s basic interests with respect to medical care or even what 
constitutes a “life-threatening situation” is a complex assessment for which there is not 
always a clear answer.  By way of example, Kukathas writes that “[p]ractising Christian 
Scientists, who forswear many conventional medical treatments such as immunizations 
(for themselves and their children), tend to do better on the standard health indicators: 
longevity, rates of illness, incidence of heart disease and cancers, and others.”68  As he 
rightly notes, few important questions have been resolved beyond dispute: “within liberal 
societies, there is no settled consensus on a great range of questions about such things as 
proper medical practice, physician-assisted suicide, or abortion—or about what children 
should properly be taught about the world and their place in it.”69  Even acts that seem 
grossly inegalitarian or harmful to Western minds might appear less so from a different 
perspective.70  Nevertheless, there will be some instances of withholding medical care 
                                                 
67Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 9, 112, 114. 
68Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 138 n.56.  See also John Howard Yoder, 
“Response of an Amateur History and a Religious Citizen,” Journal of Law and Religion, 
7 (1989), 428 (arguing against the “therapeutic orthodoxy of the American Medical 
Association” trumping “the responsibility to care for the health of my children in light of 
the particular version of psychosomatic wellness coherent with our family’s belief 
system”). 
69Ibid., 145.   
70See, e.g., Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 187 (arguing that the “constraining 
nature” of opportunities for female mosque participants may “nonetheless represent 
forms of reasoning that must be explored on their own terms if one is to understand the 
structuring conditions of this form of ethical life and the forms of agency they entail”).    
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that overcome the presumptive validity of a claim to group autonomy by a peaceable 
assembly.   
 
  d.  Extreme Economic Coercion 
The final area in which I can envision a balancing of interests negating a claim to 
free assembly is when the surrounding economic context is so coercively aligned against 
a particular class of persons that the basic civil rights of that class are unattainable 
without intervention in the internal practices of nongovernmental, nonprofit groups.  In 
my view, this interest justifies the decisions like Tilman, Sullivan, and Runyon during the 
Civil Rights era: the pervasive status of Jim Crow warranted incursions into group 
autonomy even for acts of private segregation.  But I believe these decisions reflect the 
only instance in recent American history favoring incursion into group autonomy on the 
basis of overcoming extreme economic coercion.   
 
E.  THE MISSING ROBERTS DISSENT 
Having now laid out a legal framework for assembly, I conclude this chapter with 
a thought experiment positing what a Roberts dissent premised on the right of assembly 
might have looked like.  One reason for looking beyond the confines of the right of 
association in Roberts is the law’s capacity to employ different theories in addressing 
constitutional questions.  Roberts itself suggested two distinct reasons for denying 
associational protection to the Jaycees.  The majority rooted its analysis in the idea of 
expressive association, concluding that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating 
gender discrimination overrode the Jaycees’s right to expressive association.  Justice 
O’Connor, in contrast, determined that the Jaycees’s status as a commercial organization 
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placed it outside the protections of association.  Both arguments were offered as reasons 
for ruling against the Jaycees.  But multiple reasons also weigh in favor of the Jaycees.  
One argument for the Jaycees is that a proper understanding of strict scrutiny applied to 
regulations affecting the right of association should protect group autonomy in the 
circumstances presented in Roberts.  This is a claim from within the framework of 
association, but it is weakened by Brennan’s bifurcation of intimate and expressive 
association.  A different argument for protecting the Jaycees is that their peaceable mode 
of gathering does not transgress the boundaries of the right of assembly.   
In my view, assembly provides a stronger argument than association by 
suggesting a different way of conceiving of group autonomy.  It rejects the 
dichotomization of expression (through “speech”) and background practice (through 
“association”) and insists that the assembly that gathers is itself a form of expression.  It 
draws upon historical resources that emphasize the public and political role of groups 
unattached to state and government.  And it invokes a tradition of dissent that cautions us 
to tread carefully in assuming or imposing consensus or majoritarian norms.  
My hypothetical dissent incorporates the ideas discussed in this chapter and 
demonstrates how an analysis premised on the right of association undermines group 
autonomy.  I have anachronistically attributed this dissent to Justice Rutledge, who 
authored the majority opinion in Thomas v. Collins.71  That opinion, which I discussed in 
my first chapter, marks the high point of the Court’s recognition of the right of assembly.  
I am also in agreement with Aviam Soifer’s suggestion that Rutledge’s “dynamic, 
relational language” emphasized that the right of assembly was “broad enough to include 
                                                 
71Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).   
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private as well as public gatherings, economic as well as political subjects, and passionate 
opinions as well as factual statements.”72  Soifer argues that the principles articulated in 
Thomas “starkly contrast with the instrumental focus of more recent freedom of 
association decisions,” and I believe that we would have seen this contrast in a Roberts 
dissent premised on the right of assembly.73   
                                                 
72Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1995): 77, 78. 
73Ibid., 78.   
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Rutledge, J., dissenting.  
 
Respondent United States Jaycees is a nongovernmental, nonprofit group 
that desires to exclude women from its membership.  Because its practices 
are protected by the right of peaceable assembly, see U.S. Const., Amend. 
I, I would affirm the decision below.  However much I may disagree with 
those practices or their direct and indirect consequences, they fall within 
the boundaries of peaceable assembly.  The majority’s decision to resolve 
this case under a different standard fails to account for the role of free 
assembly in our constitutional scheme and jeopardizes the tradition of 
dissent and free expression long recognized in this country.   
 
I. 
 
The right peaceably to assemble has been part of our constitutional history 
for almost two hundred years.  It guards “not solely religious or political” 
causes but also “secular causes,” great and small.  Thomas v. Collins.  
Although its “most pristine and classic form” may manifest in a physical 
gathering such as a protest or strike, Edwards v. South Carolina, our 
decisions have never limited assembly to discrete physical gatherings.  To 
the contrary, we have expressly relied on the right of assembly to 
invalidate convictions for participating in meetings (De Jonge v. Oregon), 
organizing local chapters of a national group (Herndon v. Lowry), and 
speaking publicly without a proper license (Thomas v. Collins).  We have 
also observed that the freedom of assembly is implicated in the forced 
disclosure of a group’s membership list (NAACP v. Alabama).  As Justice 
Douglas has noted:  
 
Joining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an 
associational activity that comes within the purview of the 
First Amendment, which provides in relevant part: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
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speech, or of the press; or the right of the people, peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.” “Peaceably to assemble” as used in the First 
Amendment necessarily involves a coming together, 
whether regularly or spasmodically. . .  Assembly, like 
speech, is indeed essential in order to maintain the 
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and 
that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful 
means.  The holding of meetings for peaceable political 
action cannot be proscribed.  A Free Society is made up of 
almost innumerable institutions through which views and 
opinions are expressed, opinion is mobilized, and social, 
economic, religious, educational, and political programs are 
formulated. 
 
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 
The right of assembly “cannot be denied without violating those 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
civil and political institutions.”  De Jonge v. Oregon.  Indeed, as we 
announced in West Virginia v. Barnette: 
 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and 
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship 
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections. 
  
See also Bates v. City of Little Rock (“Like freedom of speech and a free 
press, the right of peaceable assembly was considered by the Framers of 
our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a government based upon the 
consent of an informed citizenry—a government dedicated to the 
establishment of justice and the preservation of liberty.”).  In Justice 
Brandeis’s well-known words: 
 
Those who won our independence . . . believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth; that without free speech and assembly 
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion 
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affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace 
to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a 
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government. 
 
Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Only “the gravest 
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible 
limitation.”  Thomas v. Collins. 
 
II. 
 
The majority fails to recognize the importance of protecting even those 
dissenting practices out of step with popular views or values.  As we noted 
in Gilmore v. Montgomery, “[t]he freedom to associate applies to the 
beliefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible” and “tends to 
produce the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic 
government and insures peaceful, orderly change.”  In that same decision, 
we quoted approvingly Justice Douglas’s assertion that “[t]he 
associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all 
brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, 
all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell 
a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be 
as selective as he desires.”  Gilmore v. Montgomery (quoting Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 
Our nation has protected the right of assembly for dissenting groups 
throughout its history.  These groups often expressed views antithetical 
and even threatening to those who held political power.  They included the 
Democratic-Republican Societies of the 1790s, suffragists and 
abolitionists of the antebellum era, and groups advocating on behalf of 
labor, women, and racial minorities in the twentieth century.  At the same 
time, we have not always been so vigilant in our protection of civil 
liberties, and our fear-driven denials of the right of assembly mark some 
of the low points of our constitutional history.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. 
United States; Dennis v. United States.   
 
Nothwithstanding our notable failures in cases like Korematsu and Dennis, 
we have for the most part sought to extend the right of assembly to 
favored and disfavored groups alike.  Over the past few decades, some of 
our cases carved out an important exception to that view in denying group 
autonomy to segregationists who discriminated solely on the basis of race 
in the South.  Most of these cases involved access to public goods or 
public accommodations that, because of the government imprimatur on 
them, did not involve a right to exclude from private activity.  See, e.g., 
Daniel v. Paul.  In a few instances, we extended this rationale to purely 
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private organizations like swimming pools and amusement parks.  See, 
e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park; Tilman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation 
Ass’n.  Our decisions construed these private entities as within the reach of 
public accommodations statutes.   
 
In hindsight, these decisions are best interpreted as remedial action taken 
to address the “badges and incidents of slavery” that have plagued much 
of our nation’s history.  Jones v. Alfred Mayer.  In my view, it is unwise to 
interpret these cases as representing a generalizable state action rationale 
that would further impinge upon the freedom of assembly.  We are better 
off to heed Judge Friendly’s pragmatic counsel: 
 
Whatever the true explanation for Shelley v. Kraemer . . . 
most people would say of it as Paul Freund is reputed to 
have said of Brown v. Board of Education, “can you 
imagine it having been decided the other way?” Even in 
this most sensitive area, however, not every state contact 
should suffice to bring down the constitutional axe. 
 
Henry J. Friendly, “The Public-Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130 (1982): 1292. 
 
Widening the reaches of our antidiscrimination decisions beyond the 
confines of situations involving widespread and systematic mistreatment 
of African Americans would dilute the compelling reasons underlying 
those decisions.  Extending these decisions would “utterly emasculate the 
distinction between private as distinguished from State conduct.”  Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.  
 
The majority likens gender discrimination in Minnesota to the experience 
of African Americans in the South during the 1960s and 1970s, reasoning 
that the “stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that 
accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering 
discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently 
because of their race.”  Ante, 625.  I cannot agree with this comparison 
even in the rhetorical context in which it is offered.  The conditions for 
African Americans in the South were uniquely evil in American history.  
Although our government’s historical treatment of other racial minorities, 
religious minorities, women, and homosexuals has been far from spotless, 
the conditions that these groups have faced in recent years have never 
approached the pervasive exclusions that African Americans encountered 
on a daily basis until legislative and judicial action demanded change.  
Surely the denial of the right to vote in a Jaycees election does not rise to 
the level of stigmatization of an African American denied access to 
facilities in his own neighborhood. 
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It might be objected about the case before us that a group of mostly white 
men is hard to construe as a dissenting interest.  But political dissent is 
measured by a lack of political legitimacy, not a lack of social or 
economic power.  In this case, the Jaycees’s desire to exclude women 
from full membership in their organization cuts against societal norms and 
the dominant views of those holding political power.  The Jaycees is in 
this sense a dissenting minority.  That classification does not in itself 
imbue any positive or negative connotation to the group.  At various times 
in our nation’s history, communists, fascists, abolitionists, suffragists, and 
segregationists have all been dissenting minorities.  Robust democratic 
principles recognize the importance of permitting these practices 
irrespective of whether we judge them to be morally commendable. 
 
III. 
 
The majority’s creation of the category of “intimate association” builds on 
a decontextualized understanding of privacy that elevates certain forms of 
human relationships to a special protected status.  In my view, we should 
be wary of creating a distinction of constitutional significance where one 
is unwarranted. 
 
The majority’s justification for intimate association stems from the 
relationship between privacy and association that we identified in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.  But the kind of privacy underlying group 
autonomy facilitates public engagement by allowing unpopular groups to 
preserve their ability to engage in political life unrestrained by overt or 
covert social, political, or economic pressures.  See NAACP v. Alabama.   
It does not aim to create an impenetrable and insulated private sphere.  
That sphere and the kinds of relationships that the majority asserts it 
protects with the category of intimate association are already encompassed 
by the right of privacy announced in Griswold.  In fact, this Court has yet 
to encounter a case in which the putative right of intimate association 
would extend any protections beyond the right of privacy.   
 
The regrettable collateral effect of creating an unnecessary right of 
intimate association is that it jettisons those groups that fail to meet its 
stringent contours to a lower level of constitutional protection.  In the 
majority’s words, “the nature and degree of constitutional protection 
afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to 
which [intimate or expressive association] is at stake in a given case.”  
Ante, 618.  Indeed, the majority’s restriction of intimate associations to 
those “distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree 
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and 
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship,” ante, 620, 
would preclude most if not all of the groups that have found refuge in the 
right of assembly throughout our nation’s history.  And all in service of a 
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vacuous distinction that provides no greater constitutional protection for 
any group. 
 
The Jaycees is not a public group.  It receives no government sponsorship 
or dollars.  In this way, it exists in the “non-public” realm and is free to 
make membership decisions based on its own internal practices and values 
without complying with the societal norms or explanations that we 
demand from governmental activities.  This freedom is not without 
consequences: it may be that the exclusionary practices of the Jaycees 
injure the self-respect, personal autonomy, or equality of opportunity of 
those excluded from their full ranks.  That is true of all kinds of groups 
ranging from fraternities and sororities to athletic teams to musical 
symphonies.  These groups exclude members based on gender, 
appearance, talent, and ability.  Those excluded may experience the pain 
and stigma of rejection and may lose out on numerous relationships they 
would have otherwise formed had they not been rejected.  These 
circumstances are regrettable but they are not for us to remedy through the 
coercive arm of the law.   
 
IV. 
 
The majority’s creation of a category of “expressive association” 
improperly construes the Jaycees as merely a means of expression and 
ignores that it is a form of expression in its very gathering and its selection 
of members.  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence makes a similar error in 
dismissing the expressive aspects of the Jaycees.   
 
We noted in NAACP v. Alabama that the “close nexus between the 
freedoms of speech and assembly” demonstrates that “[e]ffective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”  The 
very existence of the Jaycees is a form of expression, and the forced 
inclusion of unwanted members undeniably alters the content of that 
expression.  As we stated in Griswold v. Connecticut, the related right of 
association “includes the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies 
by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful 
means.”  Joining is a method of expression.  Lathrop v. Donahue 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  The same can be said of the right of assembly.   
 
We observed in Thomas v. Collins that: 
 
If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free 
assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can 
be accomplished by the device of requiring previous 
registration as a condition for exercising them and making 
such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance 
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their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such 
a restraining order.  So long as no more is involved than 
exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is 
immune to such a restriction. 
 
The reasoning expressed in Thomas is similar to our prior restraint 
doctrine for free speech.  We recognize in that area that preventing a 
message altogether by restraining a speaker is as anathema to free speech 
as censoring that message after the fact and may send a “chilling effect” 
that discourages the speaker from even attempting to convey a message.  
The same is true with actions taken to constrain an assembly before its 
expression is manifest.  A registration requirement chills assembly by 
forcing the members of a group to disclose their affiliation.  Thomas v. 
Collins. 
 
Similarly, forcing the exclusion of unwanted members on a group 
necessarily alters the “voice” of that group and censors expression before 
it can even be made.  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence today aptly conveys 
this point: “[p]rotection of the association’s right to define its membership 
derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive 
association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the 
definition of that voice.”  Ante, 633.  And despite its blithe dismissal of 
the consequences to the Jaycees, the majority also recognizes the voice-
altering nature of its decision: 
 
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the 
internal structure or affairs of an association than a 
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does 
not desire.  Such a regulation may impair the ability of the 
original members to express only those views that brought 
them together.  Freedom of association therefore plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.   
 
Ante, 623.  In a critical comment reflecting the significance of what is at 
stake today, the majority acknowledges that: “[a]ccording protection to 
collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in 
preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority.”  Ante, 622. 
 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence proposes an alternative assessment based 
on the commercial nature of a group.  She concludes that the Jaycees is 
“first and foremost, an organization that, at both the national and local 
levels, promotes and practices the art of solicitation and management” and 
that “Minnesota’s attempt to regulate the membership of the Jaycees 
chapters operating in that State presents a relatively easy case for 
application of the expressive-commercial dichotomy.”  Ante, 639.  I am 
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baffled as to how my esteemed colleague could reach such a conclusion on 
the record before us.   
 
Justice O’Connor’s classification is, however, illustrative of the dangers 
that arise when a court imposes its own interpretation of the meaning and 
purposes of a group or its practices.  The record establishes that the 
Jaycees, like many similarly situated groups, is multifaceted in its 
purposes and activities.  Each of its members will embrace certain values 
and activities more than others, and to some it may well be first and 
foremost a commercial organization.  But we cannot state with any degree 
of certainty that the overall purposes, values, and activities of the Jaycees 
are primarily commercial in nature.  
 
V. 
 
In my view, the proper standard for determining the limits of group 
autonomy is through the right of assembly.  We should first ask whether 
the Jaycees constitutes a nongovernmental, nonprofit, peaceable assembly.  
If so, we should make a strong presumption for the legitimacy of its claim 
to autonomy.  Because the Jaycees clearly satisfies the threshold of 
peaceable assembly, this is for me an easy case to decide.  I would affirm 
its constitutional right to peaceable assembly. 
 
VI. 
 
The minimal constraints of peaceable assembly leave us with racists, 
bigots, cultists, and ideologues.  They also leave us with diversity.  
Peaceable assembly forces us to confront more honestly questions of what 
it means to live among dissenting, political, and expressive groups. 
 
Because the Jaycees is an assembly unconnected to government 
sponsorship and is entitled under our precedent to protect its autonomy 
and message in the ways it deems desirable subject only to the constraint 
of peaceability, I respectfully dissent. 
 
  
 
V.  Theorizing Religious Assembly 
An important implication of my argument for the dissenting, public, and 
expressive assembly is that meaning, purpose, and value cannot be imputed to a group by 
the state.  For this reason, an understanding of assembly must itself be justifiable not only 
from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism but also from within the particular 
traditions that lay claim to it apart from the state.  In other words, the boundary marked 
by assembly must be mutually acknowledged—assembly is sustained by arguments 
internal to the various traditions that enact it as well as by the government that permits it.1   
I have constructed a liberal constitutional approach to assembly in previous 
chapters.  In this chapter, I turn to one alternative account: an Augustinian conception of 
how Christians might see assembly as part of the “earthly peace” that allows them to 
point toward the “heavenly peace.”  My Augustinian account is both an argument for 
assembly and an example of the kind of particularized reasoning that can support a 
contingent democratic arrangement that recognizes a right of peaceable assembly.  It is 
best seen as a contrast to the liberal constitutional account, but one that converges on the 
                                                 
1For a similar perspective on a related issue, see Robert Cover’s description of the 
Mennonite understanding of the First Amendment in Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 28-
29 (“[T]he Mennonites inhabit an ongoing nomos that must be marked off by a normative 
boundary from the realm of civil concern, just as the wielders of state power must 
establish their boundary with a religious community’s resistance and autonomy.  Each 
group must accommodate in its own normative world the objective reality of the other.”).  
Cover elaborates: “From a secular perspective on the Constitution, the free exercise 
clause's creation of small, dedicated, nomic refuges may appear to be merely an 
(unimportant) accommodation to religious autonomy. But for the Mennonites, the clause 
is the axis on which the wheel of history turns.”  Ibid., 30 n.85. 
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same boundary.  It will not encompass all claims to religious group autonomy or the free 
exercise of religion and, in fact, will fall short of persuading many Christians.  But it 
reflects a theologically coherent understanding of assembly in the Augustinian tradition. 
I begin by situating assembly within a discussion about religious group autonomy.  
The traditional view that religion occupies a special place in American political thought 
and constitutional law has come under fire in recent years.  Claims to religious freedom 
have increasingly been resolved under an attenuated free exercise framework or treated as 
analogous to speech and association claims.  I explore the weaknesses of these 
approaches and contend that assembly offers a more robust protection for religious group 
autonomy.  My argument assumes that religious groups seek to live out of a competing 
political space rather than be absorbed into the unitary political space of the nation-state.2  
 
A.  THE SPECIAL PLACE OF RELIGION? 
Questions of religious group autonomy have often received special attention in 
liberal political thought.  Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, one of the classic texts 
on freedom of association, focuses on the relationship between the church and 
government.3  Madison and Jefferson both addressed religious freedom and the role of 
churches in the new democracy.4  Following the recognition of the constitutional right of 
                                                 
2This is not true of all religious groups, but as I will argue below, it is consistent with 
some Christian theology.   
3John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).   
4See James Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” 
(1785); Thomas Jefferson, “The Virginia Act For Establishing Religious Freedom” 
(1786).  See generally Steven Waldman, Founding Faith: Providence, Politics, and the 
Birth of Religious Freedom in America (New York: Random House, 2008). 
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association in NAACP v. Alabama,5 commentators devoted particular attention to 
religious associations.6   
Contemporary theorists have also focused on the unique challenges posed by 
religious group autonomy.  Nancy Rosenblum, whose work figures prominently in this 
area, argues that religious groups have “an exceptional constitutional status” and that “the 
internal life of religious associations, particularly its congruence with public norms or 
resistance to them, is the heart of the moral uses of pluralism.” 7  Rosenblum is not alone 
in making these kinds of claims.  In an important collection of essays on the freedom of 
association, Kent Greenawalt argues that “claims deriving from religious association will 
often have more force than those deriving from other associations.”8  Other recent 
considerations of religious group autonomy from within political theory include Jeff 
                                                 
5NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
6See, e.g., Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association (New York: New York University 
Press, 1962); Robert A. Horn, Groups and the Constitution (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1956), 44-66; Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1961), 175-80. 
7Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 73, 79.  See also Nancy L. 
Rosenblum, ed. Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: Religious 
Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
8Kent Greenawalt, “Freedom of Association and Religious Association” in Freedom of 
Association, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 136.  
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Spinner Halev’s Surviving Diversity,9 William Galston’s Liberal Pluralism,10 and Lucas 
Swaine’s The Liberal Conscience.11   
 Despite the longstanding practice of according special consideration to religious 
groups, some scholars have recently argued that even if “religion” once occupied a 
privileged position in our nation’s history, that view is no longer tenable today.12   These 
scholars suggest that religion should be treated indistinctly from other forms of 
expression and that religious groups should be treated the same as other groups.  Three 
important developments have contributed to these arguments: (1) a weakening of the 
constitutional protections of the free exercise clause; (2) challenges to the definition of 
religion; and (3) the resolution of a growing number of religious freedom cases within the 
constitutional framework of speech and association.  
 
  1.  Diminished Free Exercise 
 The well-known case of Employment Division v. Smith (which denied the free 
exercise claims of Native American spiritualists seeking to smoke peyote for religious 
                                                 
9Jeff Spinner-Halev, Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2000).   
10William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for 
Political Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).   
11Lucas Swaine, The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious 
Pluralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
12See, e.g., Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution: The Case 
Against Religious Correctness (New York: Norton, 1996); Christopher L. Eisgruber and 
Lawrence G. Sager, “The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for 
Protecting Religious Conduct” University of Chicago Law Review 61 (1994): 1245.  See 
also Marci Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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reasons) concluded that general laws of neutral applicability need only pass rational basis 
scrutiny to survive constitutional challenge under the free exercise clause.13  In 
announcing this standard, the Court reversed the course of modern free exercise cases 
that had applied strict scrutiny to laws affecting religious conduct.14  Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion reached back to the distinction between religious belief and religious 
action made in Reynolds v. United States, the 1878 decision that outlawed the Mormon 
practice of polygamy over a free exercise challenge.15  Reynolds had expressed the 
Jeffersonian idea that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”16  
Smith’s revival of Reynolds opened the door to significant limitations on religious 
practice.17  Its doctrinal language also contributed to an increasingly unworkable 
constitutional framework for addressing matters of religious freedom.18   
                                                 
13Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
14See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972).  Smith somewhat disingenuously attempted to distinguish these cases rather 
than overrule them.  Smith, 881-82. 
15Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
16Ibid., 166.  Reynolds drew the distinction between belief and action from Jefferson’s 
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.  Ibid., 164 (quoting Jefferson). 
17The Court quashed Congress’s attempt to rebut Smith when it ruled unconstitutional 
provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq., in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996).  RFRA’s 
federal provisions remain valid.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao 
Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  A number of post-Smith state legislative acts or 
constitutional amendments provide increased protections to religious freedom.  See 
generally, Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel, 109. 
18See, e.g., John Witte, Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment, 2nd ed. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2005), 3 (the “constitutional experiment” of religious liberty 
is “wandering, without any regular system of operations”); Mary Ann Glendon and Raul 
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  2.  The Meaning of “Religion” 
A second reason for calls to treat religion as indistinguishable from other forms of 
expression centers on the definition of “religion.”  The increasingly diverse forms of 
religious belief in the United States have led some to question whether the constitutional 
category of religion has an “essence” capable of coherent definition.19  These arguments 
typically refer to the Court’s brief foray into the definition of religion in two draft cases 
during the Vietnam era.  In 1965, the Court noted in United States v. Seeger that religious 
belief was “based upon a power or a being, or upon a faith, to which all else is 
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent.”20  Five years later, in Welsh 
v. United States, the Court upheld a religious exemption to the draft for a man whose 
objection to the war arose solely from his “reading in the fields of history and 
sociology.”21  The Court asserted that the statutory meaning of “religious” encompassed 
                                                                                                                                                 
F. Yanes, "Structural Free Exercise," Michigan Law Review 90 (1991): 478 (religion 
clause jurisprudence is “unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable”); Vincent Phillip 
Muñoz, “Establishing Free Exercise” First Things 138 (2003): 14 (“If conservative and 
liberal church-state scholars agree on one thing, it is that the Supreme Court’s religious 
liberty jurisprudence is a disaster.”); Steven D. Smith, “The Rise and Fall of Religious 
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140 
(1991): 149-50 (“It is by now notorious that legal doctrines and judicial decisions in the 
area of religious freedom are in serious disarray.”). 
19See George C. Freeman III, "The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 
'Religion'" Georgetown Law Journal 71 (1983): 1519; Kent Greenawalt, “Religion as a 
Concept in Constitutional Law” California Law Review 72 (1984): 753.  A related 
argument is that religious preferences cannot be distinguished from expensive tastes.  
See, e.g., Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001).  
20United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
21Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 280 
beliefs that “rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principles.”22  These broad 
statutory interpretations are not controlling constitutional definitions of religion, and the 
Court has to some degree backed away from them—in 1972, it distinguished Amish 
belief from Thoreau’s transcendentalism, nothing that “Thoreau’s choice was 
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the 
demands of the Religion Clauses.”23  But the conceptual challenge to the meaning of 
“religion” remains, and reducing religion to a set of essences may be philosophically, if 
not constitutionally, problematic.24    
 
3.  Religious Speech and Association 
Diminished free exercise and questions over the definition of religion both 
challenge the notion that religious freedom should be given special protection in our 
constitutional framework.  I have serious concerns about Smith’s approach to religious 
practice.25  And I am not convinced that philosophical concerns about the “category” of 
religion preclude us from applying commonsense definitional boundaries.26  But setting 
                                                 
22Ibid., 342-43. 
23Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
24Freeman writes that “[c]ourts simply cannot use ‘religion’ as a term of art without 
converting the right to the free exercise of religion into a seemingly illimitable right of 
personal autonomy.  Freeman, "The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition 
of 'Religion,'" 1564.  
25For critiques of Smith to which I am sympathetic, see Stanley Hauerwas and Michael 
Baxter, "The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of 'Belief' Is Not Enough," DePaul Law 
Review 42 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, “Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision,” University of Chicago Law Review 57 (1990). 
26See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F.Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting the claim of 
an “ordained minister of the Neo-American Church” that her convictions for the sale and 
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aside these objections, I am even more wary of the compromise that has arisen through 
proposals to address religious freedom claims through the rights of speech and 
association.   
These proposals can be traced to the Court’s 1981 opinion in Widmar v. Vincent, 
which upheld on free speech principles access to a state university’s facilities by a 
registered student religious group.27  The Court noted that “religious worship and 
discussion” are “forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment.”28  
Since Widmar, the Court has increasingly decided religious freedom cases under these 
rights.29  A number of legal scholars have also advocated this approach; as Steven Smith 
notes, “[p]roposals to collapse the commitment to religious freedom into other values 
such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection have 
proliferated.”30  One recent example is Mark Tushnet’s argument against the “redundant” 
free exercise clause.31  Tushnet analyzes the Court’s free speech cases (including the 
Court’s treatment of symbolic speech) and concludes that “[t]he Free Speech Clause, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
possession of marijuana and LSD violated her free exercise of religion); Church of the 
Chosen People v. United States, 548 F.Supp. 1247 (D.Minn. 1982) (rejecting free 
exercise challenge from organization whose primary doctrine was “The Gay 
Imperative”). 
27Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
28Ibid., 269. 
29See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 
(1993); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1994); Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School, 538 U.S. 98 (2000).  
30Smith, “The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,” 239 
n.363. 
31Mark Tushnet, “The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?” Loyola University Chicago 
Law Journal 33 (2001). 
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currently interpreted, provides protection for almost all of what the Free Exercise Clause, 
as currently interpreted, does.”32  He then suggests that most religious practices not 
falling within free speech fall within the right of expressive association.33  Construing 
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America34 as providing broad protections to expressive 
associations, Tushnet suggests that Dale “could support the development of constitutional 
prohibitions on a substantial range of state regulatory efforts that might not fall directly 
under the protection of the Free Speech Clause.”35  He concludes that “[t]he free speech 
doctrine and the newly defined right of expressive association go a long way to providing 
an adequate substitute for the Free Exercise Clause.”36  Tushnet believes that these 
alternative protections alleviate concerns that Smith “substantially reduce[d] the 
constitutional protection afforded religious belief and practice.”37  
 Although I doubt that the Court’s free speech doctrine is as capacious as Tushnet 
wants it to be—the scope of what the Court recognizes as symbolic speech is far broader 
than the scope of what it actually protects with anything beyond rational basis scrutiny—
I agree with his suggestion that some religious expression is protected by the freedom of 
                                                 
32Ibid., 83. 
33Ibid., 84-86. 
34Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
35Tushnet, “The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?,” 91.  Tushnet offers as examples the 
use of peyote in religious ceremony, religiously motivated provision of sanctuary to 
refugees, religiously motivated objections to autopsies, and objections to local zoning 
ordinances or historic preservation rules. 
36Ibid., 94. 
37Ibid. 
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speech.38  But for reasons that should be apparent by now, I am not as optimistic that the 
freedom of association will adequately protect religious groups.  My earlier arguments 
suggested that this right too often assumes consensus norms, privatizes and depoliticizes, 
and treats groups as merely instrumental to expression.  More ominously, I argued in the 
last chapter that these characteristics of association all reflect forms of control by the 
state.  Religious believers wary of state control will benefit from recovering a concept of 
assembly that offers stronger grounds for resistance to the state. 
 
  4.  The Alternative of Assembly 
I propose the right of assembly as a partial alternative to the options described 
above.  Assembly sidesteps questions about the meaning of religion or whether religious 
practices are constitutionally privileged over nonreligious practices because it protects 
group autonomy generally without having to determine whether a group’s practices are 
sufficiently religious in nature.  At the same time, assembly falls outside of the doctrinal 
limitations of speech and association.  
My argument for assembly bears some resemblance to Lucas Swaine’s proposal 
to grant semisovereign (or quasi sovereign) status to “theocratic communities.”39  Swaine 
defines a theocratic community as “one in which persons endeavor to live according to 
                                                 
38For examples of when the Court has recognized but not protected symbolic speech, see, 
e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Court 
assumes that “sleeping in the park” is expression covered by the First Amendment but 
upholds ban on overnight sleeping as a content neutral restriction); Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“nude dancing of the kind sought to be 
performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First 
Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”). 
39Swaine, The Liberal Conscience, 72.  Swaine uses “semisovereign” and “quasi-
sovereign” interchangeably.  Ibid., 91.  I dislike Swaine’s term “theocrat” but use it in my 
discussion of his theory for purposes of clarity. 
 284 
the dictates of a religious conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its 
range of teachings.”40  He suggests that semisovereignty might offer “a significant 
measure of political or legal autonomy” and even that “[a] semisovereign body of 
community could be the ultimate recognized political authority within the territory that it 
occupies.”41  Swaine’s proposal advances some of what I am arguing for in the concept of 
assembly.  But three aspects of his theory are problematic: (1) his binary categorization 
of theocrats; (2) the scope of semisovereignty; and (3) the ontology of semisovereignty.   
My first concern is the most important to understanding the argument that 
comprises the bulk of this chapter.  It objects to Swaine’s contention that “[t]heocrats in 
modern liberal democracies divide naturally into two different kinds.”42  The first, which 
he calls “ambitious theocrats,” are “enthusiastic participants in public life, engaging in 
public discourse and political affairs with a view to supplanting liberal institutions with 
stricter laws and regulations drawn from their religious conceptions of the good.”43  The 
second, which he calls “retiring theocrats,” “withdraw from everyday affairs,” are 
“reluctant to participate in political or other public matters,” and work “to live instead in 
small communities where they may practice their religion in seclusion.”44 Swaine’s 
dichotomy between ambitious and retiring theocrats is false.  It is the kind of binary 
thinking about theologically informed politics that has frustrated Stanley Hauerwas for so 
                                                 
40Ibid., 72. 
41Ibid., 91. 
42Ibid., 9. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
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many years.45  Hauerwas and similarly minded theologians are theocrats under Swaine’s 
definition: they conceive of communities “in which persons endeavor to live according to 
the dictates of a religious conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its 
range of teachings.”46  But they seek neither to engage with legal institutions to impose 
their own religiously informed conception of the good nor to withdraw from society.  
They represent a category missing from Swaine’s framework: the church that bears 
witness to the world in a dissenting, public, and expressive form.47  This is the kind of 
assembly that I explore later in this chapter. 
My second concern flows in part from the first.  Swaine only extends his 
conception of semisovereignty to retiring theocrats.48  He identifies three prerequisites for 
semisovereignty: (1) the religious community “must be virtually homogenous in its 
religious affiliations and have ownership of the property in the area to be made 
semisovereign”; (2) the “theocrats’ territory must be distinct, free from and clear of 
                                                 
45For a summary of repeated characterizations of Hauerwas as “sectarian,” and 
Hauerwas’s repeated denial of these characterizations, see Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and 
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 140-61. 
46Swaine, The Liberal Conscience, 72. 
47In sociological form, this group of religious believers comes closer to Jeff Spinner-
Halev’s definition of “religious moderates” (although they would eschew that label).  
According to Spinner-Halev, religious moderates “believe their religion is true, but are 
more willing to work and live among others than [religious] conservatives.”  They “seek 
to retreat to some exclusive social space on a regular basis, where outsiders are not 
welcome.”  And they “worry about their members straying from their particular path, but 
they also find that they can learn from others and that they want to be part of mainstream 
society in at least some ways.”  Spinner-Halev, Surviving Diversity, 10.  I would qualify 
Spinner-Halev’s definition by noting that this category of religious believers would 
welcome outsiders to observe their practices (although they may maintain membership 
requirements for some forms of participation in those practices).   
48Swaine, The Liberal Conscience, 74, 76, 158. 
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neighboring districts or communities”; and (3) the “community would have to provide a 
basic plan for its social institutions, showing the ability to take care of members’ basic 
needs and requirements.”49  Hauerwas’s conception of the church would be unlikely to 
meet these conditions, but the political theory behind Swaine’s semisovereignty could be 
useful to Hauerwas’s kind of community as well as to those comprised of retiring 
theocrats.  
My third problem with Swaine’s theory is ontological.  Despite the promising 
potential of semisovereignty, Swaine retains a fundamental privileging of the state: 
theocratic communities are “subgroups within liberal polities” and “semisovereign bodies 
are subunits of larger polities, either ensconced within a polity or adjunct to it.”50  The 
latter description bears parsing; the conjunctive “or” separates two very different ideas.  
A semisovereign that is “ensconced within a polity” is part of the whole that privileges 
the larger entity.  In contrast, a semisovereign that is “adjunct to” a polity suggests 
proximity and relationship but does not imply subordination.  This latter interpretation of 
semisovereignty is consistent with Augustine’s ontology.  As William Cavanaugh notes, 
for Augustine, “[t]here is no sense that there is a single given public space in which the 
church must find its place.”51  Rather, the political space occupied by the earthly city is 
always epiphenomenal to the existence of the heavenly city.  Moreover, even though 
                                                 
49Ibid., 94-95.  
50Ibid., 76, 91. 
51William Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two: Christian Reimagining of Political 
Space,” Political Theology 7 (2006): 310.  Cavanaugh warns that “[w]hen the church is 
viewed as particular—as one of many in civil society—and the nation-state is viewed as 
universal—as the larger unifying reality—then it is inevitable that the one will absorb the 
many, in the putative interests of harmony and peace.”  Ibid., 320. 
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“[t]he City of God is not a theoretical treatise aiming to clarify the nature of politics,”52 its 
theological and ontological claims about the two cities are not contingent on a particular 
political arrangement.  Augustine’s theological commitments ground normative insights 
not only for the church of his time but also for the church in our time.  
 
B.  WHY AUGUSTINE? 
I employ a distinctively Augustinian account of assembly out of commitments 
within Christian theology requiring the avoidance of general religious terminology.  The 
eminent theologian Karl Barth lamented that “[t]he nineteenth century was certainly in 
error, when it understood the Church as a ‘religious society,’ a term taken over by 
jurisprudence.”53  John Howard Yoder similarly questioned “whether the best way to talk 
about Christian faith is to put it within the wider category of ‘religion’ at all.”54  Christian 
particularity means beginning with a people whose story is situated not within a specific 
state, government, or legal system but proceeds outside of these constructs in the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  It means that the practices of sharing, serving, 
proclaiming, and forgiving are undertaken in a framework that is both teleological and 
                                                 
52Thomas W. Smith, “The Glory and Tragedy of Politics,” in Augustine and Politics ed. 
John Doody, Kevin L. Hughes, and Kim Paffenroth (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 
188. 
53Karl Barth, The Faith of the Church: A Commentary on the Apostle's Creed According 
to Calvin's Catechism, ed. Jean-Louis Leuba, trans. Gabriel Vahanian (New York: 
Meridian Books, 1958), 136. 
54John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
Notre Dame Press, 1984), 182.  As Stanley Hauerwas has written, the term “religion” is 
problematic because “it usually implies that the service and worship of God can be 
meaningfully discussed without specifying the identity of God, who God is, which god is 
being worshipped.” Hauerwas and Baxter, “The Kingship of Christ,” 110. 
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eschatological.  It rejects the Lockean distinction between belief and action but agrees 
with Locke that “[t]he sprinkling of Water, and the use of Bread and Wine, are both in 
their own nature, and in the ordinary occasions of Life, altogether indifferent” but “in the 
Worship of God they wholly cease to be indifferent.”55  It is possible that this kind of 
assembly will also be tenable to people of other faiths, but its theological plausibility will 
need to be justified in terms persuasive to them.56 Augustine is also useful for 
encouraging interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and political theory.  The City 
of God provides a common text and language from which to engage a diverse set of 
theological thinkers who have reflected upon the relationship between church and state 
and allows me to make a theological argument without addressing distinctions that would 
quickly become too specialized and too lengthy.57  But my use of Augustine also works 
                                                 
55Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 40, 41.  Cf. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 8 
(“There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday and refusing the sacraments, 
between having a snack and desecrating the fast of Yom Kippur, between banking a 
check and refusing to pay your income tax. In each case an act signifies something new 
and powerful when we understand that the act is in reference to a norm.”). 
56An example of an Islamic account that might envision religious practice as assembly is 
Saba Mahmood’s description of da’wa.  Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 58 (The 
practice of da’wa in contemporary Egypt “encompasses a range of practical activities . . . 
includ[ing] establishing neighborhood mosques, social welfare organizations, Islamic 
educational institutions, and print presses, as well as urging fellow Muslims toward 
greater religious responsibility, either through preaching or personal conversation.”).  
57The theological voices I draw upon include John Milbank, Stanley Hauerwas, Kristen 
Deede Johnson, H. Jefferson Powell, Reinhard Hütter, William Cavanaugh, Rowan 
Williams, Bernd Wannenwetsch and Oliver O’Donovan.  I recognize significant diversity 
in their views.  Hauerwas stands out as the least “Augustinian,” but I think my rendering 
of assembly is (mostly) consistent with his thinking.  My generalities and oversights may 
nevertheless leave theologically astute readers unsatisfied.  My hope is that others with 
greater theological sophistication will be able to make better arguments in a language that 
can dialogue with political theory.  I am aware that this challenge risks aligning theology 
with politics rather than the other way around.  But there is also a danger in the other 
direction that traps theological arguments in a parochial grammar and vocabulary 
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in the other direction because he is widely recognized as a key figure within political 
theory.58  His major writings rightfully retain a canonical place in political theory; his 
ideas influence not only subsequent Christian political thinkers like Aquinas, Luther, and 
Calvin but also theorists as diverse as Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Arendt.  
Unfortunately, much contemporary scholarship and teaching that reads Augustine 
through the lens of political theory ignores “the heart of Augustine’s account of the true 
worship of the crucified God and the charitable service of neighbor in collective 
caritas.”59  Eric Gregory cautions against this approach: “[t]o understand Augustinian 
politics, it is not enough to relegate distinctively theological commitments as incidental to 
‘religious’ or ‘philosophical’ views.”60  Like Gregory, I believe the enterprise of political 
theory is better practiced with continued attention not only to Augustine but also to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
inaccessible to non-specialists.  I think this is a mistake.  To the extent that Christian 
theology can find common ground with democratic resources, theologians ought to be 
able to articulate their views in language that is not only faithful to their Christian 
commitments but also cognizant of and conversant with the particular history, 
jurisprudence, and political theory that they encounter in the United States. 
58It is for this reason that I have chosen Augustine’s City of God over Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum Communio.  See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A 
Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard 
Krauss and Nancy Lukens, vol. 1, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1998).  I am fairly convinced that Bonhoeffer’s early work provides an equally 
compelling (and perhaps more interesting) theological framework for my understanding 
of a Christian assembly.  But because political theorists will be much more familiar with 
Augustine than Bonhoeffer, I leave a consideration of Sanctorum Communio for another 
context.  
59Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic 
Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 379.  Cf. ibid., 33 (noting “the 
relative neglect of theology in academic political theory”).  
60Ibid., 33-34.  Gregory chides “political Augustinians who like to talk about religion but 
are not sure what to do with the particularity of Christian God talk.”  Ibid., 48. 
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theological framework that informs his writing.  The account of the dissenting, public, 
and expressive assembly that follows is such an attempt. 
  
C.  AN AUGUSTINIAN ACCOUNT OF ASSEMBLY 
1.  The Dissenting Assembly 
My first claim is that an Augustinian assembly is inherently dissenting.  The 
justification for this assertion requires entering the complex relationship between the 
heavenly city and the earthly city that has repeatedly confounded Augustine’s 
interpreters.  Before I begin that journey, let me set forth my penultimate conclusions as a 
guide to where I am heading: (1) although the heavenly city and the earthly city do not 
map to “church” and “state,” (2) the assembly is the sociological form of the heavenly 
city “on pilgrimage” to the extent that it bears witness to true peace and justice, and (3) 
the earthly city, which maintains an earthly peace through government, can never bear 
witness to true peace and justice but instead views earthly peace and justice as ultimate 
goods; therefore, (4) the properly oriented assembly dissents from the earthly city’s 
orientation toward earthly goods.  These conclusions do not mean that the dissenting 
assembly never supports institutions of government in the earthly city.  To the contrary, it 
endorses the earthly peace because that peace facilitates its witness to the true heavenly 
peace.  The dissenting assembly objects to the earthly city’s orientation toward earthly 
goods, not to the goods themselves.  Now to the work of explaining these contentions.   
In Book XV of the City of God, Augustine famously distinguished the two cities 
by the objects of their love: the heavenly city pursues the love of God; the earthly city 
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pursues the love of self.61  This ontological distinction explains the need for Augustine’s 
massive historiography in the preceding books.  By constructing a history of the 
saeculum, he shows that the earthly city is fundamentally rooted in violence and self-
love.62  Even the “bonds of peace” that foster unity in the earthly city are built upon 
bloodshed and violence.63  The heavenly city, in contrast, proceeds from an ontology of 
peace rooted in a love of God.  The two cities thus reflect “two contrasting codes.”64  But 
the heavenly city is not merely eschatological.  The “city of the saints is above” but “here 
below it begets citizens, in whom it sojourns till the time of its reign arrives.”65  The 
heavenly city is “in a state of pilgrimage” and “sojourns on earth and lives by faith.”66  Its 
sociological form is the church, or what I am calling the assembly.67  
                                                 
61City of God, Book XIV, c. 28.   
62Cf. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990), 390 (“Augustine’s contrast between ontological antagonism and 
ontological peace is grounded in the contrasting historical narratives of the two cities.”); 
ibid, 391 (“Mythical beginnings of legal order are therefore traced back to the arbitrary 
limitation of violence by violence, to victory over rivals, and to the usurpation of fathers 
by sons.”).   
63City of God, Book XIX, c. 7.  Augustine writes: “how many great wars, how much 
slaughter and bloodshed, have provided this unity!”  Ibid.  Cf. Cavanaugh, “From One 
City to Two,” 310 (“There is a unity in the earthly city, but it is a false unity, one based 
on the libido dominandi.”). 
64Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 405.  
65City of God, Book XV, c. 1.  
66Ibid., Book XIX, c. 17.  Cf. ibid., Book XV, c. 21 (“the heavenly city, which sojourns 
on earth”). 
67See ibid., Book VIII, c. 24 (“the city of God, which is the holy Church”); ibid., Book 
XIII, c. 16 (“the city of God, that is, His Church”).  I emphasize the church as the 
sociological form of the heavenly city on pilgrimage because there are also members of 
the heavenly city who reside outside of the church.   
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Importantly, the sociological form of the heavenly city does not create a binary 
distinction between “church” and “state.”68  There is no such clear separation in 
Augustine’s thought.  To the contrary, Augustine recognized that Christian citizens share 
a “mortal life” that is “common to both cities.”69  He writes of “the mortal course of the 
two cities, the heavenly and the earthly, which are mingled together from the beginning 
down to the end.”70  Prior to the last judgment, this commingling permeates not only the 
institutions of the earthly city but also the church itself: 
We must understand in one sense the kingdom of heaven in which exist 
together both he who breaks what he teaches and he who does it, the one 
being least, the other being great, and in another sense the kingdom of 
heaven into which only he who does what he teaches shall enter.  
Consequently, where both classes exist, it is the Church as it now is, but 
where only the one shall exist, it is the Church as it is destined to be when 
no wicked person shall be in her.  Therefore the Church even now is the 
kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven.  Accordingly, even now 
His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign 
hereafter; and yet, though the tares grow in the Church along with the 
wheat, they do not reign with Him.71  
                                                 
68As Milbank notes, “[t]he civitas terrena is not regarded by [Augustine] as a ‘state’ in 
the modern sense of a sphere of sovereignty, preoccupied with the business of 
government.”  Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 406.  Cf. Sheldon Wolin, Politics 
and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 113 (“In Augustine’s system the civitas terrena was 
not intended to represent in an exact way the political community any more than the 
civitas dei was synonymous with the Church”).   
69City of God, Book XIX, c. 17.  Cf. ibid., Book XV, c. 21 (both cities “starting from a 
common gate opened in Adam into this mortal state”). 
70Ibid., Book XVIII c. 54.  See also Book XIX c. 26 (“the two cities are commingled”). 
71Ibid., Book XX, c. 9.  See also ibid. (“For to this beast belong not only the avowed 
enemies of the name of Christ and His most glorious city, but also the tares which are to 
be gathered out of His kingdom, the Church, in the end of the world.”).  Cf. Gregory, 
Politics and the Order of Love, 129 (“The kingdom of God is much bigger than the 
church, and the church experiences the same sinful divisions and broken ruptures that 
characterize the world.”); John N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine’s “City of 
God” (New York: Longman’s, 1921), 52 (“Members of either body are found, and 
always will be found, in the terrene representative of the other.”).   
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How then do we explain the apparent paradox of a church that is both the heavenly city 
on pilgrimage and yet comprised of both good and wicked people?  The answer, I think, 
lies in conceiving of the church as assembly.  I agree with John Milbank against Robert 
Markus that while “Augustine is certainly at pains to stress that many true members of 
the city of God lie outside the bounds of the institutional Church, just as many of the 
baptized are not true members at all, this does not mean that he regards institutional 
adherence as a secondary and incidental matter.”72  Rather, it is through the collective 
practices of the church that the heavenly city manifests God’s peace and justice before an 
audience of the earthly city.  What is not possible by the expression of individuals in the 
heavenly city (whether they reside inside or outside of the church) is made possible 
through the corporate expression of the church as assembly.   
The key to the significance of assembly is highlighted by Augustine’s insistence 
that life in the heavenly city is inherently social.  He writes: 
[T]he life of the wise man must be social. . . .  For how could the city of 
God (concerning which we are already writing no less than the nineteenth 
book of this work) either take a beginning or be developed, or attain its 
proper destiny, if the life of the saints were not a social life?73   
 
                                                 
72Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 402.  Markus’s important interpretation of 
Augustine’s political thought minimized the importance of a visible, sociological church.  
See Robert A. Markus, Saeculum, History, and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine 
(New York: Cambridge, 1970).  
73Ibid., Book XIX, c. 5.  In the words of the British pluralist John Figgis, Augustine’s 
thought is “eminently social.”  Figgis, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine’s “City of 
God,” 51. 
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Indeed, as Oliver O’Donovan suggests, “Augustine makes society central to the supreme 
good.”74  This social life consists of practices that point toward true peace and justice.  
Chief among these is forgiveness.  Augustine argues that “mutual forgiveness” is critical 
to “keep that peace without which no man can see the Lord.”75  He writes: 
Our very righteousness, too, though true in so far as it has respect to the 
true good, is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists rather in the 
remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues.  Witness the prayer of 
the whole city of God in its pilgrim state, for it cries to God by the mouth 
of all its members, “Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors.”76 
 
Milbank underscores the social and eschatological dimensions to Augustine’s 
understanding of forgiveness: 
[G]iven the persistence of the sin of others (as well as our own sinfulness, 
which we cannot all at once overcome, but remains alien to our better 
desires) there is only one way to respond to them which would not itself 
be sinful and domineering and that is to anticipate heaven, and act as if 
their sin was not there, by offering reconciliation.77    
 
Forgiveness and reconciliation are thus central practices to the church embodying the 
heavenly city.  But as Bernd Wannenwetsch suggests, the church also reflects the 
heavenly city when it practices “the proclamation of the Word and the administration of 
the sacraments in the proper way (recte)—that is, in the promise of the Spirit.”78  These 
                                                 
74Oliver O’Donovan, “The Political Thought of City of God” in Oliver O’Donovan and 
Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, Bonds of Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past and Present 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 51.  
75City of God, Book XV, c. 6.  
76Ibid., Book XIX, c. 27.     
77Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 411.  Cf. ibid. (“there is a way to act in a violent 
world which assumes the ontological priority of non-violence, and this way is called 
‘forgiveness of sins’”).       
78Bernd Wannenwetsch, Political Worship: Ethics for Christian Citizens trans. Margaret 
Kohl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2.  
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practices are how “the Church can be understood as a divine institution.”79  Yet the 
church is not synonymous with the heavenly city because, comprised as it is of good and 
wicked members, it will not always be what Hauerwas calls the “faithful manifestation of 
the peaceable kingdom in the world.”80  Creating and maintaining a political space for the 
assembly is thus important for its capacity to reflect the heavenly city but does not in and 
of itself guarantee that reflection.81 
 Recognizing that the church commingles with the earthly city helps explain the 
church’s use of earthly goods.  Augustine is clear that earthly goods are beneficial: “the 
things which this city desires cannot justly be said to be evil, for it is itself, in its own 
kind, better than all other human good.”82  Most significantly, the heavenly city and the 
earthly city share an “earthly peace,” which is “the temporal peace which the good and 
the wicked together enjoy.”83  According to Augustine: 
The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and 
the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and 
rule, is the combination of men’s wills to attain the things which are 
helpful to this life.  The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which 
sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because 
it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away.84   
                                                 
79Ibid.  
80Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (London: 
SCM Press, 1984), 99. 
81This is an important qualifier given the historical record of the church’s use of violence 
and rejection of peace.  Clearly, the church has not always been faithful in its witness to 
the heavenly city.  But its empirical failings should not be read as a negation of 
Augustine’s ontological claim that the church in true form is the heavenly peace on earth.  
82City of God, Book XV, c. 4.   
83Ibid., Book XIX, c. 26.   
84Ibid., c. 17.  Cf. ibid. (The heavenly city “while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of 
the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and 
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As Oliver O’Donovan observes, this earthly peace is “not an institution but simply a 
condition of order.”85  Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests that Augustine’s use of the earthly 
peace means that Christians “can use the political order because it introduces regularity 
into social relations and thus helps to make possible the life of the Church.”86  And H. 
Jefferson Powell notes similarly that an Augustinian “has good theological reasons to 
support the legal enforcement of certain individual rights as a strategy for protecting and 
promoting the temporal peace of American society.”87  
Augustinian Christians, then, do not need to view liberal democracy as inherently 
bad but can instead capitalize on the freedom that it offers for proclamation and worship.  
Karl Barth reached a similar conclusion in the particularly ominous context of 1938 
Europe:   
No direct action that the Church might take . . . could even remotely be 
compared with the positive relevance of that action whereby, without any 
interference with the sphere of the State, this Church proclaims the coming 
Kingdom of Christ. . . [T]he guarantee of the State by the Church is finally 
accomplished when the Church claims for itself the guarantee of the State, 
i.e., the guarantee of freedom to proclaim her message.  This many sound 
strange, but this is the case: all that can be said from the standpoint of 
divine justification on the question (and the questions) of human law is 
                                                                                                                                                 
maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries 
of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven.”).  
85O’Donovan, “The Political Thought of City of God.”    
86Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1995), 21. 
87H. Jefferson Powell, “The Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic” in Christian 
Perspectives on Legal Thought eds. Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., and 
Angela C. Carmella (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 86.  
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summed up in this one statement: the Church must have the freedom to 
proclaim divine justification.88  
 
The church has a stake in preserving a space for worship and proclamation and can “use 
liberal politics along the way to enjoying the politics of an infinite God.”89  That the 
United States has constitutionally enshrined a right of assembly is a good thing for the 
church, and challenging the government to honor that right is a project worth pursuing.90    
At the same time, the church is never fully at home in the earthly city.  Its 
members commingle in the earthly city and make use of the earthly peace, but “however 
much they may support and encourage the ‘consensus of human wills in respect of 
resources for man’s mortal existence,’” they “are not members of the earthly city, too.”91  
For Augustine, the heavenly city’s acceptance of the earthly peace is always conditioned 
upon its freedom to worship God:  
This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all 
nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not 
                                                 
88Karl Barth, "Church and State," in Community, State, and Church: Three Essays ed. 
Will Herberg (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 147.  Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, 
Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (Grand Rapids: 
Brazos Press, 2004), 56 (“It has always been my conviction, a conviction I believed I 
learned from Barth, that the character of a society and state is to be judged by the 
willingness to have the gospel preached truthfully and freely.”).  
89Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 381.  Gregory’s conception of an “Augustinian 
civic liberalism” emphasizes “the central role that love (of God and neighbor) can and 
should play in an Augustinian social vision.”  Ibid, 2.  
90In this regard, I am in agreement with a kind of “Augustinian civic liberalism” that 
differs from an antiliberal reading of Augustine.  See ibid., 12 (describing the antiliberal 
reading of Augustine as holding “a distaste for liberal political arrangements” and 
imagining “liberal democracy as morally and spiritually bankrupt, a social expression of 
theological heresies.”).  Gregory includes both Hauerwas and Milbank in the antiliberal 
category.  Ibid., 2, 17.  
91O’Donovan, “The Political Thought of City of God,” 58 (quoting City of God, Book 
XIX, c. 17).  
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scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby 
earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognising that, however 
various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace.  
It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that 
it even preserves and adapts them, so long only as no hindrance to the 
worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced.92    
 
The Augustinian assembly recognizes the limitations of the earthly peace, and it endorses 
that peace only to the extent that it remains free to worship and to name the injustice of 
the earthly city.93  
 For Augustine, both cities “alike either enjoy temporal good things, or are 
afflicted with temporal evils, but with diverse faith, diverse hope, and diverse love.”94  As 
Markus elaborates:  
The members of the two cities are distinguished according to the objects in 
which they seek their final satisfaction, that is to say those they wish to 
“enjoy” for their own sake, above all else, to the pursuit of which their 
other concerns are subordinated.  The citizens of the heavenly city 
                                                 
92City of God, Book XIX, c. 17 (emphasis added). 
93I recognize that my argument here relies upon a contested interpretation of Augustine’s 
understanding of the earthly peace and the church’s reliance upon the state’s coercion to 
maintain peace.  Augustine endorses the church’s reliance on the state’s coercive power 
in the early sections of the City of God.  And as Gregory notes, “[i]t is a sad fact that 
Augustine’s willingness to use political might to lovingly ‘correct’ religious opponents 
has frequently been pressed into the service of paternalist politics and love crusades of 
different kinds.” Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 16.  But I am arguing from the 
more limited framework that Augustine establishes primarily in Book XIX.  Importantly, 
I am not offering a defense of the internal coherence of the City of God (and, in 
particular, whether Augustine’s endorsement of coercion against heretics is superseded 
by his account of peace in Book XIX).  Rather, I am using Augustine’s text as a starting 
point for a framework for assembly.  Cf. ibid., 10 (“[W]hat Augustine actually meant 
does not settle the normative question of what a modern Augustinian thinker . . . ought to 
believe about liberal democracy.  On any point where Augustine’s statements prove 
unacceptable, incomplete, or ambiguous, his intellectual descendents are free to amend 
them; and the improved theory need not take the form of a revisionist account of what 
Augustine really meant or would have meant.”).   
94City of God, Book XVIII, c. 54.  
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recognise no object worth of such ultimate allegiance but God; the citizens 
of the earthy city prefer some lower good.95  
 
These differences are theological because misconceiving of proper ends and purposes 
converts goods into gods.  Augustine sees this clearly.  Because the heavenly city 
worships one God and the earthly city recognizes many gods, “it has come to pass that 
the two cities could not have common laws of religion.”96  For this reason: 
[T]he heavenly city has been compelled in this matter to dissent, and to 
become obnoxious to those who think differently, and to stand the brunt of 
their anger and hatred and persecutions.97  
 
Although Augustine directs his critique against Roman polytheism, it remains applicable 
in contemporary American society, which also recognizes many gods in its earthly goods.  
Powell brings this contemporary critique sharply into focus: “A society resting on liberal 
premises is literally incapable of engaging in true worship: any religious exercises under 
the auspices of a liberal government would necessarily be idolatrous and grounds for 
Christian dissent, not Christian approval.”98  The orientation of government in the earthly 
city also explains why the efforts of some “ambitious theocrats” to baptize aspects of 
American government with religious language and symbolism are theologically 
misguided.  As Powell writes: 
[T]he professions of carefully “nonsectarian” religious belief that 
permeate American government—the national motto “In God We Trust,” 
the prayer at the opening of the legislature, the “God bless you” at the end 
                                                 
95Markus, Saeculum, History, and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, 67-68. 
96City of God, Book XIX, c. 17.   
97Ibid., (emphasis added).    
98Powell, “The Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic,” 91.  Cf. Gregory, Politics and the 
Order of Love, 381 (“[I]n the precise Augustinian sense, the logic of modern culture does 
insist on perpetual enjoyment, even of liberal democracy.”).   
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of the official speech—ought to provoke Christian outrage.  Rather than 
greeting these expressions of American “civic religion” with a kind of 
relief, as though they were a welcome reminder of some underlying 
equation of the United States and the biblical city on the hill, Christians 
should view them as objectionable, an attempt to manipulate public 
sentiment that is as cynical as it is essentially blasphemous.  We need to 
educate politicians who are practicing Christians about their Christian duty 
not to engage in this type of profanity.99    
 
Because no earthly government can recognize the true purposes and limitations of earthly 
goods, an Augustinian assembly must always offer a dissenting voice flowing from its 
knowledge of the ultimate good.  Thus, as Thomas Smith suggests, “Christian faith does 
more than supply a counternarrative to modernity” but also “imparts a wisdom about the 
wide horizon of human possibility that provides a standard for a countervailing critique 
of political practices, as well as a motive to push against those defects through loving 
service.”100  
 
2.  The Public Assembly 
The Augustinian distinction between the two cities means that the church, insofar 
as it reflects the heavenly city, exists as its own public and political space.  For 
Augustine, the church’s public nature derives flows out of its reimagining of the 
relationship between polis and oikos: 
Since, then, the house ought to be the beginning or element of the city, and 
every beginning bears reference to some end of its own kind, and every 
element to the integrity of the whole of which it is an element, it follows 
plainly enough that domestic concord of domestic obedience and domestic 
rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and civic 
rule.101   
                                                 
99Powell, “The Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic,” 91. 
100Smith, “The Glory and Tragedy of Politics,” 204.    
101City of God, Book XIX, c. 16. 
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Reinhard Hütter traces this redefinition of polis and oikos to the New Testament: 
One way to show that the church is a public in its own right in distinction 
from the polis is to draw upon the ‘other’ of the ancient polis, namely the 
oikos or household.  Ephesians 2:19 shows wonderfully how the church 
can be understood as something similar to a polis and to an oikos, though 
not identical with either one: ‘So then you are no longer strangers (xenoi) 
and aliens (paroikoi), but you are citizens (sympolitai) with the saints and 
also members of the household (oikeioi) of God.’  If we take this sentence 
in all its radicality, we have to conclude that the ekklesia explodes the 
framework of antique politics which is precisely built on the strict 
dichotomy between polis and oikos.”102 
 
This “overcoming of the antinomy between oikos and polis”103 creates a new form of 
public, and the church appears “as a reality that is neither polis nor oikos.”104  Thus, as 
Hütter argues, the church is “a public in its own right” that is “a human ‘space’ which is 
constituted by binding teachings, principles, and norms; that makes possible a ‘coming 
together’ for action and interaction; and that creates a common identity and mutual 
accountability.105  The public assembly cannot be defined relative to the state but must 
possess its own public nature: “there is no public without clear visibility, without a 
defining and constituting set of binding convictions, rules, and key practices.”106  
                                                 
102Reinhard Hütter, “The Church as Public: Dogma, Practice, and the Holy Spirit” Pro 
Ecclesia 3 (1994): 354. 
103Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 403. 
104William Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination (New York: T&T Clark, 2002): 86. 
105Hütter “The Church as Public,” 336 and ibid., n.7. 
106Ibid., 349.  Hütter’s recognition of the church as public flows from Arendt’s 
observation that any human space seeking to be public is constituted by defining walls.  
See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1958), 194-99. 
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But Augustine is even more subversive than simply insisting on a public space for 
the church.  As Rowan Williams suggests, Augustine’s argument is “designed to show 
that it is life outside the Christian community which fails to be truly public, authentically 
political.”107  William Cavanaugh elaborates that Augustine insists “that the Empire is not 
public at all because its practices are not oriented toward the worship of God.”108  
Instead: 
A true res publica is based on justice, which must include giving God his 
due sacrifice, for only when God is loved can there be love of others and a 
mutual acknowledgement of right.  According to Augustine, the true 
public thing is thus constituted by the Eucharist, which offers true sacrifice 
to God and makes the Church into Christ’s body.109 
 
For Augustine, the heavenly city is “social” and the earthly city is “private.”110  The 
earthly city is ordered to a love of self and can be neither social nor a “public thing”: 
[W]here there is not this righteousness whereby the one supreme God 
rules the obedient city according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none 
but Him, and whereby, in all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul 
consequently rules the body and reason the vices in the rightful order, so 
that, as the individual just man, so also the community and people of the 
just, live by faith, which works by love, that love whereby man loves God 
as He ought to be loved and his neighbour as himself—there, I say, there 
is not an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right 
and by a community of interests.111   
 
                                                 
107Rowan Williams, “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God” Milltown 
Studies 19/20 (1987): 58. 
108Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination: 90. 
109Ibid. 
110Augustine, “The Literal Meaning of Genesis,” Book XI, c. 15, quoted in Kristen Deede 
Johnson, Theology, Political Theory, and Pluralism (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 161. 
111City of God, Book XIX, c. 23. 
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  For Augustine, the church as the sociological form of the heavenly city is the true 
public that is also political.  Because the church as public can never be privatized or 
depoliticized, it will always require an engagement with the government that rules the 
earthly city.  Kristen Deede Johnson suggests that this Augustinian perspective may 
remedy liberalism’s “problematic . . . failure to provide the space and the means for 
interactions between the different particularities that coincide in contemporary political 
society.”112   According to Johnson: 
[The Augustinian] reminder of the one-time public nature of the Church 
can help us pause for a moment to remember that, by definition, “public” 
can refer to any community or group of people united by a common 
interest or good.  It need not refer only to a nation or a state, or to the 
explicitly political realm of nations and states.  This means, for example, 
that a people united by worship of God can be considered a public just as 
much as a people united by a common national allegiance.  Throughout its 
history and tradition, Christianity has been conceived, by both its 
participants and its opponents, as communal, social, and public at its very 
core.  It is only recently, under liberalism, that it has distanced itself from 
its communal embodiment to become more a matter of private faith and 
belief.  Such a transformation has surely impacted not only Christianity 
but many other constituencies within western liberal societies who have 
reduced their communal claims in order to exist as “private” entities, 
coming together in the public realm of liberalism as almost anonymous 
entities.113  
 
The church thus errs when it allows itself to be seen as either part of the state or as one of 
many associations relegated to a privatized civil society.114  In both of these cases, the 
                                                 
112Johnson, Theology, Political Theory, and Pluralism, 257.  Johnson continues that: 
“Christians themselves have acquiesced to the definitions and parameters provided to 
them by liberalism.  By allowing themselves to be positioned and trained by the language 
and practices of liberalism, they have lost the imaginative power to picture other 
possibilities that are rooted in the language and practices of Christianity.”  Ibid. 
113Ibid., 257-58. 
114Cavanaugh cautions that “[m]any attempts at salvaging the ‘public’ nature of 
Christianity proceed by carving out a space for the church in civil society, a supposed 
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church is positioned by other than its own theological framework.  Wannenwetsch offers 
a corrective: “In its very existence as worshipping community, the Church stands for the 
limitation of state and society which these themselves cannot provide.”115   
 
3.  The Expressive Assembly 
The final aspect of assembly that I wish to highlight through an Augustinian 
framework is the assembly as a form of expression rather than a means of expression.  
Unlike the first two characteristics I have discussed, this one isn’t explicit in Augustine’s 
theology or epistemology but is superimposed by reading him through the lenses of 
Wittgenstein, MacIntyre, and Hauerwas.116  But it is, I think, a philosophically coherent 
interpretation that flows out of an Augustinian account of assembly.117   Indeed, reading 
Augustine in this light exposes the incoherence of conceiving of the Augustinian 
assembly as an “expressive association” that is only instrumentally valuable to more 
                                                                                                                                                 
sphere of free participation that stands independent of the state.”  Cavanaugh, 
Theopolitical Imagination, 6. 
115Wannenwetsch, Political Worship, 245.  Cf. Cavanaugh, “One City or Two,” 310. 
116See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscome (New 
York: Macmillan, 1953); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).  See also the various citations to 
Hauerwas in these notes.  On the connections between Wittgenstein and Augustine, see 
Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics, 30-34.  It is important to recognize the 
influence of these three thinkers on the argument that I am making.  Christopher Insole 
helpfully cautions against the urge to construe Augustine’s heavenly city as a “set of 
practices or dramatic performances” and “thus crediting Augustine for anticipating the 
work of Alisdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas, with their interest in virtuous 
practices within tradition-guided frameworks.”  Christopher J. Insole, “Discerning the 
Theopolitical: A Response to Cavanaugh’s Reimagining of Political Space,” Political 
Theology 7 (2006): 332-333.   
117My description of the expressive assembly also bears some affinity with Augustine’s 
hermeneutics and epistemology in On Christian Doctrine.  
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primary modes of expression.118  The expressive message of the Augustinian assembly is 
found not only in the words it utters but also in its very act of gathering and the ways in 
which its members relate to one another, to outsiders, and to God.  
We glimpse the inherent expressiveness of assembly in Augustine’s discussion of 
sign (signum), thing (res), and sacrament (sacramentum).  He writes in On Christian 
Doctrine: 
All instruction is either about things or about signs; but things are learnt 
by means of signs. I now use the word “thing” in a strict sense, to signify 
that which is never employed as a sign of anything else: for example, 
wood, stone, cattle, and other things of that kind.  Not, however, the wood 
which we read Moses cast into the bitter waters to make them sweet, nor 
the stone which Jacob used as a pillow, nor the ram which Abraham 
offered up instead of his son; for these, though they are things, are also 
signs of other things.119  
 
Signs point to things.  But not every sign is of equal importance:  
[A]t the present time, after that the proof of our liberty has shone forth so 
clearly in the resurrection of our Lord, we are not oppressed with the 
heavy burden of attending even to those signs which we now understand, 
but our Lord Himself, and apostolic practice, have handed down to us a 
few rites in place of many, and these at once very easy to perform, most 
majestic in their significance, and most sacred in the observance; such, for 
example, as the sacrament of baptism, and the celebration of the body and 
blood of the Lord. And as soon as any one looks upon these observances 
he knows to what they refer, and so reveres them not in carnal bondage, 
but in spiritual freedom.120  
 
                                                 
118Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
119Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Book I, c. 2.2. Augustine continues: “There are 
signs of another kind, those which are never employed except as signs: for example, 
words. No one uses words except as signs of something else; and hence may be 
understood what I call signs: those things, to wit, which are used to indicate something 
else.”  Ibid. 
120Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Book III, c. 9.13. 
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The church is thus to be concerned first and foremost with “sacred signs,” or “visible 
sacraments.”121  Pier Franco Beatrice highlights the scope of sacramentum for Augustine: 
Augustine uses sacramentum of such diverse cultic realities as baptism 
and Eucharist and the annual commemorations of the mysteries of Christ, 
that is, the feasts of the liturgical year.  In general, he uses the word for all 
the rites connected with the instruction of the catechumens and 
competentes, as for example, the sign of the cross, the salt, the 
insufflations and exorcisms, the tunics of animal skin trodden as a sign of 
repentance, the bows of the head, the traditio of the creed and the Lord’s 
Prayer, the putting off of shoes and the donning of linen, and, furthermore, 
for the Easter octave of the neophytes, public or private penance, the 
laying on of hands, reconciliation, Lent, the Lord’s Prayer, and the 
marriage bond.122  
 
These sacraments constitute the very nature of the church.  As Emmanuel Cutrone 
suggests, for Augustine “[t]he body of Christ is one with the church, and to that extent the 
sacraments are signs of, and one with, the church.” 123  Indeed, Augustine writes in 
Against Faustus: “[T]here can be no religious society, whether the religion be true or 
false, without some sacrament or visible symbol to serve as a bond of union.  The 
importance of these sacraments cannot be overstated, and only scoffers will treat them 
lightly.”124   
                                                 
121Augustine, City of God, Book 10, c. 5.  Markus notes the significance of Augustine’s 
“definition of sacramentum in terms of signum.”  Robert A. Markus, “St. Augustine on 
Signs,” Phronesis 2 (1957): 60. 
122Pier Franco Beatrice, “Christian Worship,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, eds. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1999), 158.  Beatrice continues that: “Augustine also uses sacramentum to refer to 
parables, biblical figures, the mystical meaning of numbers, the typologies of the Old 
Testament, and, in short, all the mysteries hidden beneath a sacral exterior, every 
externally perceptible reality whose true meaning is known to faith.”  Ibid. 
123Emmanuel J. Cutrone, “Sacraments,” in Augustine through the Ages, 745.  Cf. ibid., 
743 (“It is not possible to separate Christ from the church and the sacraments, because 
both the church and the sacraments come from Christ.”). 
124Augustine, Against Faustus, Book 19, c. 11, quoted in ibid., 741.  
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The centrality of sacrament to the church’s expression means that a “political 
dimension” is “embedded in the quite normal give and take of activity in congregational 
worship.”125  In Hauerwas’s well-known phrase, “the church does not have, but rather is, 
a social ethic.”126  The practices of the church convey more about its message than 
foundationalist appeals to doctrine.  As Wannewetsch elaborates, these practices are an 
ongoing activity: 
The fact that the practice is bound to repetition makes it impossible to 
identify a foundational claim that is somehow derived from its essence; for 
the knowledge of such an essence would actually make the constitutive 
character of the Church’s worship superfluous, this constitutive character 
being the fact that men and women have to attend and participate in it 
again and again, so as to practise at the proper place what Barth calls “the 
art of correct asking about God’s will.”127  
 
This means that ethics must “spring from” worship, and worship is “in the fullest sense a 
form of life.”128  As Augustine writes in The City of God: “This is the sacrifice of 
Christians: we, being many, are one body in Christ.  And this is also the sacrifice which 
the Church continually celebrates in the sacrament of the altar, known to the faithful, in 
which she teaches that she herself is offered in the offering she makes to God.”129  The 
                                                 
125Wannenwetsch, Political Worship, 8. 
126Stanley Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1977), 143. 
127Wannenwetsch, Political Worship, 3.  Cf. ibid. (“The practical experience of worship 
continually impresses on the Church that it cannot simply ‘possess’ its own ethic, in the 
sense that it could also apply that ethic to an external field of action, as something it ‘has’ 
and over which it can dispose.  Its ethical knowledge will always be available to it only in 
the mode of ‘being’, embodied in its own praxis.  And the exemplary mode of this 
incorporation is simply the complex celebration of worship, which integrates the different 
aspects of living.”). 
128Ibid., 2, 5. 
129Augustine, City of God, Book X, c. 6. 
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sacraments of the church are signs pointing to Christ, and in this way the church’s 
political life is always a form of theological expression. 
  
D.  RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY 
Having sketched a theological framework for the dissenting, public, and 
expressive assembly, I turn now to considering some of its implications in American 
constitutional law.  The boundary formed by my Augustinian account of the dissenting, 
public, and expressive assembly matches the boundary that I have justified in previous 
chapters from a liberal constitutional perspective.  In other words, I believe that Christian 
practices understood in the Augustinian sense that I have described can flourish within 
the constitutional framework of assembly.130  I turn now to some of the practical effects 
of that framework.   
The strong presumption in favor of group autonomy that I articulated in the last 
chapter would protect the membership, hiring, educational, and worship practices of 
groups.  This view of assembly extends beyond the strictures of Augustinian Christianity 
to endorse the Court’s decisions permitting the Mormons to terminate the employment of 
a building engineer not in good standing with their church131 and the Amish to disregard 
compulsory school attendance laws in the interests of protecting their children from 
                                                 
130Moreover, it can do so without needing to rely on an “institution-sensitive doctrine” 
that distinguishes between groups like churches and the Boy Scouts.  For an institution-
sensitive approach, see Richard W. Garnett, “Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches 
(Just) Like the Boy Scouts?” St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 22 (2007): 515-33. 
131Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).  
 309 
worldly influences.132  Conversely, this kind of assembly challenges the Court’s 
curtailment of peaceable but unpopular activities like Mormon polygamy133 and the use 
of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies.134     
At the same time, an Augustinian conception of assembly does not provide a 
comprehensive solution to the problems plaguing the First Amendment’s religion clause 
jurisprudence.  Its focus on the internal practices of groups manifesting a political form 
apart from the state has little to say about concerns raised by Swaine’s ambitious 
theocrats.  Arguments for a return of prayer in public schools, the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in courtrooms, the display of nativity scenes on public property, or the 
inclusion of creation science in educational curricula will find no refuge in the right of 
assembly—they fall beyond the questions of group autonomy encompassed by assembly.  
Nor does assembly resolve claims about wholly individualistic religious beliefs (perhaps 
akin to the kind of transcendentalism to which the Court alluded in Yoder) that have 
nothing to do with the shared practices of a group.   
Finally, although a more nuanced concept of assembly might provide guidance for 
cases involving the use or denial of public funds or resources, the assembly that I have 
sketched here does not address those situations.  It does not resolve questions of “equal 
access” to public property or funding.135  Nor does it answer questions of entitlement to 
                                                 
132Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
133Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
134Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
135See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 
(1993) (showing of Christian film on school grounds after normal school hours); 
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1994) (use of general student funds 
by student-run Christian publication); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 538 
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unemployment benefits or tax exemptions.136  It may be that some or all of these matters 
can appeal to other aspects of the First Amendment, but they lie beyond the concern of 
the right of assembly.   
The case that comes closest to the line that I have drawn with assembly is City of 
Boerne v. Flores, in which the Court intimated that the City’s denial of a permit to St. 
Peter Catholic Church to enlarge its building within a designated “historic district” was 
subject only to rational basis scrutiny.137  The extent to which the denial of the building 
permit would have infringed upon the assembly of the church is not clear to me from the 
Court’s opinion.  But it is possible that limiting the scope of the church’s private property 
would restrict religious expression in a way qualitatively different than the denial of 
access to public funds or resources.  
It is apparent, then, that my Augustinian conception of assembly is limited in 
scope and will not satisfy all religious adherents.  I have only gestured at how and why 
the framework of the dissenting, public, and expressive assembly might help sharpen 
debates within and among political theory and theological politics.  Yet it may be the case 
that assembly offers a possibility that is neither political liberalism nor theocratic 
hegemony.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. 98 (2000) (use of public school facilities for Christian instruction after normal 
school hours).  
136See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (addressing entitlement to unemployment 
benefits by Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays); Bob Jones 
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding denial of tax exemption to 
private educational institutions with religiously based racially discriminatory policies).   
137City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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Conclusion 
The preceding pages have traced the history of the constitutional protections 
accorded to groups, beginning with the freedom of assembly in the Bill of Rights and 
culminating with what I have characterized as a weak right of association that emerged in 
the middle of the twentieth century.  The declension narrative that I have offered is not 
easily explained.  If, as one commentator has suggested, “an association is merely an 
assembly dispersed over time and space,”138 then it would seem that the constitutional 
protections of groups would only have grown with an increased focus on the right of 
association. But assembly and association are concepts shaped by particular frameworks 
and histories.  I have argued that the history of assembly in the United States recognizes 
the political character of the dissenting, public, and expressive group.  Association, in 
contrast, has lost sight of these attributes by drawing upon shifting justifications during 
its development over the past fifty years: first a pluralism that emphasized consensus and 
stability, then the penumbras of the First Amendment that linked association to privacy, 
and, most recently, a tenuous elevation of intimacy over expressivism.  The result has 
been a highly malleable doctrine that arbitrarily extends constitutional protection to some 
groups and denies it to others, thus weakening the indispensable liberal value of group 
autonomy, which in robust form provides one of the most effective limits to state power. 
                                                 
138C. Edwin Baker, "Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech," UCLA Law 
Review 25 (1978): 1032.  
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One way to challenge the current state of affairs is to return to the concept of 
assembly.  The right of assembly—at least as it was originally conceived in the early part 
of our nation’s history—protects the members of a group based not upon their principles 
or politics but simply by virtue of their coming together in an alternative way of life.139  
By itself, of course, this definition is as flimsy as that of association.   Because the state 
determines the kinds of practices that are “inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite 
to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government 
and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means,” the interests of the state always trump the 
right of assembly.140  But an emphasis on the right of assembly and the kinds of 
unpopular, renegade, and even dangerous gatherings that have sought refuge in that right 
reminds us of the importance of resisting all but the rarest of encroachments upon an 
assembled people.  This caution is obscured in the shifting theoretical and jurisprudential 
justifications of association, which have too easily permitted incursions into group 
autonomy.  
                                                 
139The growth of online social networks like Facebook and MySpace raises important 
sociological and philosophical questions about what it means to be part of a group.  There 
is in the virtual world more diversity, fluidity, and expression than ever before.  But 
whether this virtual space falls within the auspices of constitutional protection remains to 
be seen.  As the virtual world becomes graphically and interactively more “life-like,” the 
relationships that we form “in-world” (to borrow a term from the burgeoning online 
game, Second Life) raise new questions about the nature of groups and the protections 
that should be extended to them (questions like what constitutes membership in an online 
group, what counts as exit or renunciation of membership, and when virtual group 
activities transgress the boundaries of permissible conduct). 
140Whitney v. California, 371.  Even Brandeis’s response to the Whitney majority 
acknowledged this reality.  He wrote that “[t]he fact that speech is likely to result in some 
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression,” but he 
intimated that restraints will be warranted when there is “the probability of serious injury 
to the State.”  Ibid., 378.  
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One eminently practical way to challenge the weakened right of association is to 
raise the freedom of assembly as an independent constitutional claim in First Amendment 
litigation.  Rather than relying solely on the freedom of association or an ambiguous 
conglomeration of other First Amendment freedoms, future litigants in appropriate cases 
might argue in the alternative the right of peaceable assembly.  Although it is possible 
that courts would conclude that the freedom of assembly is an antiquated precursor to the 
freedom of association,141 it would be unprecedented for a judicially constructed right 
completely to subsume an a right enumerated in the text of the Constitution.  Moreover, 
the Court’s previous decisions maintain an ambiguous link between assembly and 
association that falls short of equating the two concepts.  On the other hand, if courts 
were expressly to recognize the continued importance of the freedom of assembly, then 
they would need to craft a doctrinal framework and outline the relationship of assembly 
to other First Amendment freedoms.   
My argument for an express recognition of assembly does not come without a 
price.  It calls into question the doctrinal soundness of the Warren Court decisions that 
shut down the racial discrimination of private organizations, decisions whose results are 
now almost universally regarded as morally commendable.  It weakens Roberts, a 
consequence that many would view as unhealthy to a liberal society.  But what is at stake 
in the right of people to express together in both word and action beliefs and views that 
differ from those held by the state is the autonomy from the state that liberalism 
ostensibly defends.  This is the case even when those views are morally repugnant to or 
                                                 
141Cf. Rishe, "Freedom of Assembly," 317  (“To refer to [association] as a new freedom 
would be amiss for it is only a further development of the freedom of assembly so plainly 
stated in the first amendment.”). 
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threaten a liberal democratic vision.  By losing touch with our past recognition of the 
freedom of assembly and the groups that have embodied it, we risk embracing too easily 
an attenuated right of association that cedes to the state control over what kinds of groups 
are acceptable in the democratic experiment.  Democracy and stability may be easier in 
the short-term, but in forgetting the freedom of assembly, we forget the kind of politics 
that has brought us this far.   
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